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This dissertation explores the extent to which policy alleviates or exacerbates labor market risks 
borne by workers looking at three different policies: Right-to-Work (RTW) laws, disability insurance, and 
state-level minimum wages. 
My first chapter examines impact of state RTW laws using Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data. Employing a state fixed effects model and a Synthetic Control design focusing on Wisconsin’s 
RTW legislation, I find that RTW laws are associated with sizeable increases in public sector free riding 
by union covered workers and considerable decreases in private sector union membership and coverage.  
RTW laws also substantially decrease private sector employer health insurance contributions and 
marginally reduce private sector wages. Given the role that union decline has had increasing worker 
precarity, it appears that RTW laws exacerbate labor market risks for workers. 
My second chapter examines the impacts of changes to disability insurance eligibility in the 
United Kingdom using an individual fixed effects model and data from the United Kingdom Household 
Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) and the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). Increased reassessment 
using more stringent eligibility criteria at the local level is associated with a higher probability of 
disability receipt.  However, my findings are suggestive of policy spillover effects, wherein individuals 
assigned to work-conditioned benefits seek out other benefits. While relatively well-targeted, this reform 
created temporary financial uncertainty for a vulnerable population and induced those assigned to work-
conditioned benefits to find other methods of support. 
 
 iv 
My third chapter employs the American Community Survey (ACS) data and a Quadruple 
Difference (DDDD) model to examine the compositional effects of state minimum wage increases, 
specifically on the rates of self-employment within occupations. A state minimum wage increase is 
associated with a decrease in self-employment, particularly unincorporated self-employment within low-
wage occupations with flexible work hours. Self-employed workers are induced into hired employment 
when the wage they can expect to earn from hired employment matches or exceeds expected earnings in 
self-employment. Therefore the minimum wage, in allowing for workers to select into work arrangements 
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This dissertation explores the extent to which policy alleviates or exacerbates labor market risks 
borne by workers looking at three very different policies in different contexts: Right-to-Work laws, 
disability insurance (specifically tightening disability insurance eligibility in the United Kingdom as part 
of a broader active labor market policy mix), and state-level minimum wages.  
Chapter 1 uses recent policy variation to identify the impact of state RTW laws on wages, 
benefits, free riding, union membership and union coverage among private and public sector workers, 
using Current Population Survey (CPS) data. Using CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
(ASEC) data, I find that RTW laws are associated with a 54.2% increase in public sector free riding and a 
23.6% reduction in private sector union membership. RTW passage is associated with a 22.2% decrease 
in private sector union coverage, which suggests that RTW laws influence the decisions of not only 
individual workers but also union leaders. Whereas RTW laws have no impact on the union wage 
premium (additional earnings associated with union membership), there is a ‘benefit premium’ (measured 
by employer health insurance contributions): employer contributions for union members remain the same 
following the passage of a RTW law, whereas covered workers’ contributions decrease.  I further study 
Wisconsin’s experience with RTW using a Synthetic Control design and CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups 
(ORGS) data. Wisconsin enacted RTW for public sector workers in 2011 and for private sector workers 
in 2015, though its 2011 legislation contained other provisions that were likely to negatively affect unions 
in general.  I find the 2011 legislation reduced Wisconsin’s public sector union membership by 28.4% and 
union coverage by approximately 28.7% over the 2011-2017 period. The 2015 RTW law is associated 
with a reduction in Wisconsin’s private sector union membership of approximately 38% and union 
coverage of approximately 40% over the 2015-2018 period. Given the role that union decline has had in 
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increasing inequality and stagnating wages, it appears that RTW laws serve to exacerbate labor market 
risks for workers. 
Chapter 2 examines the impacts of changes to disability insurance eligibility using the UK’s 
recent experience with the Work Capability Assessment (WCA), a more stringent metric for assessing 
disability eligibility than its predecessor.  Using an individual fixed effects model and Special License 
data from the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) as well as Department of Work 
and Pensions (DWP), this paper identifies the effects of tightened disability insurance eligibility on labor 
market and benefit enrollment outcomes among people with long-term disabilities. Contrary to the 
Government’s stated policy goals as well as widespread media reporting of people losing their benefits, I 
find that increased reassessment using more stringent eligibility criteria at the local level is associated 
with a higher probability of individual disability receipt and no change in labor force participation.  
However, my findings are suggestive of policy spillover effects, wherein individuals assigned to benefits 
with work conditions seek out other benefits. Thus while these reforms did not push an entire population 
of vulnerable people into the labor market, they created a great deal of uncertainty for people around their 
livelihoods and induced those assigned work-conditioned benefits to search out other sources of support. 
Chapter 3 considers the effects of state minimum wage increases on labor supply: specifically 
self-employment within occupations. Previous empirical work on the minimum wage has examined its 
potential impacts on unemployment, however there may be other consequences for workers that cannot be 
observed in unemployment insurance rolls. What is the impact of a minimum wage increase on the share 
of self-employment? This chapter employs the American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2000-2017 
and a Quadruple Difference (DDDD) model to examine the compositional effects of state minimum wage 
increases, specifically on the rates of unincorporated and incorporated self-employment within 
occupations. The results indicate that a state minimum wage increase is associated with a decrease in self-
employment, particularly unincorporated self-employment within low-wage occupations with flexible 
work hours. While self-employment can confer higher wages and greater control for some workers, it is 
also associated with greater wage volatility and a lack of benefits and labor protections. I theorize that 
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workers consider both the earnings from self-employment and hired employment as well as the relative 
risk of each type of work. Workers previously classified as self-employed are induced into hired 
employment when the wage they can expect to earn from hired employment matches or exceeds expected 
earnings in self-employment. Therefore the minimum wage, in allowing for workers to select into work 
arrangements that are inherently less risky, may present another policy lever for reducing the labor market 









CHAPTER 1: THE RIGHT-TO-WORK OR THE RIGHT-TO-FREE RIDE? THE IMPACTS OF 
U.S. RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS ON WAGES, FREE RIDING, AND UNIONIZATION  
Economists have suggested for several decades that labor unions, in offering public goods to their 
members and nonmembers who enjoy union coverage, suffer from a free rider problem. The National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935, also known as the Wagner Act, gave employees the right to join a labor 
union, the right to collectively bargain, and the right to go on strike. This legislation required that union-
covered members and non-members must receive equal application of contract terms, however it also 
allowed for union security agreements, such that workers covered by union arrangements either join their 
union or contribute to the costs of collective bargaining by paying some portion of union dues. 
 The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, more commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 
allowed state legislatures to prohibit union security agreements but maintained the requirement for equal 
application of contract terms between union members and nonmembers. This type of legislation is 
commonly called Right-to-Work (RTW) legislation. Consequently, employees in union-covered sectors in 
RTW states are not required to become members of labor unions or pay dues to a union in order to receive 
the benefits a union provides.  
 Because union members and covered nonmembers alike receive union negotiated contracts, 
contract agreements made between firms and unions are public goods: the benefits of these arrangements 
cannot be withheld from nonmembers or non-contributors, and the benefits enjoyed by one worker do not 
preclude another worker from enjoying those same benefits.  
Insofar as a union-set wage is a public good that is applied to a union-covered sector or firm 
regardless of an employee’s union status, free riding may occur in the absence of arrangements requiring 
the payment of dues or fees by those who receive union benefits. Individuals, considering the costs of 
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joining a union against the likelihood that there are no additional economic benefits to being a member, 
may opt to not join a union.  
This paper focuses on whether RTW laws create (or exacerbate) free rider problems for unions. 
While other authors have attempted to identify a free rider problem in unions, this paper focuses more 
directly on the extent to which RTW laws induce free riding in unions and consequentially result in a 
decline of union membership. This paper takes advantage of recent variation in RTW laws and a state 
fixed effects model to address issues of time-invariant omitted variable bias. It also looks at both private 
and public sectors, whereas the vast majority of the literature has only focused on the private sector. 
After a summary of the literature on RTW laws, free riding, and union wages, I discuss research 
questions and hypotheses and lay out the data and methods used. I then discuss the results of various 
industry-level and state-level fixed effects models and a synthetic control design.  The results suggest that 
RTW laws result in reduced worker benefits, union membership and union coverage, but the effect of 
RTW laws on free riding remains ambiguous and sector-dependent. I find that RTW laws are associated 
with approximately a 23% decline in private sector union membership and a 22% decline in private sector 
coverage, as well as an increase in free riding among public sector workers by 54%. While RTW laws 
have no discernable impact on the union wage premium, RTW laws differentially impact union members 
versus covered workers with respect to employer health insurance contributions. Finally, using a 
Synthetic Control design, I estimate that Wisconsin’s RTW provisions are associated with reductions in 
public sector union membership and coverage of approximately 28% and reductions in private sector 
union membership and coverage of approximately 40%; these results suggest that declining unionization 







Literature Review and Conceptual Framework  
As can be seen in Figure 1.1, there are 27 RTW states,1 largely in the Southeast and the West, the 
majority of which became RTW in the 1940s and 1950s, although some states passed RTW legislation 
following renewed interest in RTW laws in the 1970s and 1990s (NCSL, n.d.). Indiana expanded its RTW 
provisions from just public school employees to all employees in the state in 2012, and Michigan and 
Wisconsin became RTW states in 2013 and 2015,2 respectively (ibid). In early 2017, Kentucky and 
Missouri became the most recent states to pass RTW legislation, however Missouri’s RTW legislation 
was overturned by a state referendum in November 2017.3 RTW legislation was passed in West Virginia 
in February 2016 and was effective in July 2016, followed by an injunction in August 2016. After a 
prolonged court challenge by unions, the law went into effect in October, 2017 following a decision by 
the West Virginia Supreme Court. Most recently, in late April 2019, the Supreme Court stayed a February 
2019 judgment by a Kanawha County circuit judge, who had struck down portions of the legislation.4 
 RTW laws indicate that a state has declared its authority to determine whether workers can be 
required to join a labor union to get or keep a job. In most cases, this means that all employees in the state 
are not obliged to join a union, however in the case of Indiana before 2012, this was only true for public 
sector teachers. RTW bills were introduced in sixteen states in 2014, five states in 2015, and fourteen 
states in 2016; and in February 2017, Representative Steve King (R-IA-4) introduced H.R. 785 - National 
Right-to-Work Act, which would establish a RTW law at the national level (he has introduced the same 
legislation in previous years). And in June 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Janus v. AFSCME that 
                                               
1 The 27 states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
2 Wisconsin had prohibited union security agreements for public sector workers in 2011. Its 2015 legislation 
expanded the prohibition to private sector workers. 
3 Consequentially, Missouri is not considered a treated state in this study and is excluded from regressions. 
4 West Virginia is included in the sample and is considered a treated state in 2018, however I run all regressions 
without West Virginia as a robustness check. I also run all regressions with West Virginia considered treated from 
2016, when its RTW law was passed. The results are unchanged. 
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public sector unions cannot charge fees to employees who decline to join a union but are covered by its 
collective bargaining agreement (agency fees), a blow to public sector unions in the United States. The 
Janus ruling particularly underscores some of the implications of this paper, as this analysis focuses on 
both private and public sector union members and covered workers. 
 There have been counter-efforts by unions and Democrats to preempt RTW legislation. In May 
2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S. 2810, the “Workplace Democracy Act,” which would 
nationally repeal RTW laws. Although the bill had little chance for success in the Republican-controlled 
Senate, 18 fellow Democrats co-sponsored the bill. Finally, the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (or 
PRO Act), introduced in 2019, would abolish state RTW laws, requiring the payment of agency fees in 
addition to other provisions expanding worker bargaining. 
RTW Laws and Unions 
RTW proponents argue that RTW policies result in increased employment and economic growth, 
however opponents argue that RTW policies reduce unionization rates and the bargaining power of 
unions, thereby reducing wages, the rate of pension provision, and workplace safety. Reed (2003) 
concludes that RTW states have higher wages, on average, than non-RTW states. However, Shierholz and 
Gould find that in RTW states versus non-RTW states, wages are 3.2% lower, and the rate of employer-
sponsored pensions is 4.8 percentage points lower (2011)5. Eren and Ozbeklik (2015) observe no effects 
of Oklahoma’s passage of a RTW law on employment or average private sector wages using a Synthetic 
Control design. Using an industry and year fixed effects model, Roberts and Habans find that RTW laws 
reduce private sector hourly wages by 1%, however they note that this effect is correlated with state 
development and regulation (2015: 20). They also note differential impact of RTW laws on wages. RTW 
laws: exacerbate gender wage gaps; reduce the wage gap between white and Hispanic workers; 
marginally expand the wage gap between African American and white workers; reduce the difference 
                                               
5 Gould and Kimball update this analysis; after controlling for individual demographic and socioeconomic factors, 
they find that wages in RTW states are 3.1% lower than wages in non-RTW states (2015). 
 
 8 
between workers with degrees and workers with high school diplomas; and reduce the wage premium 
between union members and nonmembers (2015: 19-20). 
 RTW laws are associated with a lower level of union membership (Moore and Newman, 1985; 
Eren and Ozbeklik, 2015), however the reason for this association is unclear. RTW laws may create 
opportunities for free riding, making organization and maintenance of unions costlier, leading to an 
undersupply of union services. Conversely, with increased free riding, RTW laws may lower unions’ 
bargaining power, reducing demand for union services. Both of these explanations identify free riders as 
the mechanism through which RTW laws reduce unionization rates. 
 While authors like Hirsch (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggest RTW laws create free 
riding problems for unions, Davis and Huston find that once controlling for other factors that may 
determine whether someone free rides, the impact of RTW laws on the incidence of free riding—while 
still statistically significant—is smaller in magnitude (1993: 53).6 It may be the case that RTW laws have 
no independent effect on the supply or demand of union services. Rather workers in RTW states have 
tastes and preferences against high unionization (Lumsden and Peterson, 1975; Moore and Newman, 
1985; Sobel, 1995). 
Olson (1965) suggests that, without coercion, unions may offer excludable goods or services to 
their members to encourage employees to join. A good or service is excludable if it is possible to prevent 
people who have not paid for that good or service from having access to it. Much of the literature around 
free riders in labor unions focuses on whether there is a wage premium associated with union membership 
above the wage for a union-covered nonmember. According to the existing literature, a positive wage 
premium would suggest that there is some excludability associated with union-negotiated contracts; in 
other words, the union-negotiated wage cannot be enjoyed without becoming a member and, therefore, 
                                               
6 The authors used an OLS model, which may present biased results if a state’s propensity to pass RTW legislation 
is correlated with union power and influence within that state, factors which one would expect to be correlated with 
rates of free riding. 
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the free rider problem does not exist. Implied in this is that the contract is somehow no longer a public 
good. 
Finding a Wage Premium 
Using national survey data, Jones (1982), Blakemore, Hunt, and Kiker (1986), Sobel (1995), 
Schumacher (1999), Budd and Na (2000), and Eren (2009) find positive wage premiums and conclude 
there are substantial, excludable economic gains to union membership. However, Booth (2004) argues 
that these findings may be driven by a spurious correlation between membership and wages. She and 
Bryan ask, why do non-members in covered sectors refrain from joining a union when the economic gains 
(the wage premium) are so large? (2004: 405). Using UK7 employer-employee linked data, Booth and 
Bryan exploit within-workplace variation in membership and wages of covered nonmembers and find no 
evidence of a wage premium. Non-members in covered sectors refrain from joining unions, because they 
can realize the same wage regardless of membership status. 
 Union members and nonmembers may differ systematically in unobservable characteristics that 
also influence wage, particularly in analyses relying on national survey data, where differences between 
bargaining units and variation of workers within bargaining units cannot be discerned. For example, Budd 
and Na suggest that workers who unionize are more motivated or are more likely to stay with the firm and 
invest in firm-specific human capital (2000: 787). Younger, more temporary workers, consequentially, are 
less likely to join a union, either due to their own preferences or because unions may not target them in 
the same way as other workers. Probationary periods, during which individuals are not required to join a 
union, may result in covered nonmembers appearing to have shorter tenures and lower wages than 
average union members (Jones, 1982).  
 Members may be systematically found in higher paid firms for a few reasons. First, workers may 
be more likely to join where other bargaining structures like multiple union bargaining help unions 
achieve higher wages.  Second, unions may also concentrate their activities in higher-wage firms (Booth 
                                               
7 The institutional arrangements for union membership and provision of union contracts in the United Kingdom are 
essentially the same as non-RTW states in the United States. 
 
 10 
and Bryan, 2004: 404). Third, Chaison and Dhavale (1982) found that lower paid workers are more likely 
to free ride, either because they are less able to afford the cost of union dues or find they benefit less from 
membership (360). Without more detailed data collected at the bargaining level, we cannot be sure that a 
wage premium exists between union members and covered nonmembers within a covered firm.  
 The literature around unions and inequality may prompt us to ask among which groups a wage 
premium should exist. Freeman and Medoff (1980) found that unions in fact compress wages within 
unionized sectors, particularly in manufacturing, and this effect more than offset any dis-equalizing 
effects found between union and non-union workers. Subsequent research such as that by Card, Lemieux, 
and Riddell (2004) attributes falls in unionization with increasing wage inequality, which lends further 
credence to the notion that unions serve to reduce wage premiums rather than create them. 
 Finally, there may be measurement issues associated with union status.8  Jones (1982) suggests 
that there may be greater measurement error associated with union coverage than union membership, 
which would bias the estimated effect of free riding on coverage to zero. Mis-measured union 
membership status would also bias the penalty of free riding towards zero (Schumacher, 1999: 504).  
Does a Positive Wage Premium Indicate an Absence of Free Riding? 
Theoretically, a wage premium of zero is indicative of free riding, because it suggests that the 
benefits of union coverage—or the union-negotiated wage—are non-excludable. However, there should 
be no observable wage premium, because of federal law requiring equal pay between union members and 
nonmembers in a bargaining unit. Setting issues of measurement and omitted variable bias aside, 
Blakemore et al. (1986) suggest that a wage premium may result from discriminatory behavior by a 
union, a firm, or both. Chaison and Dhavale (1992) argue that unions may provide preferential treatment 
to union members, or may convey the impression that they do (360). Budd and Na (2000) note that 
businesses have the incentive to treat members and nonmembers differently, arguing that firms may 
                                               
8 Indeed, measurement error is evident in the sample. The Annual and Social Economic  Supplement (ASEC) of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) imputes values for union status, affecting  approximately 5% of the sample. These 




exploit worker ignorance of bargained contracts by undercutting nonmembers so as to reduce labor costs 
(787). Granted, Booth and Bryan (2004) argue that unions are unlikely to want nonmembers’ wages to be 
undercut, because the firm would then be more likely to substitute cheaper nonmembers for more 
expensive members, eventually reducing union bargaining power (405). 
 Economic theory would suggest that RTW laws damage unions by inducing free riding among 
covered workers. It follows that, if the wage premium is indicative of free riding, RTW laws will reduce 
any wage premium that exists between union members and covered non-members. Robert and Habans 
(2015) find that RTW legislation reduces the wage premium between union members and non-members. 
 However, there may be differential gains between union members and non-members for other, 
unobservable reasons. Farber (1984) posits that, if free riding is the mechanism by which RTW laws 
result in union decline, RTW laws increase the price of unionization, driving down the supply of union 
contracts relative to their demand. Consequentially, workers who are unionized in the absence of a RTW 
law (and who remain unionized in the presence of a RTW law) gain more from unionization than those 
who are not (i.e. the wage premium will be higher in non-RTW states; the analysis in this paper does not 
corroborate this theory). 
 One must also consider that unions may behave differently depending on whether a state is RTW. 
Bennett and Johnson (1980) note that, since workers are required to pay union dues in non-RTW states, 
union leaders may have less of an incentive to provide higher benefits in those states rather than RTW 
states. Unfortunately, this hypothesis was not tested in their study. More generally, there is some evidence 
of a trade-off between wages and premiums, but the literature supports the notion that union strength also 
matters in health insurance contributions. In their study of teachers unions, Clemons and Cutler (2014) 
find that school district employees bear a smaller share of the cost of higher health insurance premiums 
when the union is stronger, with unions negotiating higher contributions as well as compensation. 
Focusing on teachers unions in Illinois, Lubotsky and Olson (2015) acknowledge that a unionized setting 
does not independently imply that the wage-premium trade-off vanishes. This paper addresses questions 
around the effect of RTW laws on benefits through employer health insurance contributions. 
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 If unions or firms were successful in rewarding members or punishing free riders through 
differential wages, a higher wage for members would be observed despite the incidence of free riding or 
RTW legislation. It is empirically challenging if not impossible to observe pure free riding9 in non-RTW 
states; therefore, there is no counterfactual in assessing the ‘true’ impacts of RTW laws on free riding. 
This may be why the wage premium has played such a prominent role in the literature (and in this paper).  
However, the union wage premium, while useful to observe in its own right, may not be the most 
appropriate test of whether covered workers free ride. The wage premium may be a response to the 
phenomenon of free riding (and RTW laws that exacerbate free riding), rather than an indication that free 
riding is or is not occurring. Still, a wage premium remains empirically useful as an indication of whether 
or not there are incentives for covered workers to free ride.  
It is important to note that unions provide other (excludable) benefits to their members, which 
workers may consider in their decision about membership. Unions can also offer excludable benefits such 
as scholarships, life insurance options, legal assistance, training programs, grievance procedures, pension 
advice, unemployment insurance, strike compensation, housing assistance, and rental car discounts that 
may induce potential free riders into joining a union (Bennett and Johnson, 1979; Budd and Na, 2000; 
Booth and Bryan, 2004). Unions can also alter workers’ access to workers’ compensation, as this does not 
stem from the collective bargaining agreement (ibid). The rate of turnover in a firm may influence the 
relative mix of private goods offered by unions: for example, if grievance procedures are only provided to 
members, workers may be more likely to join in the face of high employee turnover (Booth and Bryan, 
2004: 404). 
Bounded Rationality of Actors: Other Considerations 
The literature discussed thus far largely assumes that a prospective union member rationally 
weighs out the tangible benefits of membership versus the costs in member dues (Sobel, 1995). However, 
                                               




workers do not exist in isolation; their behavior is influenced, at least in part, by the actions of others 
(Naylor, 1989). 
 Using CPS data, Chaison and Dhavale (1992) identify characteristics of workers that distinguish 
free riders from union members, including knowledge of available options, preferential treatment of union 
members, the value of reputation, and union consciousness. Regarding information asymmetries, Singer 
(1987, p. 323) claims that “the average resident of right-to-work state is either uninformed or 
misinformed concerning his/her rights,” and as a result, workers may be unaware of the available options 
regarding union membership.10 Chaison and Dhavale (1992) qualify Singer’s point by adding that it 
relates only to residents of right-to-work states, and that workers in unionized establishments or workers 
in general may have greater awareness of the free rider option (359). Awareness and appreciation of 
union achievements may also play a role, as free riders tend to be younger and have lower organizational 
tenure (Chaison and Dhavale, 1982; Jermier et al., 1988). Bennett and Johnson (1979) note that many 
accomplishments once made by unions—such as improved working conditions—are protected by the 
government and therefore may not factor into present-day decisions by workers to unionize. 
 Some authors have also noted the importance of norms of union membership and threat of 
reputational damage of non-membership in union membership decisions, because reputation-conscious 
individuals see utility in the social custom of belonging to a union (Booth, 1985; Naylor, 1989). 
Importantly, proxies for the value of reputation and union consciousness are likely more accurate at the 
bargaining unit level rather than national surveys (Chaison and Dhavale, 1982: 365). However, as 
unionization rates decline, these factors may be less relevant: Chaison and Dhavale posit that generally, 
employees in occupations with lower union density should be less concerned about reputational effects of 
not belonging to a union (1982: 363). 
 Schumacher (1999) makes a related point, finding that sectors with relatively low rates of covered 
nonmembers (free riders) are associated with higher wage premiums than sectors with relatively high 
                                               




rates of covered nonmembers. There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, workers respond 
to the relative benefits provided by a union in the form of higher wages or better workplace rights and 
laws, joining when relative benefits are high. Second, free riders weaken the bargaining position of unions 
through decreased membership and payment of dues, so bargaining power of unions (for both members 
and covered nonmembers) diminishes as free ridership increases. Schumacher concludes that the ability 
of a union to ‘punish’ free riders decreases with the number of free riders (1999: 501). He also observes 
that there has been a decline in the union wage premium in RTW states since the 1980s (1999: 499-500).  
What Type of Free Rider? 
This paper and others identify free riders as workers, who are covered by a union contract but 
who are not members of that union (see Figure 1.2). However, there is some notable heterogeneity 
among free riders. Sobel (1995) makes a theoretical distinction between true free riders—those who 
would join a union if threatened with exclusion—and induced free riders—those who would opt out of 
union membership by finding a nonunion job (348). True free riders value the benefits of union coverage 
more than the cost of becoming a member, whereas induced free riders value union coverage less than the 
cost of membership. 
 The distinction is important regarding RTW laws: if RTW laws were repealed, thereby requiring 
union membership or payment of partial union dues, only the true free riders would become (and remain) 
union members. Therefore, “the extent to which union membership suffers because of RTW laws is 
measured solely by the number of true free riders. The induced riders do not contribute to the undersupply 
of union services. The undersupply of union services is a result of the lost union revenues (and bargaining 
power) from those workers who would join if threatened with exclusion, the true free riders,” (Sobel, 
1995: 348). Thus, the greater the proportion of induced free riders, the less union membership is affected 
by RTW laws. However, any meaningful methodological distinction between induced and true is difficult 
to make. 
 Chaison and Dhavale (1982) briefly discuss agency fees—or the fees paid by nonmembers 
towards the cost of collective bargaining undertaken by the union representing them—and the concept of 
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cheap riders, which is more relevant in non-RTW settings. When agency fees make up a very high 
percentage of member dues, there may be fewer stigmas associated with being a nonmember and less to 
be gained in reputation by being a member but employees may have lower financial incentive to remain 
nonmembers and may opt to join a union (Chaison and Dhavale, 1982: 366). This is corroborated by the 
observation that there are relatively few covered nonmembers in non-RTW states (Schumacher, 1999).  
 Chaison and Dhavale (1982) add that free riders may not be all that bad for unions after all. Free 
riders represent internal organizing opportunities for unions, because their recruitment elicits less 
employer opposition (as the bargaining unit is already unionized) and are relatively easy to reach (355). 
Much of the literature on why workers join unions deals exclusively with decisions made in initial 
campaigns at nonunion facilities, but Chaison and Dhavale (1982) posit that the motives behind voting for 
a union and joining a union in an already organized unit are fundamentally different (356). This analysis 
attempts to deal with this distinction by looking at both union coverage and union membership. 
The Theorized Impacts of Right-to-Work Legislation 
According to existing literature, a substantial wage premium would not be expected for a couple 
reasons. First, the illegality of wage premium; and second, higher rates of free riding are correlated with 
reduced bargaining power of unions (Schumacher, 1999), which would suggest a more limited ability of 
unions to reward members or penalize nonmembers.   
While several papers have found positive wage premiums, the possibility for spurious 
correlations from omitted variables and the likelihood of measurement error suggest that previous 
findings have been biased.  Due to a lack of firm-level data, this paper cannot address all methodological 
issues that hamper previous attempts in quantifying the union wage premium, though I do control for 
relevant confounding variables and include state, year and industry fixed effects. The aforementioned data 
limitations suggest that a wage premium is expected. 
As for the effect of RTW legislation on the wage premium, existing literature would predict that 
RTW laws shift the wage premium towards zero. Acknowledging the possibility that wage differentials 
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between members and non-members may be zero, positive or negative, the predicted direction of this 
effect is ambiguous. Predicted attenuation may also be incorrect;  
reconsidering discussions by Bennet and Johnson (1980), Blakemore et al. (1986), Chaison and Dhavale 
(1992), and Schumacher (1999), there may be (legal) union responses to increased free riding. In a policy 
environment that creates free riding opportunities, unions may be induced to provide exclusive benefits 
(such as additional training or advancement opportunities that result in higher wages) in order to 
incentivize membership, even when union members and covered non-members alike must receive the 
same contract. 
Hypothesis 1: While there is a wage premium between union members and free riders as well as 
between covered workers and non-covered workers, RTW laws have no discernable impact on 
these wage differentials. However, RTW laws differentially affect workers’ employer health 
insurance contributions. 
The ambiguity in predictions outlined above belies the soundness of a wage premium as a reliable 
measure of free riding. I attempt to identify the impact of RTW laws on free riding more directly by 
examining the proportion of free riders among covered workers in a state (i.e. the proportion of workers 
covered by union contracts who are not union members, among all workers covered by a union contract). 
Notably, much of the existing literature has not quantified free riding in this manner at all. Only 
Schumacher (1999) has considered the rate of free riding with respect to RTW laws, though he does not 
attempt to identify a causal impact of RTW laws on free riding. 
Hypothesis 2: RTW laws result in higher rates of free riding among union covered members, as 
workers are no longer required to join a union upon entering a unionized bargaining unit. 
There is clear evidence in existing literature to support the argument that the decline of unions is due in 
part to RTW laws. The below hypothesis seeks to corroborate existing research. 
Hypothesis 3: RTW laws result in decreased state union membership (unionization) rates. 
There are two potential sources for declines in state-level union membership: (1) increased free riding by 
covered workers, or (2) a decline in the number of covered workers within a state. The former represents 
decisions by individual workers, whereas the latter represents decisions by union leaders or employers. 
Unions likely make decisions regarding where to unionize based upon the policy environment and the 
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corresponding tradeoff between organization efforts and likelihood of success.  RTW laws may reduce 
union coverage, as unions facing declining membership are no longer viable and are forced to leave a 
bargaining unit. In addition, there may be a secondary effect of RTW laws on union coverage through the 
preemption of new bargaining contracts between firms and employees. Due to increased maintenance 
costs associated with free riding, union leaders are likely to consider bargaining units in non-RTW states 
more favorably than those in RTW states when selecting bargaining units for prospective union 
arrangements. Conversely, one could argue that RTW legislation inspires renewed or emboldened labor 
efforts in a particular state; for example, labor organizations spent more than $15 million in a successful 
effort to overturn Missouri’s RTW legislation by voter referendum in 2017 (Neuman, 2018). 
Hypothesis 4: RTW laws result in decreased  union coverage.  
It is likely that unions make decisions regarding where to expand their operations based upon either 
demand for union services or the cost to provide such services, both of which are likely to be affected by 
RTW legislation. Ellwood and Fine (1987) find strong short-run reductions in union organizing following 
passage of a RTW law that decays over time (ten or more years out).    All but one of the treated states in 
this sample have passed RTW legislation in 2011 or later, and most recently RTW states have historically 
had higher rates of unionization. I therefore expect to see large effects of RTW legislation on union 
coverage.  
Data 
This paper uses data from the March Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) supplement to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1990 to 2018 for the fixed effects regressions and data from the 
CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups questions (ORGS), or earner study, from 1990 to 2018 for Synthetic 
Control.  
The CPS is a monthly U.S. household survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Households in the CPS are interviewed for four months, excluded for 8 
months, and then interviewed for 4 more months. Households that are interviewed for the fourth month or 
eighth month are asked additional labor questions: the earner study, or ORGS. Households interviewed 
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for the March CPS are asked a wider array of questions, and supplemental inquiries of certain topics have 
been completed for certain time periods. 
Data were extracted from the Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS), a harmonized compilation of over 50 surveys of the American population.11  
 The sample consists of private and public sector wage or salary earners; the sample spans all 50 
states and Washington D.C. Self-employed individuals, unemployed individuals, and those not in the 
labor force are excluded. Those under the age of 16 or above the age of 65 are also excluded, as well as 
individuals whose union status was imputed12 by the Census Bureau. 
The sample is broken down into further subsamples, such as workers covered by a union versus 
all workers, or private sector workers versus public sector workers.  
 The ASEC sample: the individual wage models are comprised of 55,634 (covered workers) and 
363,072 (all workers) observations.13 The sample sizes for the state-level free rider, union membership, 
and union coverage models are 1,400.14 
Used for Synthetic Control, the ORGS sample includes only non-RTW states and Wisconsin. The 
ORGS sample contains 1,712,277 individual observations, collapsed to the state-year level (and stratified 
by public and private sector). Once collapsed to the state-year level, there are 667 state-year observations. 
 The CPS variable, union, indicates whether, for their current job, a respondent is: (a) a member of 
a labor union or employee association similar to a union; (b) not a union member but covered by a union 
or employee association contract; or (c) neither a union member nor covered by a union contract. Union 
                                               
11 For more information, see IPUMS: https://www.ipums.org 
12 Approximately 21,000 observations for the ASEC sample; approximately 169,000 observations in the ORGS 
sample. 
13 The sample sizes for employer health insurance contributions models are 34,024 (covered workers) and 168,090 
(all workers); the sample sizes are smaller than those of the wage models, because employer contribution is 
calculated only for workers who have employment-based insurance. 
14 There are zero-values for some state free riding, unionization, and coverage rates in some years; once logged, 




members are likely to be markedly different from covered nonmembers (free riders) and non-covered 
workers. 
As can be seen in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 (Un-Weighted and Weighted Summary Statistics, 
respectively, using CPS ASEC data), union members are disproportionately male and employed in a 
‘highly unionized industry’15 compared to covered nonmembers or non-covered workers. The higher 
proportion employed in a highly unionized industry underscores the importance of reputation in union 
membership decisions, specifically that reputational damage of free riding is of less concern in work 
places with lower union density (Chaison and Dhavale, 1982). There are more women who are free riders 
than non-covered workers, while the proportion of women who are non-covered workers is seven 
percentage points higher than the proportion of women who are union members (Table 1.2). Union 
members are also slightly older than covered nonmembers and non-covered workers, on average.  Racial 
composition does not appear to vary greatly across union status, though non-covered workers have a 
marginally higher proportion of white workers in comparison to union members and free riders. Though 
union members are slightly more educated than non-covered workers, covered nonmembers appear to 
have more education than union members, on average. Union members and covered workers also have 
more experience in their industry than non-covered workers, and the rate of part-time work is noticeably 
lower among union members and covered non-members than non-covered workers. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, those who are covered by a union contract are paid more than those who are not. Union 
members also earn more than covered non-members; this may be because of a wage premium for being a 
union member or may be due to a range of individual- and firm-level characteristics, as discussed above. 
Union members and covered non-members are substantially more likely to receive insurance from their 
employer than non-covered workers, and union members are approximately nine percentage points more 
likely to receive employment-based insurance than covered non-members (Table 1.2). 
                                               
15 A ‘highly unionized industry’ is an industry among the top-three unionized industries according to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics: Transportation, Telecommunications, and Utilities and Sanitary Services. 
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 Table 1.3 displays rates of union coverage and union membership in RTW states versus Non-
RTW states, decomposing the analysis further by private and public sector workers. As one might expect, 
union coverage and union membership is higher for both the private and the public sector in non-RTW 
states compared to RTW states, though the difference between non-RTW and RTW states is largest in the 
public sector (approximately 30 percentage points). 
Methods 
Primary Analysis 
I examine the impact of RTW laws on five outcomes:16 the natural log of wage and salary 
income, !"#, and the natural log of employer health insurance contributions (conditioned on being the 
policy holder of employment-based insurance),17 $"#  (to test Hypotheses 1a); the natural log of the rate of 
free riders among covered workers in a state, %&#  (to test Hypothesis 2); the natural log of the rate of union 
membership among all workers in a state, '&# (to test Hypothesis 3); and the natural log of the rate of 
union coverage among all workers in a state, (&#  (to test Hypothesis 4). 
 The independent variables of interest are )*!&#  (dummy variable equaling 1 if the state is a 
RTW state),18 +,-.,/" (a dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker is a union member), and (01,/,2" 
                                               
16 Additional three outcomes are explored and presented in the Appendix: the probability a union-covered individual 
free rides, Pr(%/,,/62,/), the probability an individual is a union member, Pr(+,-.,/), and the probability an 
individual is covered by a union, Pr((01,/,2). These are used in individual-level regressions (linear probability 
models) in order to check the robustness of the state-level findings, using industry fixed effects in addition to state 
and year fixed effects. 
17 Employer health contributions (CPS variable EMCONTRB) are conditioned on GROUPOWN, whether the 
respondent was the policy holder for group health insurance related to their employment. The interviewer asked 
whether, at any time during the previous calendar year, anyone in the household was covered by a health plan 
provided through a current or former employer or union, with follow-up questions identifying the policyholder(s). It 
is important to narrow this analysis to only policy holders, as I am interested in the relationship between an 
employee’s insurance coverage and their union status. 
18 All 27 RTW states take the value of 1 in the year that RTW policy is in effect. However, because I use state fixed 
effects, the coefficient for RTW only reflects the effects of RTW legislation for states that have varied in RTW 
designation since 1990 (Oklahoma, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Kentucky, and West Virginia). Having passed 
RTW legislation that never went into effect, Missouri was dropped from all regressions. In order to check that these 
results are not driven by any one recently RTW state, I re-run all regressions, iteratively excluding a treated state. 
Despite a loss of statistical significance in some instances, the coefficients remain similar in magnitude; these results 
are available upon request. 
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(a dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker is covered by a union contract). An interaction between 
)*!&#  and +,-.,/" (in Equations 1-4) and between are )*!&#  and (01,/,2" (in Equations 2 and 4) are 
also included (to capture the impact of RTW laws on any wage premium of being a union member and 
any wage premium of being covered by a union contract, respectively). 
 The wage models (Equations 1 and 2) are at the individual level; Equation 1 pertains only to 
covered workers, while Equation 2 includes all workers.  I use the same design of Equations 1 and 2 to 
study employer health insurance contributions.  The free riding, unionization, and union coverage rate 
models (represented by Equation 3) are aggregated at the state-by-year level. The free riding model 
includes covered workers only, whereas the unionization and union coverage rate models include all 
workers. 
 All models include a state fixed effect (9&) and year fixed effect (:#). The wage and health 
insurance contributions models include a industry fixed effect (;<). Subscripts are as follows: i  for 
individual, I  for industry, s  for state, and t  for time. 
(1)		ln(!"&#) = BC)*!&# + EC+,-.,/"&# + FC)*!&# ∗ +,-.,/"&# + HCI"&# + JCK&# + ;C"<
+	9C& + :C# + L"&# 
(2)		ln(!"&#) = BN)*!&# + EN+,-.,/"&# + FN)*!&# ∗ +,-.,/"&# + :C(01,/,2"&# + OC)*!&#
∗ (01,/,2"&# + HNI"&# + JNK&# + 9N& + ;N"< + :N# + L"&# 
(3)		ln(%&#) = 	BQ)*!&# + HQI&# + JQK&# + 9Q& + :Q# + 	L&# 
Each regression is further stratified by sector (public versus private) in order to understand the varied 
impacts of RTW legislation.19 I"# is a vector of individual characteristics of the employee, including: age, 
gender, race, educational attainment by years of schooling, occupation, job experience (whether the 
industry and occupation in which the individual is currently employed was their industry of employment 
                                               
19 In order to understand whether the effect of RTW varies by industry, I also stratified the regressions represented 
by Equations 1-3 by broad industry category using the CPS variable IND1950; the 16 categories were as follows: 
agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining; construction; manufacturing, durable goods; manufacturing, nondurable 
goods; transportation; telecommunications; utilities and sanitary services; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, 
insurance, and real estate; business and repair services; entertainment; professional and related services; and public 
administration (public sector). RTW laws did appear to negatively affect union status among durable goods 
manufacturing, transportation, retail, and professional industries in particular. Results are available upon request. 
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and occupation the previous year), and whether an employee is part time (works less than 35 hours a 
week).  
 The free riding rate, unionization rate and union coverage models (Equation 3) use data 
aggregated to the state-by-year level.  K&#  is a vector of state characteristics, which appears in all models, 
and is comprised of the natural log of the state annual average unemployment rate. 
 The wage model should identify the impact of RTW laws on a wage premium (if one exists). By 
looking at different subsamples such as only covered workers or all workers, I can examine whether 
union members earn a wage premium compared to covered nonmembers (free riders) as well as non-
covered workers (workers who do not have a union-negotiated contract). The health insurance models 
should identify the effect of RTW laws on employer contributions to health insurance for union members, 
covered non-members, and non-covered workers. The state-level models should identify the impact of 
RTW laws on state-level free riding, union membership, and union coverage rates.  
 The few authors who have examined the impact of state RTW laws on instances of free riding 
(e.g. Schumacher, 1999) have typically relied on pooled ordinary least squares regressions. These 
estimates may be biased by omitted state-level variables. I attempt to address omitted variable bias from 
time-invariant unobservable state characteristics by including a state-fixed effect in all of the models. I 
also include a year fixed effect. However, it is important to note that these estimates may be sensitive to 
unobservable factors that vary within states over time like attitudes towards unions or the strength of state 
economies not captured by unemployment rate. The wage and health insurance contribution models 
(Equations 1-2) include industry fixed effects (;C"<- ;N"<) to address omitted variable bias resulting from 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in union activity and wages across industry; however, these 
estimates are sensitive to time-varying unobservable characteristics such as wages and union status 
changing differentially across industries.  
 The existing literature has also typically focused on private sector union-covered workers, which 
make up roughly 10% of American workers. This paper broadens the scope of analysis to public and 
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private sector workers, as well as covered and non-covered workers, allowing me to differentiate the 
impacts of RTW legislation on a greater variety of workers. 
National survey data like the March CPS are not ideal for this analysis: differences between 
bargaining units (firms) and variation of workers within bargaining units cannot be discerned using the 
March CPS. Firm-level data, like the data employed by Booth and Bryan (2004), would allow for the use 
of within-firm and within-industry variation to discern differences in wages between members and 
covered nonmembers and (possibly) the differences in information about the benefits and costs of union 
membership between members and covered nonmembers. However, as treatment (RTW legislation) 
occurs at the state level, there would ideally be data at the firm-level with firms that cross state borders in 
order to identify what can be considered a true impact of RTW laws on the union wage premium. 
Secondary Analysis 
I explore the dynamics of how RTW laws affect union membership and union coverage in 
Synthetic Control designs for Wisconsin, a historically pro-labor state that enacted high-profile RTW 
laws in 2011 and 2015. Wisconsin’s experience with RTW is somewhat unique, in that its public sector 
workers experienced treatment nearly four years prior to its private sector workers. Wisconsin’s 
enactment of RTW for public sector workers in 2011 was the first move towards RTW in a decade and 
was followed by a wave of RTW legislation in the Midwest.  
In March 2011, Governor Scott Walker signed the 2011 Wisconsin Act 10 (“Budget Repair 
Bill”), 20 which limited collective bargaining and established RTW for its 175,000 public sector workers, 
though law enforcement and firefighters were exempt.21  The bill was introduced in the state legislature 
by Governor Walker on February 14, 2011, with Governor Walker and others arguing that the state was 
‘broke’ and that changes in collective bargaining were needed in order to reign in government spending 
                                               
20 The Act’s limitations on collective bargaining and unions went into effect in late March, 2011. The Act’s budget 
cuts went into effect at the end of the state’s budget year, June 30th (“Wis. governor officially cuts collective 
bargaining, 2011). 
21 I omit law enforcement and firefighters from the public sector analysis for this reason. 
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(Associated Press, 2011). After a proposed compromise by Wisconsin Democrats and union leaders to 
preserve bargaining rights but concede benefits failed (Walker, 2011), all 14 Democratic state senators 
fled the state to prevent a quorum. The legislation received worldwide attention as the state’s Capitol 
building was swarmed with as many as 80,000 protestors  (“Wis. governor officially cuts collective 
bargaining,” 2011). 
Though there was extensive media coverage, the timeline for the legislation was short, giving 
opponents little time to countermobilize (Associated Press, 2011). Most Wisconsin union leaders 
expressed astonishment that Governor Walker’s plan comprised such sharp limits on union power, 
positing that Walker was not forthcoming during his campaign. Walker has said “[a]nybody who says 
they are shocked on this has been asleep for the past two years.” Although Governor Walker stressed the 
need for flexibility in budget decisions for local officials, his gubernatorial campaign did not 
communicate plans to curb unions (Umhoefer, 2011). For a researcher, this means that Wisconsin’s 
public sector should display no anticipation effects associated with Wisconsin Act 10. However, Act 10 
also contained other anti-union provisions, which introduces the possibility that this analysis is not 
measuring the effect of RTW in isolation. 
In addition to its RTW provision and to significant changes in state employee pension and health 
insurance policies, Act 10 required that collective bargaining units take annual votes to maintain 
certification as a union, limited union contracts to one-year terms, and prohibited unions from collecting 
dues via paycheck. The legislation also limited collective bargaining to only wage and salary negotiations 
and mandated that total increases could not exceed a cap based upon the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
unless approved by a referendum. These provisions very likely would erode both demand for and supply 
of unions in Wisconsin even if unions had still been permitted to collect agency fees from covered 
workers. In the year immediately following the Act’s passage, the median salary of a Wisconsin teacher 
fell by 2.6 percent, with their median benefits falling 18.6 percent (Madland & Rowell, 2017). 
For nearly four years after Act 10, Governor Walker maintained that he had “no interest” in 
pursuing RTW for private sector workers, stating he would “do everything in [his] power” to prevent a 
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RTW bill from arriving on his desk, because he valued his partnerships with private sector unions in 
economic development (Marley, 2012; Calamur, 2015). As late as December 2014, Walker called RTW 
“a distraction” but declined to say whether he would veto a piece of legislation that established RTW for 
the private sector (Spicuzza, 2014). However, in February 2015, Governor Walker publicly stated he 
would sign RTW legislation for private sector workers (Logan, 2015). 
There was little time between the introduction of the bill and enactment: the bill was introduced 
in the Senate February 23rd, 2015 and passed two days later, then introduced in the House February 26th, 
2015 and passed March 5th, 2015. Though thousands of protesters once again descended upon the state 
capital, the legislation’s passage was viewed as inevitable, due in part to the beleaguered state of local 
labor after Act 10 (Resnikoff, 2015).  Governor Scott Walker signed it into law (2015 Wisconsin Act 1) 
March 9th, 2015, with immediate effect. 
 Because of the public statements by Walker against private sector RTW legislation and the speed 
at which legislation was passed, there is unlikely to be anticipation effects. But the effects of this 
legislation may require some consideration: most recent RTW legislation has been applied to both private 
and public sector workers, whereas public sector unions in Wisconsin had already experienced significant 
losses in membership following Act 10. To the extent that the public sector remains a crucial stronghold 
for an already struggling labor movement, the effect of RTW legislation on private sector workers 
estimated from Wisconsin may have limited external validity for other states.  
Synthetic Control Design 
Synthetic Control is a data-driven procedure to examine the effects of a policy intervention that 
occurs in one or few treatment units (often states), whereby a control group is constructed from a 
weighted combination of non-treated units based upon observed pre-treatment characteristics.22 If the 
                                               
22 The following 22 states comprise the donor pool of non-treated states: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. States like 
Kentucky and West Virginia, which were not RTW when Wisconsin enacted its RTW legislation but which became 
RTW subsequently, were excluded. 
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resulting control group (synthetic control) is well-matched to the treated unit in the pre-treatment period, 
it is presumed to be a suitable counterfactual trend of the treated unit that would have occurred in the 
absence of treatment. A long pre-treatment period and a good match on observable characteristics should 
control for both time-invariant and time-variant unobservable confounders, as long as these confounders 
vary similarly both pre- and post-intervention (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, 2010). In this respect, 
estimates from Synthetic Control are more robust than a state fixed effects model, which cannot account 
for time-varying confounders. 
 I use CPS ORGS data, collapsed by state and year, for this design in order to have a larger sample 
size (and therefore smoother aggregated trend lines). A synthetic control group is separately constructed 
for Wisconsin for two outcomes: the natural log of the rate of union membership among all workers in a 
state, '&#; and the natural log of the rate of union coverage among all workers in a state, (&# . I also 
replicate the method for just the private sector and just the public sector in order to test whether RTW 
legislation has differential effects across sector (and also because sectors experienced RTW in different 
years). In all, I construct a total of four synthetic states for two outcome variables and two sectors.  
The set of observed predictors used to match the untreated states with Wisconsin are: the 
proportion of the state that is female, African American, working part time, 45 years old or older, and 
living in a metropolitan area; average years of education; the natural log of the state’s population and land 
square miles; and the natural log of per capita income.23 These predictors are averaged over the pre-
intervention period.24 I also include lagged outcome variables for three time points of the pre-intervention 
period.25 
                                               
23 The following matching  variables are also used by Eren and Ozbeklik’s (2015) Synthetic Control design 
estimating the effect of RTW laws on wages in Oklahoma: proportion living in a metropolitan area, average years of 
education, log of the state’s population and land square miles, and log of per capita income. 
24 With the exception of logged land square miles and logged population, which are observed 2000 and 2010. 
25 In other words, unionization or union coverage rates for 1992, 2000, and 2010 for public sector and 1992, 2004, 
and 2014 for private sector.  
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Importantly, Synthetic Control assumes that there are no spillover effects between units; that is, 
the outcomes of non-treated states are not affected by the intervention that occurs for the treated unit(s). 
States like Minnesota and Ohio are heavily weighted in the construction of a synthetic Wisconsin. 
Anecdotally, Indiana’s passage of its RTW act in 2012 was salient to both pro-RTW legislators and union 
representatives in Wisconsin. It is therefore possible that the politics around unions in neighboring states 
like Minnesota and Ohio were also affected by the RTW legislation in Wisconsin.  However, this concern 
involves individuals in neighboring non-RTW states behaving in similar ways as Wisconsin under the 
assumption that RTW would eventually pass in their state, suggesting attenuation of the effect I observe.  
I perform a variety of robustness checks of the results, including a placebo test (reassigning 
treatment in the data to a comparison unit), an in-time placebo (reassigning treatment year to the middle 
of the pre-treatment period, 2002) and the leave-one-out method (iteratively estimating the baseline model 
to construct a synthetic Wisconsin, omitting in each iteration a state that received a positive weight) 
(Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010 and 2015).  These tests are discussed in the Results section.  
Fixed Effects Results 
Wage Regressions 
The estimated impact of RTW laws on logged wages are displayed in Table 1.4; regressions 1 
and 2 focus on wages of workers covered by a union contract, and regressions 3 and 4 examine the effect 
of RTW laws on the wages of all workers, regardless of union coverage.26 Controlling for demographic 
characteristics and including industry, state, and year fixed effects, there is no statistically significant 
effect of living in a RTW state on wages either among union-covered workers or all workers. These 
estimates contrast with the wage penalties associated with RTW laws found previously by Shierholz and 
Gould (2011), Robert and Habans (2015), and Gould and Kimball (2015). Both Shierholz and Gould 
(2011) and Gould and Kimball (2015) do not include a state fixed effect in their regressions (and estimate 
that RTW laws are associated with 3.2% and 3.1%  lower private sector earnings, respectively), while 
                                               
26 Table A-1.1 in Appendix 1.1 shows the results from these regressions for all covariates. 
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Robert and Habans (2015) include an industry fixed effect and year fixed effect and find RTW laws are 
associated with 1% lower earnings. 
As discussed, existing literature predicts that a union wage premium of 0 is indicative of free 
riding. There is a wage premium associated with being a member of a union in a non-RTW state 
(observable through the coefficient on Union Member); among covered workers (Regressions 1 and 2) 
union membership is associated with 10.3% higher wages as compared to covered non-members (free 
riders) in the public sector (significant at the 99% confidence level) and 5.8% higher wages as compared 
to free riders in the private sector (significant at the 95% confidence level), all else equal. 
As can be observed in Regressions 3 and 4, there is a wage premium associated with being 
covered by a union contract (compared to non-covered workers). Being covered by a union contract is 
associated with 13.4% higher earnings in the public sector and 8.2% higher earnings in the private sector 
(both significant at the 99% confidence level), all else equal. There is also a union wage premium among 
all workers (that is, the additional earnings associated with being a union member, compared to a covered 
non-member); being a union member in the private sector is associated with 5.7% higher earnings, 
significant at the 90% confidence level, and being a union member in the public sector is associated with 
approximately 10% higher earnings, significant at the 99% confidence level. While there is no statistically 
significant effect of RTW passage among union-covered wages or private sector wages among all 
workers, RTW passage is associated with 4.6% higher earnings among all public sector workers, 
significant at the 95% confidence level (Regression 4). This effect may be due in part to government pay 
schedules; state governments may also alter schedules in addition to passing public sector RTW 
provisions.  
As was predicted in Hypothesis 1, there is no statistically significant impact of RTW laws on the 
wage premium, as measured by the interaction between RTW and Member. This result stands in contrast 
to Robert and Habans (2015), who find that RTW legislation reduces the wage premium between union 
members and non-members. While insignificant, the coefficients for RTW*Member vary in direction: the 
coefficient for private sector workers is positive, while the coefficient for public sector workers is 
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negative. There is also no discernable impact of RTW laws on the wage premiums associated with union 
coverage.  
 It does not appear that unions provide or withdraw some excludible benefit (in the form of higher 
pay) to their members as a result of RTW legislation. However, I contend that the wage premium is an 
ineffective indicator of the existence of free riding. The positive coefficients for Union Member in Table 
1.4 would suggest there are excludable benefits to union members, and consequentially, incentives to free 
ride are not present. Further, if we are to rely on previous work, we might mistakenly conclude from the 
insignificance of RTW*Member in Table 1.4 that RTW laws have no impact on free riding. 
Employer Health Insurance Contributions  
The estimated impact of RTW laws on logged employer health insurance contributions are 
displayed in Table 1.5; regressions 5 and 6 focus on wages of workers covered by a union contract, and 
regressions 7 and 8 examine the effect of RTW laws on the contributions for all workers, regardless of 
union coverage.27 While I found no statistically significant impact of RTW on wages, living in a state that 
passes a RTW law is associated with a 17.7% decrease in private sector contributions among covered 
workers (Regression 5)28 and an 5.1% decrease in private sector contributions among all workers 
(Regression 7), both significant at the 99% confidence level.  There is no statistically significant effect of 
living in a state that passes RTW legislation among public sector workers regardless of union coverage.  
Among covered workers, union membership is associated with 6.6% higher insurance 
contributions in the private sector (significant at the 95% confidence level) and 5.3% higher contributions 
                                               
27 Employer health insurance contributions are conditioned on whether the respondent is a policy holder of 
employment-based insurance using CPS variable GROUPOWN. As a robustness check, I also perform the 
regression on whether the respondent is a policy holder of employment-based insurance. Union membership and 
union coverage are associated with increased probability of being a policy holder in both the public and private 
sector. Whereas living in a RTW state is associated with a small increase in the probability of being a policy holder 
among all public sector workers, being living in a RTW state is associated with a decrease in the probability of a 
union member being a policy of employment-based health insurance. These results are available upon request. 
28 The coefficient in the table is -0.177. An interpretation specifying a decrease of 16.22%  is technically correct, as 
the coefficient is not between -0.1 and 0.1. This paper uses the table values throughout the paper for clarity. 
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in the public sector (significant at the 99% confidence level), suggestive of some excludable benefit to 
union membership.  
Importantly, the coefficient on RTW*Member in Regression 5 suggests that private sector union 
members in states that have passed RTW legislation receive 12.5% higher health insurance contributions 
than covered non-members in non-RTW states, significant at the 95% confidence level. There is no 
statistically significant effect for public sector workers.  This union ‘contribution premium’ is 
approximately twice the size as that for union members in non-RTW states. While I found no evidence 
that RTW laws affect the union wage premium, these results indicate that private sector unions secure 
higher employer contributions in the face of RTW laws, and these additional contributions can reasonably 
be seen to be an excludable benefit to union membership. It should be noted that employer contributions 
for union members remain largely the same following the passage of a RTW law, because losses have 
been offset by a union benefit premium; conversely, non-members see substantial decreases in employer 
contributions. It may be that union leaders provide this additional benefit to union members in order to 
incentivize union membership where there is no statutory requirement to join a union (Bennet and 
Johnson, 1980).  
Among all private sector workers, RTW legislation is associated with a 5.1% decrease in 
employer contributions, significant at the 99% confidence level (Regression 7). Being covered by a union 
contract in the private sector is associated with 5.2% higher employer contributions (significant at the 
90% confidence level) and being a union member is associated with 7.1% higher employer contributions 
(significant at the 99% confidence level). Being a private sector union member in a RTW state is 
associated with 11.7% higher employer contributions than being a non-covered worker in a non-RTW 
state (significant at the 95% confidence level). Again, a significant, positive coefficient for RTW*Member 
suggests that union leaders may be providing some excludable benefit of union membership. There is no 





The impact of RTW laws on logged free riding rates among covered members is shown in 
Regressions 9 and 10 of  Table 1.6 Becoming a RTW state is associated with a 54.2% increase in free 
riding among covered public sector workers (significant at the 90% confidence level), all else equal. The 
baseline free riding rate among this study’s treated states is 12.2% in the public sector, which translates to 
an increase of 6.6 percentage points in the public sector free riding rate. These results suggest RTW laws 
are profound threats to public sector union bargaining power.29  Notably, I do not find a statistically 
significant estimate for the private sector. 
 Trends in the prominence of certain industries within a state may be theoretically correlated to 
both free riding and a state’s enactment of RTW legislation through the relative strength of unions in 
particular industries.  Where union strength within an industry is likely to discourage free riding, the 
direction of the correlation between RTW legislation and union strength is ambiguous. It may be that 
states with industries with historically strong labor affiliation inspire counter-efforts to clamp down on 
union activity (as was seen in Wisconsin and Michigan). Or a state with relatively low proportions of 
unionized industries may enact RTW legislation, because there is an insufficiently strong labor force 
present to oppose the legislation.  
Unfortunately, I cannot control for industrial mix of respondents with aggregated CPS data. As a 
robustness check, I ran the above regressions using an individual linear probability model for a covered 
individual’s probability of free riding, given RTW status of the state and including an industry fixed 
effect in addition to state and year fixed effects.  These results are presented in Table A-1.3 of the 
Appendix (Regressions A7 and A8).  The above results are robust to the inclusion of an industry fixed 
effect: being in a RTW state is associated with a 5.5 percentage point increase in the probability that a 
covered public sector worker free rides, significant at the 95% confidence level.  
                                               
29 I also run these regressions with RTW lagged by one year; the results are presented in Appendix 1.1 (Table A-
1.1, Regressions A1 and A2). Lagging RTW passage by one year, the coefficient for private sector is larger, and the 




It bears repeating that measurement error, particularly for union coverage, is possible (Jones, 
1982); measurement error in union coverage would lead to a lower estimated free rider rate, which would 
attenuate the results. 
Membership  
The impact of RTW laws on free riding is instrumentally relevant to the wider relationship 
between RTW laws and unionization rates (rate of union membership). RTW laws are commonly 
understood to induce free riding and thereby cause declines to union membership. In order for free riding 
to be a plausible mechanism, the relationship between RTW legislation and union membership must be 
empirically supported. Regressions 11 and 12 of Table 1.6 display the estimated impact of RTW laws on 
logged rates of union membership among all workers in a given state. While being in a RTW state is 
associated with a 23.6% decrease in union membership among the private sector (significant at the 99% 
confidence level), there is no statistically significant effect for public sector workers.30 I find no 
statistically significant effect for public sector membership, despite observing increased public sector free 
riding and no effect on coverage (discussed below). 
Unionization rates in the private sector may be more sensitive to RTW legislation, even though 
Table 1.5 suggests that the private sector benefits decrease less than those in the public sector and though 
Table 1.6 shows no discernable impact of RTW laws on private sector free riding. It may be that the 
private sectors in these states contain more ‘induced free riders’ than the public sector, a concept coined 
by Sobel (1995) and described earlier. 
  To assuage the same concerns I have about the relative industry mix within a state described 
above, I examine the probability that any given worker in a state is a union member in an individual-level 
linear probability model with an industry fixed effect in Table A-1.3 (Regressions A9 and A10).  I find 
                                               
30 Lagged estimates are presented in Regressions A3 and A4 of Table A-1.1 of Appendix 1.1. Lagging RTW, its 
effect persists and grows slightly in magnitude: a state that passed RTW legislation a year prior experiences a 24.9% 
decrease in private sector membership, all else equal, significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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that the predicted probability that any given private sector worker is a union member is 3.1 percentage 
points lower if that individual is in a RTW state, all else equal (significant at the 99% confidence level). 
Coverage 
Are the observed declines in unionization driven by individual choices or the choices of unions? 
Individual choices have been estimated in the free riding regressions above. Decisions by unions can be 
proxied by examining the rate of coverage by a union contract. Admittedly, there is some agency among 
individual workers in union coverage; workers vote to unionize their workplace.31 Regressions 13 and 14 
of Table 1.6 present the estimated effect of RTW laws on rates of union coverage. The coefficient for 
RTW is statistically significant among private sector workers, suggesting a combination of individual and 
group decisions driving declining unionization rates after RTW passage (as predicted by Hypothesis 4). 
Passing RTW legislation is associated with a 22.2% decrease in private sector union coverage, all else 
equal significant at the 95% confidence level.32 Private sector union membership and coverage fall by 
similar percentages, with similar baseline rates. This may explain why I find no statistically significant 
effect for private sector free riding: the private sector free riding rate remains relatively stable despite 
declines in coverage and (therefore) declines in membership. 
As with union membership, I find no statistically significant effect of RTW passage on public 
sector union coverage; a curious result given the coefficient on RTW in the free riding model.  Albeit not 
significant, there is an estimated 7.9% decrease in membership (Regression 12) and a 2.4% reduction in 
coverage (Regression 14). Although these coefficients are not significant, the difference between the 
coefficients for public sector union membership and coverage is greater than their private sector 
counterparts and may be explained by the large effect observed in the free riding model. It may be that 
                                               
31 Any impacts of RTW legislation on votes to unionize are theoretically ambiguous and likely determined by 
several other factors; notably, the decision to vote for a union is intrinsically different than the decision to join a 
union (Chaison and Dhavale, 1992). 
32 These results persist when RTW enactment is lagged by one year (Regressions A5 and A6 of Table A-1.2 in  
Appendix 1.1); all else equal, private sector union coverage is predicted to decline 20.8% following RTW passage a 
year prior, significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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union coverage is more fixed in the public sector due to legal constraints, and therefore individual-level 
decisions to join or to free ride are more sensitive to public sector RTW provisions than coverage.  The 
lack of significance of these coefficients may be due to small underlying sample sizes.  
Similar to free riding and unionization, I model an individual’s probability to be covered by a 
union contract with a linear probability model and inclusion of industry fixed effect in Table A-1.3 
(Regressions A11-A12). As with unionization (Regressions A-9 and A-10), the coefficient for RTW is 
significant and negative for private sector workers  but not for public sector workers. Living in a RTW 
state is associated with a 3.2 percentage point decrease in the probability that a given individual is 
covered by a union contract, all else equal (significant at the 99% confidence level).  
Synthetic Control Results: Wisconsin 
As explained in the Methods section, I employ the Synthetic Control design for Wisconsin’s 
union membership and union coverage, by sector (public and private).33  In each iteration, I construct a 
synthetic state as a weighted combination of the states in the donor pool (untreated states) that most 
closely resemble the treated state in terms of the pre-RTW values of predictors of union membership and 
union coverage.34  
Wisconsin: Public Sector 
Because public and private sector workers experienced RTW at different times in Wisconsin, I 
present the analysis by sector.  The results for public sector union membership are displayed in Table 1.7, 
which compares the pre-2011 means for actual Wisconsin, synthetic Wisconsin, and an average of the 22 
states in the donor pool (the same comparison but for union coverage is also presented in Table 1.7). 
                                               
33 I attempted to conduct Synthetic Control for wages (using CPS ASEC and CPS ORGS data) and insurance 
contributions (using CPS ASEC data), however this was not possible due to small sample sizes, particularly for 
ASEC data.  
34 In addition to various robustness and sensitivity checks specific to Synthetic Control, I also run a series of 
Difference-in-Difference regressions for Wisconsin’s public and private sector laws, with union membership and 
union coverage as outcomes. My results, presented in Table A-1.4 and Table A-1.5 in Appendix 1.3, are largely 
consistent with my Synthetic Control findings, though the Difference-in-Difference estimated treatment effect for 
Wisconsin’s (public sector) Act 10 was larger than my Synthetic Control estimates. 
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There appears to be different trends in unionization and coverage rates in the donor states than for actual 
Wisconsin.  The difference between coverage versus unionization rates estimates the incidence of free 
riding as a proportion of all public sector workers; Wisconsin’s public sector free riding rates are lower 
than the donor state averages over most of the pre-treatment period. Other than the lagged outcome, the 
most substantial differences between Wisconsin’s public sector and the average of 22 donor states’ public 
sectors are the proportion of African Americans, those working part-time, and those living in a 
metropolitan area. 
 The donor states for synthetic Wisconsin (public sector) for unionization and union coverage are 
presented in Table 1.8. The weights in these tables show that Wisconsin’s pre-2011 trends in union 
membership are best exemplified by Minnesota, Ohio, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Montana, Vermont, and 
Colorado; Wisconsin’s pre-2011 trends in union coverage are best produced by Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Vermont, and Rhode Island (states are ordered from highest to lowest weight). For both membership and 
coverage, Minnesota and Ohio have the largest weights. 
 Figure 1.3 presents the unionization rate (the proportion of public sector workers who are union 
members) for Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin over the period of 1990-2018. Figure 1.4 shows the 
union coverage rate (the proportion of public sector workers who are covered by a union contract) for 
Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin over the same period.  Though both graphs exhibit similar pre-
treatment variation in membership and coverage rates (likely due to smaller underlying sample sizes), the 
trend lines for Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin largely track each other until 2011, when Wisconsin 
exhibits a clear and precipitous drop in membership and coverage. Wisconsin’s membership and coverage 
rates continued to steadily decline until a slight uptick in 2018. The RMSPE for unionization and 
coverage are 0.0423361 and 0.0453823, respectively. Although the RMPSE is larger, the comparable 
trajectories of Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin in the pre-period and considerable divergence post-
2011 suggests synthetic Wisconsin provides a suitable approximation of unionization and coverage in 
Wisconsin had the Budget Repair Act not been enacted.  
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 The estimated effect of the Budget Repair Act is the difference between public sector 
unionization and coverage in Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin. The divergence in trend lines suggest a 
negative effect of Wisconsin’s Budget Repair Act (and its RTW provision) on public sector union 
membership and coverage rates. Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 plot the annual differences in union 
membership and union coverage, respectively, between Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin, represented 
by green lines; the gray lines represent iterations of placebo testing, discussed alongside other robustness 
checks below.35 These figures suggest that the 2011 legislation reduced union membership by 
approximately 12 percentage points and union coverage by 13 percentage points over the 2011-2017 
period.36 These effects correspond to a nearly 28.4% decrease in unionization and a 28.7% decrease in 
union coverage in the six years following enactment, supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4. The effect of this 
legislation on free riding can be approximated using its effect on membership and coverage: the 2011 
legislation was associated with an decrease in free riding by 1.2 percentage points. 
A comparison of the treatment effects on membership and coverage suggests that the legislation 
primarily affected unions through coverage rather than inducing more free riding by union-covered 
workers. However, as discussed earlier, the Budget Repair Act contained several anti-union provisions, 
some of which were expected to directly affect union coverage. Further, inferences about the effects of 
RTW on Wisconsin’s public sector are obscured by the existence of other union-targeted provisions in the 
legislation. 
 It is possible that a crucial assumption of the synthetic control method-- that there is no 
interference between Wisconsin and non-RTW states—does not hold.  To what extent did Act 10 serve as 
an example for other states, and to what extent was it simply an instance of a growing trend towards RTW 
particularly in Rust Belt states?  This concern is assuaged by a lack of any explicit mention of Wisconsin 
                                               
35 Graphs of annual differences in union membership and coverage for only Wisconsin (excluding results from 
placebo testing) can be seen in Figure A-1.1 and Figure A-1.2 (respectively) in Appendix 1.2, 
36 The year 2018 was omitted from these calculations due to the 2018 Janus decision. 
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in the discussions around RTW legislation in nearby states, and the observation that RTW legislation is 
proposed annually in most non-RTW states.  The effect of such interference on donor states is 
theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, if Wisconsin’s Act 10 inspired legislators or governors in other 
states to pursue RTW legislation, unionization and union coverage could decline even if legislation fails, 
as workers become more informed about their rights or develop different preferences for union 
membership. This would attenuate the estimates. Conversely, proposed RTW legislation can galvanize 
labor groups and their political allies to mount an opposition, which may that serve to boost worker 
interest in unions.  
Interestingly, Ohio passed similar legislation to Wisconsin’s Budget Repair Act in March 2011, 
however the bill did not go into effect. Immediately challenged according to the state’s referendum 
process, 62% Ohioans voted against the bill in November 2011. As with the synthetic control, 
Wisconsin’s unionization and coverage rates drop precipitously after 2011 compared to Ohio’s, the trend 
lines for which follow a similar trajectory to their pre-2011 levels (see Figure A-1.3 and Figure A-1.4 in 
Appendix 1.2).  This is unsurprising: Ohio is positively weighted for synthetic Wisconsin for both 
unionization and union membership. 
Wisconsin: Private Sector 
The results for private sector union membership are displayed in Table 1.9, which compares the 
pre-2015 means for actual Wisconsin, synthetic Wisconsin, and an average of the 22 states in the donor 
pool (the same comparison but for union coverage is also presented in the table). Wisconsin’s private 
sector has slightly higher rates of union membership and coverage than the 22 donor states. Actual 
Wisconsin differs most from the donor pool in its proportion workers in manufacturing.  
 The donor states for synthetic Wisconsin (private sector) for unionization and union coverage are 
presented in Table 1.10. The weights in these tables show that the states that the Wisconsin’s pre-2015 
trends in union membership are best exemplified by Ohio, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington; Wisconsin’s pre-2015 trends in union coverage are best produced by Ohio, Minnesota, 
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Oregon, Vermont, Maine, and Rhode Island (states are ordered from highest to lowest weight). As with 
the public sector analysis, Minnesota, Ohio, and Oregon have the largest weights. 
 Figure 1.7 presents the unionization rate (the proportion of private sector workers who are union 
members) for Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin over the period of 1990-2018. Figure 1.8 shows the 
union coverage rate (the proportion of private sector workers who are covered by a union contract) for 
Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin over the same period.  Though Wisconsin’s trajectory appears to be 
more volatile in the late 2000s, the trend lines for Wisconsin and its synthetic counterpart track closely 
until 2011, when Wisconsin diverges sharply from synthetic Wisconsin (for both unionization and union 
coverage). This is likely due to Act 10, as the trendlines converge again in 2012 and remain close together 
until private sector RTW passage in 2015. From 2015 to 2018, Wisconsin’s trendline remains relatively 
flat and notably lower than synthetic Wisconsin’s. The RMSPE for unionization and coverage are 
0.0062532 and 0.006912, respectively. 
The estimated effect of RTW is the difference between private sector unionization and coverage 
in Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin. Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 plot the annual differences in union 
membership and union coverage, respectively, between Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin, represented 
by green trend lines; the gray lines represent iterations of placebo testing discussed along with other 
robustness checks below.37 These figures suggest that RTW reduced union membership by approximately 
2.9  percentage points and union coverage by approximately 3.2 percentage points over the 2015-2018 
period. These effects correspond to a 38% decrease in unionization and a nearly 40% decrease in union 
coverage in the six years following enactment, corroborating Hypotheses 3 and 4. The impact on free 
riding can be approximated as a 0.3 percentage point decrease in free riding. This may be expected given 
nonsignificant fixed effect estimates for private sector free riding. Because private sector free riding rates 
in Wisconsin prior to the legislation were so small, these approximations should be considered with 
caution. 
                                               
37 Graphs of annual differences in union membership and coverage for only Wisconsin (excluding results from 
placebo testing) can be seen in Figure A-1.3 and Figure A-1.4 (respectively) in Appendix 1.2. 
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 As with public sector Wisconsin, there may be some concern about interference. Kentucky, West 
Virginia, and Missouri followed Wisconsin in passing RTW legislation, and RTW legislation was 
introduced in non-RTW states over the same period. However, Wisconsin was not a region ‘leader’ in 
private sector RTW legislation: Indiana and Michigan passed legislation in 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
Inference about the Effect of RTW Laws on Unionization and Union Coverage 
To evaluate the significance of the above estimates, I run a series of robustness checks: placebo 
testing, in-time placebos, and the leave-one-out method.38 
First, I test whether I would find the same results if I had randomly selected a state to study, 
instead of Wisconsin using placebo tests described by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). I 
iteratively apply the synthetic control method to each of the 22 states in the donor pool, reassigning RTW 
legislation onto one of the 22 donor states and shifting the respective treated state to the donor pool, then 
compute the estimated effect of each placebo run.  
 Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 display the results from the placebo tests for Wisconsin’s public sector 
unionization and union coverage, respectively. The gray lines represent the annual gaps associated with 
placebo runs, and the green line represents the gap between Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin. Though 
the green lines in both figures are within the control state distributions prior to 2011, the gaps for 
Wisconsin are unusually large relative to the control state distribution after 2011, suggesting that the 
reduction in public sector union membership and coverage after passage of Act 10 is not random. Figure 
A-1.7 and Figure A-1.8 in Appendix 1.2 present this observation using the ratios between the post-2011 
root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) and the pre-2011 RMSPE for Wisconsin’s public sector and 
for all the states in the donor pool. RMSPE measures the gap in the outcome variable of interest (union 
membership and coverage) between each state and its synthetic counterpart; the ratio between post- and 
                                               
38 I additionally performed Synthetic Control with data points every six months rather than annually (results 
available upon request). Though six-month trend lines are not as smooth as annual trend lines, as expected, the 
results hold. Also, I experimented with the inclusion of additional lagged outcomes (rather than including outcomes 
for three pre-treatment years); inclusion of all pre-treatment years does not improve the fit between Wisconsin and 
its synthetic counterpart. These results are available upon request. 
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pre-treatment RMSPE, therefore, captures the magnitude of the effect of the intervention relative to the 
pre-treatment gap.39 Wisconsin’s RMSPE ratio is between two and three times as high as the ratios for 
donor states, suggesting a significant effect of the Budget Repair Bill on Wisconsin’s public sector union 
membership and coverage. 
Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 display the results from the placebo tests for Wisconsin’s private 
sector unionization and union coverage, respectively. The gray lines represent the annual gaps associated 
with placebo runs, and the green line represents the gap between Wisconsin and synthetic Wisconsin. 
Again, the green lines in both figures lie within the control states’ distribution prior to 2015, but following 
RTW passage, the gap between Wisconsin and its synthetic counterpart is larger than the gaps computed 
in the placebo runs, suggesting nonrandom reductions in unionization and coverage in Wisconsin’s 
private sector following RTW enactment. As with the public sector, Figure A-1.9 and Figure A-1.10 in 
Appendix 1.2 present this observation using the ratios between the post-2011 root mean squared 
prediction error (RMSPE) and the pre-2011 RMSPE for Wisconsin’s private sector and for all the states 
in the donor pool. Again, Wisconsin’s RMSPE ratio is approximately twice as large as the ratios for other 
states, suggesting that RTW legislation had a significant effect on private sector union membership and 
coverage in Wisconsin. 
Second, I conduct in-time placebo tests, in which I compare the effect estimated in the Synthetic 
Control to a placebo effect produced by reassigning RTW legislation in the data before RTW legislation 
actually took place (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2015). A large placebo estimate would weaken 
confidence that the results observed in Figures 1.3, 1.4, 1.7, and 1.8 are due to the effect of Wisconsin’s 
legislation rather than a lack of predictive power of the synthetic control. I re-ran the models but 
reassigned RTW legislation for the middle of the pre-treatment period, or 2002, nine years prior to the 
Budget Repair Act and thirteen years prior to private sector RTW legislation, lagging predictor variables 
                                               
39 Abadie, Diamond, and Haimueller (2015) similarly present ratios of post- to pre-RMPSE for placebo tests and 
reason that a large postintervention RMSPE is not indicative of a large effect of the intervention if the 
preintervention RMSPE is also large. 
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accordingly. Results are presented in Appendix 1.2.  Figure A-1.11 and Figure A-1.12 show the results 
for the in-time placebo for Wisconsin public sector membership and coverage (respectively); though 
Wisconsin and its synthetic counterpart track each other prior to 2002, they diverge noticeably from 2007, 
which may suggest a lack of predictive power in the original analysis, as the underlying sample size of 
public sector workers in Wisconsin are admittedly small.  The lagged outcome variables may be more 
important than other predictor variables in the original analysis, particularly in the late 2000’s and through 
the Great Recession. However, even this divergence is not nearly as large as that observed in Figures 1.3 
and 1.4, when public sector union membership and coverage plummeted to less than 20% following the 
Budget Repair Act, suggesting the gap observed in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 are reflective of the effects of the 
legislation on union status. 
Figure A-1.13 and Figure A-1.14 show the results for the in-time placebo for Wisconsin private 
sector membership and coverage (respectively). Wisconsin and its synthetic counterpart track each other 
closely for the 1990-2002 and do not diverge considerably during the 2002-2015 period, excluding the 
dip in both membership in coverage in 2011, as discussed earlier. In contrast to actual private sector RTW 
passage in 2015, 2002 placebo passage had no discernable effect, indicating the gaps estimated in Figures 
1.7 and 1.8 reflect the impact of RTW passage on union membership and union coverage rather than a 
lack of predictive power in the synthetic control. 
Finally, as noted by Eren and Ozbeklik (2015), the states in the donor pool and their 
corresponding weights are outcome- and time-sensitive, thus I have slight differences in state weights 
between membership and coverage and between public and private sector models. I test the sensitivity of 
the results to changes in state weights using the leave-one-out method (Abadie, Diamond, and 
Hainmueller, 2015). I do this by iteratively running the baseline models to construct a synthetic 
Wisconsin, omitting in each iteration one of the states that received positive weights in Tables 1.8 and 
1.10. The results are presented in Figure A-1.15 through Figure A-1.18 in Appendix 1.2. Excluding a 
state with a positive weight represents a sacrifice in goodness of fit, however it allows me to evaluate the 
extent to which the results are being driven by any one state. As can be observed, the Synthetic (Leave-
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One-Out) Wisconsin trend lines largely follow the baseline Synthetic Wisconsin, indicating that the 
results of the baseline analysis are fairly robust to the exclusion of any one state from the donor pool. 
Discussion 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on unions and Right-to-Work laws in five 
important ways. First, this paper stratifies results by sector. Most of the literature concerning unions has 
focused exclusively on the private sector, while discussions in popular media are likely to discuss 
potential impacts on a state’s economy as a whole.  Disentangling effects by sector allows for a more 
nuanced understanding of RTW laws, union power, and resulting wages. Additionally, analysis specific to 
the public sector is particularly salient due to the recent Janus decision by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
 Second, I examine the impact of RTW laws on worker benefits, proxied by employer-based 
health insurance contributions, in addition to the impact on wages. Though I find no evidence that RTW 
laws affect wages, there is stronger evidence that RTW laws result in sizeable reductions in private sector 
employer health insurance contributions and smaller but still policy-relevant reductions in public sector 
employer health insurance contributions.  
Third, this paper proposes a more direct method of quantifying free riding. Theoretical 
predictions about what a wage premium should be when opportunities to free ride are present, are 
ambiguous. Some (Booth, 2004; Booth and Bryan, 2004) have argued that no wage premium, meaning no 
excludable benefits to union membership, suggests opportunities to free ride are present; others posit that 
unions may respond to a perceived risk of free riding by offering excludable benefits (Blakemore et al., 
1996; Budd and Na, 2000), or at the very least giving an impression that they do (Budd and Na, 2000). As 
in existing work, empirical analysis in this paper is limited by national survey data, which obscures intra-
firm differences between union members and non-members. While I find a positive wage premium for 
union membership and union coverage, these differentials may be as a result of unmeasured heterogeneity 
of union members, free riders, and non-covered members across bargaining units. I do not find that RTW 
laws differentially affect union members versus covered workers (RTW*Member); in other words, I did 
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not find that RTW laws affect the union wage premium. Use of the wage premium as a measure of free 
riding would mean that I would falsely conclude RTW legislation has no effect on free riding due to the 
non-significant effect of RTW legislation on the wage premium found in Table 1.4. 
Fourth, this paper empirically tests the long-assumed relationship between RTW legislation and 
free riding more rigorously. Direct measurement of free riding (as in Table 1.6) allows me to observe 
substantial increases in public sector free riding associated with RTW laws: the fixed effects regressions 
estimate that RTW laws are associated with a 54.2% increase in public sector free riding but no 
association between RTW laws and private sector free riding.  However, results from the Synthetic 
Control design using Wisconsin suggest that its RTW provisions were associated with decreases in 
private and public sector free riding. Admittedly, the Budget Repair Act contained other provisions likely 
to negatively affect unions, particularly union coverage. Therefore, peculiarities of the Budget Repair Act 
relative to other states’ public sector RTW provisions may be driving this difference in results by method. 
The legislation was associated with a 28.4% and 28.7% decrease in public sector union membership and 
union coverage, respectively. Through both fixed effects regressions and the synthetic control method, I 
also find that RTW legislation is associated with sizeable reductions in private sector union membership 
and union coverage. The fixed effects results suggest that RTW laws are associated with a 23.6% and 
22.2% decrease in private sector union membership and coverage, respectively. In Wisconsin, the private 
sector RTW law was associated with a 38% and 40% decline in private sector union membership and 
union coverage, respectively. My Synthetic Control results suggest that the decline in Wisconsin’s union 
membership, both in the public and private sector, is due to declines in union coverage rather than free 
riding by members. 
 Unfortunately, the second half of the commonly described causal pathway between RTW 
legislation and union decline—that increased free riding eventually leads to declines in unionization—
cannot be empirically tested. This is because the relationship between free riding and union membership 
is deterministic among covered workers. As a theoretical mediator of the relationship between RTW laws 
and unionization, free riding is perhaps more accurately characterized as a proxy for some phenomenon 
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affecting the supply or demand for unions. For instance, increased free riding may (a) make organization 
and maintenance of unions costlier, leading to an undersupply of union services; and/or (b) lessen unions’ 
bargaining power, thereby reducing demand for union services. I have attempted to understand to what 
extent RTW laws affect unionization through supply (coverage) versus demand (free riding), however 
individuals and unions make decisions simultaneously, over different time horizons and for unobservable 
reasons. 
 Finally, this paper interrogates the relationship between RTW passage and unionization and union 
coverage in Wisconsin through a synthetic control design, allowing a greater focus on trends compared to 
a fixed effects model. This exercise highlights the extent to which the effect of RTW passage varies by 
state. Wisconsin’s Budget Repeal Act, which included a RTW provision, is associated with a 28% 
decrease in union membership and union coverage, and its private sector RTW legislation four years later 
is associated with a nearly 40% reduction in union membership and union coverage. The state fixed 
effects models employed in this paper address the concern that some intrinsic qualities of this study’s 
treated states are associated with both a state’s propensity to pass RTW legislation and free riding. 
However, state fixed effects do not address threats to validity posed by unobservable, time-varying trends 
in union power, general animosity towards unions, or workers’ attitudes towards union membership. 
Wisconsin is a historically strong labor state, where union coverage is comparatively more extensive. It 
follows that the estimated effects for these states may be larger than those for a non-RTW state with 
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Figure 1.1: U.S. Right-to-Work States, with Enactment Years 
 
 
Note: The blue states enacted RTW legislation since 1990; red states already had RTW in effect. Wisconsin passed RTW legislation for public 
sector workers in 2011 and for its private sector workers in 2015. West Virginia passed RTW legislation in 2016, but the policy did not go into 
effect until October 2017. Missouri passed RTW legislation in 2017, but the law was overturned by referendum in the same year, prior to the law 





Figure 1.2: Schema of Union Coverage vs. Union Membership 
  




















   
 
Table 1.1: Unweighted Descriptive Statistics 
  Union Members Free Riders (Covered Non-Members) Non-Covered Workers 
  
Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max 
Wage and 
salary 
income $40,872 $31,534 $0 $1,099,999 $37,359 $35,255 $0 $680,000 $34,950 $43,595 $0 $1,379,999 
Insurance 
from 
Employer 0.830 0.375 0 1 0.743 0.437 0 1 0.556 0.497 0 1 
Age 42.816 10.855 16 65 41.533 11.325 16 65 38.516 12.488 16 65 
Female 0.430 0.495 0 1 0.531 0.499 0 1 0.507 0.500 0 1 
Nonwhite 0.178 0.382 0 1 0.174 0.379 0 1 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Years of 
Education 13.841 2.551 0 19 14.337 2.609 0 19 13.445 2.580 0 19 
Job 
Experience 0.908 0.290 0 1 0.888 0.315 0 1 0.811 0.392 0 1 
Part Time 0.119 0.323 0 1 0.147 0.354 0 1 0.239 0.426 0 1 
Unionized 
Industry 0.114 0.318 0 1 0.058 0.233 0 1 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Observations 51,990* 5,885* 327,595* 
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) ASEC 1990-2018. * Observations for insurance are: 38,731, 4,141 and 257,416 for union members, free 




   
 
 
Table 1.2: Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
  Union Members Free Riders (Covered Non-Members) Non-Covered Workers 
  
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev 
Wage and salary 
income $42,115 177 $38,827 603 $36,282 95 
Receiving Insurance 
from Employer 0.825 0.002 0.737 0.008 0.549 0.001 
Age 42.541 0.055 41.023 0.175 38.114 0.025 
Female 0.422 0.002 0.520 0.008 0.493 0.001 
Nonwhite 0.200 0.002 0.206 0.006 0.181 0.001 
Years of Education 13.832 0.013 14.293 0.040 13.452 0.005 
Job Experience 0.905 0.001 0.882 0.005 0.808 0.001 
Part Time 0.121 0.002 0.145 0.005 0.233 0.001 
Unionized Industry 0.113 0.002 0.061 0.004 0.046 0.000 
 Observations 51,421* 5,806* 324,008* 
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) ASEC 1990-2018.  * Observations for insurance are: 38,731, 4,141, and 257,409 for union members, free 





   
 
Table 1.3: Rate of Union Coverage and Union Membership in Non-RTW States and RTW States 
  Non-RTW States RTW States 
  
All Workers Private Sector Workers 
Public Sector 





Covered by Union 
Contract 0.189 0.119 0.540 0.090 0.057 0.241 
Union Member 0.175 0.110 0.495 0.074 0.049 0.187 
Observations 233,341 194,220 39,121 152,129 124,826 27,303 
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS) ASEC 1990-2018. 
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Table 1.4: Estimated Impact of RTW Laws on Logged Wages 
          
  Workers Covered by a Union Contract All Workers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector 
Right-to-Work State -0.065 0.024 -0.003 0.046** 
  (0.063) (0.044) (0.028) (0.019) 
Union Member 0.058** 0.103*** 0.057* 0.099*** 
  (0.025) (0.014) (0.029) (0.013) 
Covered by Union 
Contract   0.082*** 0.134*** 
    (0.019) (0.017) 
RTW*Member 0.038 -0.015 0.033 -0.017 
  (0.036) (0.022) (0.041) (0.023) 
RTW*Covered   -0.018 -0.029 
    (0.040) (0.027) 
      
Observations 28,936 26,698 299,829 63,243 
R-squared 0.388 0.426 0.481 0.515 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The above regressions include industry, state, and year fixed effects. The 
following covariates are included: age, female, nonwhite, years of education, job experience, part-time 
employment, and the natural log of the state unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. 
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS) ASEC 1990-2018. 
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Table 1.5: Estimated Impact of RTW Laws on  Logged Employer Health Insurance Contributions 
          
  Workers Covered by a Union Contract All Workers 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector 
Right-to-Work State -0.177*** -0.087 -0.051*** -0.020 
  (0.063) (0.069) (0.019) (0.046) 
Union Member 0.066** 0.053*** 0.071** 0.077*** 
  (0.028) (0.018) (0.027) (0.019) 
Covered by Union 
Contract   0.052* 0.021 
    (0.026) (0.021) 
RTW*Member 0.125** 0.025 0.117** -0.006 
  (0.049) (0.035) (0.045) (0.035) 
RTW*Covered   -0.035 0.014 
    (0.047) (0.045) 
      
Observations 16,504 16,582 128,007 35,011 
R-squared 0.416 0.412 0.351 0.368 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The above regressions include industry, state, and year fixed effects. The 
following covariates are included: age, female, nonwhite, years of education, job experience, part-time 
employment, and the natural log of the state unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. 






Table 1.6: Estimated Impact of RTW Laws on Logged Aggregate Union Outcomes 
              
  Logged Free Riding Logged Union Membership Logged Union Coverage 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector 
Right-to-Work State -0.001 0.542* -0.236** -0.079 -0.222** -0.024 
  (0.230) (0.313) (0.088) (0.095) (0.084) (0.067) 
        
Baseline Rate 0.044 0.122 0.082 0.288 0.086 0.317 
Observations 1,393 1,394 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Logged Free Riding is calculated among union-covered workers; union membership and coverage is calculated 
among all workers. Zero values for free riding, membership, and coverage rates have been changed to 0.01 in order to preserve the observation in a 
logged model; because there are state-years with no union covered workers, the sample sizes for the free riding models is different from the 
membership and coverage models.  The above regressions include state and year fixed effects. The following covariates are included: average  age, 
proportion female, proportion nonwhite, average years of education, proportion with job experience, proportion employed part-time, and the natural 
log of the state unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 












   
Table 1.7: Predictor Means for Wisconsin's Union Membership and Coverage (Public Sector) 
Variables 
Unionization Rate Union Coverage Rate Average of 22 Donor 
States Treated Synthetic Treated Synthetic 
Percent Female 59.39% 59.29% 59.39% 59.23% 57.44% 
Percent African American 5.31% 5.74% 5.31% 6.16% 9.32% 
Percent Aged 45-65 41.89% 41.70% 41.89% 42.41% 43.44% 
Average Years of Education 14.71 14.63 14.71 14.66 14.63 
Percent Working Part-Time 20.03% 19.94% 20.03% 19.51% 16.50% 
Percent Working in  Manufacturing 0.11% 0.51% 0.11% 0.32% 0.75% 
Percent Living in a Metropolitan Area 68.67% 71.30% 68.67% 72.71% 74.73% 
Logged Per Capita Income 9.32 9.34 9.32 9.32 9.40 
Logged Square Land Miles 10.90 10.71 10.90 10.83 10.21 
Logged Population 15.52 15.34 15.52 15.43 15.07 
Unionization Rate (1992) 52.47% 46.56%   43.67% 
Unionization Rate (2000) 54.46% 53.13%   45.02% 
Unionization Rate (2010) 42.07% 49.20%   46.45% 
Union Coverage Rate (1992)   56.87% 50.67% 49.51% 
Union Coverage Rate (2000)   58.30% 52.95% 49.77% 
Union Coverage Rate (2010)   45.97% 51.79% 49.90% 
Note: All variables except for unionization rates are averaged for the 1990-2010 period. 
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Table 1.8: State Weights for Synthetic Wisconsin: Union Membership & Union Coverage (Public 
Sector) 
Union Membership Union Coverage 
State Weight State Weight 
Colorado 0.005 Minnesota 0.346 
Hawaii 0.065 Ohio 0.312 
Minnesota 0.563 Oregon 0.245 
Montana 0.043 Rhode Island 0.037 
Ohio 0.25 Vermont 0.06 
Rhode Island 0.047     
Vermont 0.026     
Note: All other donor states have a weight of zero. 
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Synthetic Control Results for Wisconsin’s Public Sector Unionization Rate 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows trends in 
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Figure 1.4: Synthetic Control Results for Wisconsin’s Public Sector Union Coverage Rate 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows trends in 
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Figure 1.5: Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Public Sector Unionization Rate) 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows the results for 
placebo testing for public sector union membership (also see: Figure A-7). 
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Figure 1.6 Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Public Sector Union Coverage Rate) 
 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows the results for 
placebo testing for public sector union coverage (also see: Figure A-8).
 
    
 
Table 1.9: Predictor Means for Wisconsin's Union Membership and Coverage (Private Sector) 
Variables 
Unionization Rate Union Coverage Rate Average of 22 
Donor States Treated Synthetic Treated Synthetic 
Percent Female 47.71% 47.40% 47.71% 47.55% 47.45% 
Percent African American 4.34% 5.50% 4.34% 5.75% 6.95% 
Percent Aged 45-65 28.61% 28.88% 28.61% 29.06% 29.29% 
Average Years of Education 13.16 13.28 13.16 13.28 13.30 
Percent Working Part-Time 21.74% 21.06% 21.74% 21.15% 19.74% 
Percent Working in  Manufacturing 25.62% 19.91% 25.62% 20.26% 15.05% 
Percent Living in a Metropolitan Area 71.76% 75.24% 71.76% 75.74% 78.76% 
Logged Per Capita Income 9.34 9.34 9.34 9.35 9.42 
Logged Square Land Miles 10.90 10.81 10.90 10.88 10.21 
Logged Population 15.52 15.53 15.52 15.59 15.07 
Unionization Rate (1992) 12.65% 12.80%   10.97% 
Unionization Rate (2004) 9.63% 9.56%   8.38% 
Unionization Rate (2014) 7.50% 7.07%   7.10% 
Union Coverage Rate (1992)   13.91% 13.97% 12.06% 
Union Coverage Rate (2004)   9.83% 9.82% 9.10% 
Union Coverage Rate (2014)   7.98% 7.82% 7.84% 
Note: All variables except for unionization rates are averaged for the 1990-2015 period. 
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Table 1.10: State Weights for Synthetic Wisconsin: Union Membership & Union Coverage (Private 
Sector) 
Union Membership Union Coverage 
State Weight State Weight 
Minnesota 0.32 Maine 0.023 
Ohio 0.391 Minnesota 0.341 
Oregon 0.11 Ohio 0.424 
Vermont 0.095 Oregon 0.151 
Washington 0.083 Rhode Island 0.005 
    Vermont 0.057 
Note: All other donor states have a weight of zero. 
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. 
 
 
Figure 1.7: Synthetic Control Results for Wisconsin’s Private Sector Unionization Rate 
 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows trends in 
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Figure 1.8: Synthetic Control Results for Wisconsin’s Private Sector Union Coverage Rate 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows trends in 
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Figure 1.9: Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Private Sector Unionization Rate) 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows the results for 
placebo testing for private sector union membership (also see: Figure A-9). 
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Figure 1.10: Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Private Sector Union Coverage Rate) 
 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows the results for 
placebo testing for private sector union coverage (also see: Figure A-10).
 




CHAPTER 2: THE LABOR MARKET IMPACT OF STRICTER DISABILITY INSURANCE 
ELIGIBILITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE UK WORK CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT 
In the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States, there has been increased concern about 
receipt of disability insurance by individuals who are able to work. This paper examines the impacts on 
benefit receipt, income and labor market outcomes of changes to disability insurance eligibility using the 
UK’s recent experience with the Work Capability Assessment (WCA). The WCA was initially enacted by 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) in 2008 to assess new disability claims. Successful 
claimants would receive the Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), a new form of disability benefit 
intended to replace Incapacity Benefit, Income Support, and Severe Disablement Allowance (IB, IS, and 
SDA respectively). Contrary to expectation, new disability claims increased following the introduction of 
the WCA and ESA, in part due to the Great Recession (2008-2009). Amid concerns that those able to 
work were receiving ESA coupled with broader discussions of austerity and welfare reform in Britain, 
eligibility requirements were further tightened in early 2011. It was in this context that, between 2011 and 
2014, the majority of existing IB and IS recipients were reassessed using the amended WCA. Since, the 
WCA has garnered widespread criticism for lack of consideration of individuals’ barriers to employment, 
with many disabled people incorrectly assessed as ‘fit for work.’  I exploit reassessment by the WCA—a 
policy change that virtually everyone receiving SDA/IB experienced— as exogenous variation in 
disability receipt among people who had been previously assessed as long-term unemployed to estimate 
the effects of disability insurance on disability insurance enrollment and benefit income.  
The ESA and WCA were implemented with the goal of accelerating the off-flow of IB recipients 
from disability insurance enrollment, thereby representing employment gains and fiscal savings. Did the 
policy work as intended? Namely, do more stringent eligibility assessments for disability insurance result 
in lower enrollment in disability benefits?  What is the impact of the policy on benefit incomes (both 
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amount and source) of claimants? While I find no significant impact on employment outcomes for 
existing IB recipients, IB reassessment is associated with higher rates of ESA receipt, suggesting 
appropriate targeting of the policy for what may be considered a population with the most severe 
impairments. However, my results with respect to benefits income and receipt of other benefits are 
suggestive of spillover of disability recipients into other programs.  
Literature Review 
Neoclassical economic theory predicts that disability insurance creates work disincentives; one 
would rationally choose benefit income over labor income, as benefit income requires relatively less 
effort. Empirically, the labor market impacts of disability insurance are predominantly estimated by 
comparing the employment outcomes of rejected and allowed applicants, examining variation in benefit 
rate, or exploiting a change in benefit eligibility. Average labor market impacts of disability insurance 
obscure the effects felt by particular groups as well as spillover effects of DI policy changes into other 
programs.  
Using the Outcomes of Rejected Applicants 
Empirical support for this theory began with Bound (1989), who argued that, insofar as rejected 
applicants for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) are healthier than their accepted counterparts, 
the labor force participation outcomes of rejected applicants for can serve as an upper bound for what can 
be expected for SSDI recipients, had they not received SSDI. Using data from the 1972 Survey of 
Disabled and Non-Disabled Adults (SDNA) and the 1978 Survey of Disability and Work (DSW),40 he 
finds that among men aged 45-54 years, 48.9% of rejected applicants in the 1972 survey and 36.7% of the 
1978 survey were employed during the survey week (Bound, 1989: 485).41 However, the earnings for 
                                               
40 Both of which were conducted by the Census Bureau for the Social Security Administration. 
41 Using the 1990-1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and Social Security data 
containing application and award information, Chen and van der Klaauw (2007) replicate Bound’s work, with some 
distinctions; for instance, they examine both SSDI and Social Security Income (SSI), and other men and women. 
They conclude that the upper bound on the reduction of labor force participation of applicants due to DI benefits is 
14-15 percentage points (2007: 766). 
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rejected applicants who did work are less than half of the median earnings for able-bodied men of the 
same age (Bound, 1989: 486). Maestas et al. (2013) similarly note that some denied applicants recover 
some capacity for work following the initial decision, average work capacity of this group is far below 
what is suggested by their pre-disability earnings (Maestas et al., 2013: 1801). 
 Rejected applicants may not be an appropriate comparison group. Lahiri, Song, and Wixon point 
out that while rejected applicants are healthier than DI benefit recipients, they may have non-health 
characteristics, such as intermittent work histories, that make them less likely to work (2008). Depending 
on the determination process, relying on a comparison of rejected versus approved applicants may bias 
OLS estimates either upwards or downwards. Researchers have refined identification to address these 
concerns; for example,  Chen and van der Klaauw (2007) use a regression discontinuity (RD) design, and 
Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) and French and Song (2014) both use instrumental variable (IV) 
designs. 
Responding to Bound (1989), Parsons argues that Bound’s comparison of rejected and allowed 
applicants does not capture the total effect of DI on employment if the application process itself also 
reduces the labor supply of applicants (1991). Maestas, Mullen, and Strand acknowledge that their study 
produces a reduced form estimation, only capturing the impact of benefit receipt upon labor supply, not 
the entire impact of the program itself; there could be other impacts of the program through the 
application and appeals process (2013: 1827). In the United States, applicants must demonstrate they are 
not working before applying, and any denied applicant must remain unemployed in order to appeal a 
denial or reapply. Time away from work may diminish human capital, making it all the more difficult for 
an applicant to enter the workforce. Parsons notes that Bound’s approach may actually underestimate the 
labor market impacts of SSDI, insofar as denied applicants, in their continued pursuit of DI approval, may 
have lower employment potential than allowed applicants. Authors like Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 
(2013) and French and Song (2014) deal with this issue by looking at longer-run employment outcomes 
of rejected applicants. 
 
 




A number of authors use variation in benefit rates to estimate the labor market effects of disability 
insurance (Neumark & Powers, 1998 and 2004; Gruber, 2000; Autor & Duggan, 2003). Bell and Smith 
(2004) and Faggio and Nickell (2005) use variation in levels of the Invalidity Benefit (IVB) and 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) in the United Kingdom in the 1980s to later 1990s. Both estimate a negative 
relationship between benefit levels and male labor force participation, and that this effect is larger for 
lower-skilled workers.  However, Bell and Smith (2004) find that this relationship was no longer 
statistically significant when age trends were included. Neither study controls for health and labor market 
conditions, likely confounders; indeed, in a regression that does not include the benefit-to-wage 
replacement rate, Faggio and Nickell observe that differential declines in regional wages for low-skill 
occupations are associated with declining labor market participation (2005).  
Changes in Eligibility 
Studies that exploit policy changes in DI eligibility requirements provide for more mixed and 
modest estimates of the labor market impacts of DI receipt, likely owing to differences in the policy 
changes themselves and the extent to which they push claimants off of DI rolls.  
Noticing that state denial rates increased dramatically in the 1970s due to funding issues at the 
federal level, Gruber and Kubik (1997) use data on differential denial rate increases and data from the 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for 1976-1978 (before policy change) and 1980-1982 (after 
policy change). They find that a 10% increase in denial rates leads to a 0.48 percentage point decrease in 
non-participation (from a mean level of 17.3%) (Gruber & Kubik, 1997: 13-14). 
Staubli (2011) exploits a policy change in Austria’s disability insurance, wherein men aged 55 to 
57 were subject to stricter eligibility requirements previously applied to those under 55. Using a DD 
design (where the treatment group is men aged 55-56, and the control groups are men aged 49-50 and 51-
52) and administrative data, he estimates a decline in disability enrollment of 6-7.4 percentage points and 
an increase in employment by 1.6 to 3.4 percentage points (Staubli, 2011).  
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Using administrative data from the United States Social Security Administration and a 
differences-in-differences design, Moore (2015) examines the labor market outcomes for those who lose 
their DI eligibility after the removal of alcohol and drug addictions as qualifying conditions in 1996. 
Roughly 2% of DI benefit recipients had an alcohol or drug addiction that contributed to their eligibility, 
and half of these recipients were judged as eligible after the policy change. The other half experienced a 
termination in benefits in January 1997, the largest-scale termination in DI eligibility since major reforms 
in 1984 (Moore, 2015: 31). Approximately 22% of would-be claimants began working at intensities 
which would have disqualified them for DI (Moore, 2015: 31).  
Disney et al. (2003) study the impact of the Incapacity to Work Act (IWA) in the United 
Kingdom, which enacted changes to both benefit generosity and eligibility requirements, on 50-64 year-
olds using British Household Panel Study (BHPS) data and a fixed effects logistic regression, and find a 
weak relationship between policy change and employment. Also focusing on the IWA using BHPS data, 
Clasen et al. (2006) employ hazard modeling to find that the IWA made transitions from inactivity into 
employment more likely for 25-49 year-olds and decreased transitions from employment into long-term 
sick for older workers. 
Using a similar design to this paper, Barr et al. (2016b) exploit variation in cumulative IB 
reassessment rates across upper tier local authorities matched to data from the Quarterly Labor Force 
Survey (QLFS), a rolling panel that follows households for five consecutive quarters much like the 
United States’ Current Population Survey (CPS). They include all out-of-work respondents aged 18-64 in 
England who responded to at least two quarterly surveys between the first quarter of 2010 and the first 
quarter of 2013. Their explanatory variable is the cumulative proportion of the working age population 
that had been through IB reassessment at the end of each quarter, and their outcome variables were the 
probability that respondents moved into employment or moved between inactivity and unemployment. 
They find that reassessment was associated with a significant decrease in the chances that women with a 
mental health problem entered employment as well as a significant decrease in the chance that men with 
mental health problems entered employment. They also observe that for every additional 1% of the 
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working age population that experienced reassessment, the probability of inactive people with mental 
health problems moving into unemployment increased by 22% (Barr et al., 2016b: 454).42  There are 
some limitations of this study, largely due to data; for instance, individuals are only followed at most for 
5 quarters. If the employment impacts of being assessed as fit for work take longer than four quarters, it is 
not possible to observe these effects. Also, there may be some unobservable characteristic that is related 
to both an individual’s assessment status and their ability to find and hold a job. My analysis, using the 
United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS), allows me to follow individuals over a 
longer period of time and address time-invariant unobservable characteristics of individuals through an 
individual fixed effect. I am able to study reassessment rates at the local authority district level, a lower 
geography than upper tier local authorities. The UKHLS also allows me to measure education, physical 
and mental health, income, and benefit receipt more granularly. 
Barr et al. (2016b) and Moore (2015) are particularly relevant to my study; within the literature 
focusing on more stringent eligibility requirements, Barr et al. (2016b) and Moore (2015) explicitly focus 
on the impacts of tighter eligibility requirements for existing beneficiaries, as do I in this study. It is 
reasonable to expect that existing beneficiaries and new claimants are different across a range of 
characteristics including severity and type of impairment as well as ties to the workforce. Therefore, the 
impact of the WCA is likely to be different between reassessed IB recipients and new ESA claimants.  
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
The impact of disability insurance receipt on employment is not the same across all beneficiaries. 
Rather, labor market outcomes with respect to disability insurance have been shown to vary by severity of 
impairment, duration of DI benefit receipt, skills, and age. 
Maestas, Muller, and Strand (2013) show that employment capacity for some would-be 
beneficiaries is as high as 50 percentage points for those with less severe impairments and as low as 0 for 
those with the most severe impairments (1827). They acknowledge the group that experiences the effect 
                                               
42 Using an individual fixed effects model as discussed in the Methods section, I examine the impact of reassessment 
on mental health outcomes and find no statistically significant relationship. 
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they observe—that the employment rate would have been approximately 28 percentage points higher two 
years later—were younger, had lower earnings histories, and had more mental impairments than their 
broader sample (Maestas et al., 2013: 1801). French and Song observe that the reduction in labor force 
participation due to DI benefit receipt is smaller for applicants 55 and older, college graduates, and those 
with mental illness (2014: 321). 
Moore finds that individuals who had received DI for 2-3 years exhibited the largest labor market 
response to tightened DI eligibility, and that the relationship between length of benefit receipt and 
employment response was strongest among younger people (2008: 41). 
 It is increasingly important to recognize the characteristics that moderate the labor market effects 
of DI benefit receipt. Despite policy changes in developed countries to either slow the inflow of DI 
claimants or accelerate the outflow of claimants, the overall rates of DI benefit have remained the same or 
continued to increase; further, the population that receives disability insurance has changed over time 
(Kemp, 2006). Changes to the DI population can potentially change the estimates further studies will find. 
Autor and Duggan show that the DI population became younger and more female, more likely to suffer 
from comparatively lower mortality impairments and even less likely to have a high school diploma 
(2003: 166-167). Kemp and Davidson note that both females, younger people, and people with mental 
health conditions have assumed greater proportions of Incapacity Benefit rolls in the United Kingdom 
(2010). 
In the United States in the 1990s and 2000s, SSDI caseload grew 300% while relative 
employment of disabled workers fell by 50% (Maestas, Mullen, and Strand, 2013: 1797). However, von 
Wachter, Song, and Manchester posit that the overall employment potential of the SSDI caseload has 
increased since the 1970s due to the increase in beneficiaries who are younger, longer-lived and who have 
nonterminal impairments like back pain and mental health (2011: 3309-3310). They also note that DI 
recipients are also more likely to be female. Von Wachter, Song, and Manchester suggest that the changes 
in SSDI population are due to declining job prospects for low-skilled workers and revisions to the 
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eligibility process in the 1980s that made it easier to obtain benefits for conditions that are more difficult 
to identify on medical terms alone.43  
Targeting Efficiency and Spillovers onto Other Programs 
Some authors have also considered the targeting efficiency of DI programs; or in other words, 
whether more stringent eligibility requirements result in lower DI enrollment and higher employment 
among those who are ‘truly able’ rather than ‘truly disabled’ (Gruber & Kubik, 1997).  Parsons argues 
that increases to policy parameters like the denial rate and longer waiting times before applying for DI 
can result in greater reductions in DI benefit receipt among disabled adults rather than able bodied adults, 
due to differences in risk aversion, mortality expectations, and credit market constraints (1991). 
Notably, Parsons does not find that a change in the denial rate of disability insurance in 1977 led 
to perverse screening effects (1991). Using Body Mass Index (BMI) as a proxy for health and therefore a 
proxy for being disabled, Gruber and Kubik also do not find perverse screening effects, concluding that 
denial rate increases were correctly targeted at those who were not disabled (1997: 20).  
De Jong, van der Klauuw, and Lindebloom (2011) conduct an experiment, wherein caseworkers 
in two of 26 Dutch regions were instructed to screen DI applications more stringently (spending 40% 
longer than in control regions). Their DD model shows that stricter screening decreased long-term 
sickness absenteeism (absent spells lasting longer than 13 weeks) and DI applications, but increased 
screening has no impact on unemployment insurance receipt. In other words, while sickness insurance is a 
complement to DI, there appears to be no relationship between DI and unemployment insurance. De Jong, 
van der Klauuw, and Lindebloom posit that no observable effect on unemployment suggests that there 
were no perverse effects of stricter screening (wherein disabled individuals experienced a reduction in 
benefits). 
                                               
43 The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 revised standards for mental health impairments, 
placed more weight on treating physician’s opinion, and put greater emphasis on combined effects of multiple 
impairments than the absence of a single severe impairment (von Wachter, Song, and Manchester, 2011: 3308). 
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The use of enrollment in other programs as an indicator of perverse screening effects is common 
in DI literature, however the extent to which non-DI enrollment is a reasonable indicator of perverse 
effects likely depends on both the design of the study as well as practical characteristics of the programs 
(eligibility, application process, time limits, benefit amounts, etc.) and how they interact. For example, De 
Jong, van der Klauuw, and Lindebloom suggest that the stricter screening in the Dutch DI system may be 
less likely to result in perverse effects, because Dutch DI applicants receive sick pay up to 100% of their 
net earnings during their waiting period, as opposed to American DI applicants, who have no income 
during their waiting period. In the United Kingdom, claimants receive a weekly benefit of £65.45 while 
their claim is being assessed (see Table 2.1). Those who are employed before moving to disability are 
also entitled to approximately £90 per week of statutory sick pay for up to 28 weeks. 
De Jong, van der Klauuw, and Lindebloom’s data do not cover sectors such as construction and 
retail, which are typically comprised of higher rates of low-skill workers. Further, the protocol for DI 
determination that they describe involves a series of actions taken by an employee with their employer, 
leaving one to ask what the process would be for someone unemployed or not in the labor force. The 
estimate De Jong, van der Klauuw, and Lindebloom find may overstate the employment effects and 
understate the perverse screening effects of increased DI eligibility screening insofar as the experiment 
inadvertently focused on workers with stronger ties to work.  
Several other authors find evidence of spillovers into other social welfare programs following 
changes to a DI program. Staubli finds that Austria’s tightened eligibility requirements were associated 
with increases in unemployment and sickness insurance enrollment of 3.5-3.9 and 0.7 percentage points, 
respectively (Staubli, 2011). Unemployment insurance and sickness insurance act as substitutes for DI. 
Clasen et al. (2006) observe that despite some employment gains among young people and decreased 
transitions from employment to long term sick for older people, there is an increased flow from 
unemployment into long-term sickness. Therefore, IWA did not result in a decrease in overall enrollment 
into Incapacity Benefits (IB) (Clasen et al., 2006).  
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Karlström et al. (2008) employ a difference-in-differences design to capture the impact of 
tightened DI eligibility requirements for those aged 60-64 in Sweden that was enacted in 1997. While 
they find no significant effect on employment, there is an increase to both the unemployment rate and 
utilization of sickpay insurance for the treated group (Karlström et al., 2008: 2081), suggesting that other 
social welfare programs absorbed the individuals who would have otherwise moved into DI benefit 
receipt. Riphan (1997) and Larsson (2006) discuss the potential interactions between UI and DI programs. 
 The policy significance of program spillovers is obvious: underlying much of the DI literature is 
the great fiscal expense of paying DI benefits, to individuals who are extremely unlikely to exit the DI 
program for reasons other than death or retirement (French & Song, 2014). Indeed, in 2008, 1.5 million 
Incapacity Benefit recipients in the U.K. had been enrolled in the program for over five years (DWP, 
2008: 85). Transitions out of DI into other programs do not represent fiscal savings. But more 
importantly, if spillovers into other programs signify issues in targeting efficiency, efforts to reduce the 
disability rolls potentially cause undue hardship for the population DI is designed to serve. Indeed, over 
60 percent of those denied SSI or SSDI benefits are allowed benefits in 10 years, suggesting that those 
denied benefits continue to appeal and reapply, during which time they have no income, until they get 
benefits (French & Song, 2014: 321).  
Deshpande (2016) examines the effects of changes to eligibility determinations for Social 
Security Income (SSI) from the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996. 
The policy change increased the number and strictness of medical reviews for SSI recipients turning 18 
after August 22, 1996 (when PRWORA was enacted), creating a discontinuity in the likelihood of 
removal from SSI at that date. Using a regression discontinuity design (DD-RR), she finds that youths 
removed from SSI experience a large reduction in income and an increase in income volatility. 
Incapacity Benefit (IB), the Work Capability Assessment (WCA), and Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) 
The number of people on incapacity benefits tripled in the 1980s and 1990s despite improvements 
to overall health (Black, 2008, 85). In 2007, 2.7 million people in the U.K. received Incapacity Benefit, 
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costing the U.K. government £12 billion a year; more than half of claimants were under the age of fifty 
(O’Day & Stapleton, 2008). For reference, the working age population44  is comprised of 36.6 million 
people (Black, 2008, 29). 
Six hundred thousand people moved onto IB each year, with mental health issues as the most 
common primary health concern. In fact, while there had been a decline in the on-flow of nearly all other 
health concerns, the on-flow of people with mental ill-health remained at roughly 200,000 (one third of all 
claims) per year since the late 90s (Black, 2008: 85).  Approximately 28% of those coming onto IB had 
been receiving Income Support (IS) or Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) immediately beforehand (Kemp 
and Davidson, 2010: 208). 
Through the Work Capability Assessment and incentives to work created by the Employment and 
Support Allowance established by the Welfare Reform Act of 2007, the U.K. government publicly 
announced its target was to remove one million people off of disability benefits by 2015 (Black, 2008, 
45). Overall, 1.5 million IB recipients were due to be reassessed (DWP, 2011: 4). 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) 
In October 2008, Incapacity Benefits (IB), Severe Disablement Allowance (SWA), and Income 
Support (IS) were replaced by a new benefit, the Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), for new 
claimants. IB is a contributory benefit payable if the claimant has made sufficient National Insurance (NI) 
contributions. If a claimant does not have sufficient NI contributions, they can claim IS, a means-tested 
benefit, on grounds of incapacity instead. IS could be paid on its own or it could top up IB. SDA is a 
benefit for people who are severely disabled and have been incapable of work since before April 2001. 
                                               
44 Working age is defined as ages 16 to 59 for females and ages 16 to 64 for males. This is consistent with the 
current school-leaving age and State Pension age. The State Pension age is being gradually increased for women (to 
ultimately be consistent with men), while the State Pension age has been increased for men over time, as well. 
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 The ESA has two parts: a contribution-based ESA and an income-related ESA. Contributions-
based ESA replaced SDA (a non-taxed benefit) and IB (a taxed benefit),45 and income-related ESA 
replaced Income Support (see Figure 2.1). The ESA has different tax implications from the benefits it 
replaces. Contributions-based ESA benefits are taxable, whereas income-related ESA are not, potentially 
changing the tax liability for those receiving SDA or IB. 
 Eligibility for the ESA is determined by the Work Capability Assessment (WCA), which, 
according to the aims of the DWP, focused on what individuals can do, rather than what they cannot do. 
Claimants complete a limited capability for work questionnaire (ESA50), a checklist of potential levels of 
impairment in different activities. Based upon the contents of the ESA50 and supplementary evidence, a 
Jobcentre Plus46 decision maker determines whether a face-to-face assessment is needed. Face-to-face 
assessments were completed by the DWP’s medical services contractor (first Atos Healthcare; later 
Maximus). The Department of Work and Pensions stated that they intended for the most severely disabled 
or terminally ill claimants to not require a face-to-face appointment (2011, 5).  
 An ESA claimant is determined to either be fit for work, or eligible for ESA. Those who are 
deemed fit for work may apply for Job Seeker’s Allowance and may still qualify for Income Support for 
another condition of entitlement (such as being a carer or a single parent). Those assessed as eligible for 
ESA fall into two groups: 
• Support Group: those who are most severely disabled and have limited capability for work-
related activity. Individuals in the Support Group may choose to receive work-related support, but 
they are not required to take part in work-related activities. 
• Work-Related Activity Group (WRAG): those who have limited capability for work. These 
individuals are required to attend work-focused interviews (WFIs) and undertake mandatory 
“work-related activity,” which include voluntary work, work trials or a training programme. 
Claimants can have their benefits cut if they do not comply. 
                                               
45 In some instances, IB is not taxed, such as for claimant who have received IB since before April 1995 for the 
same illness (DWP, 2011: 6).  
46 Jobcentre Plus is an agency of the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). 
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Weekly benefits for ESA and IB in 2010/2011 are detailed in Table 2.1; the policy change 
represented by the shift to ESA and the WCA did not include a change in benefit rates. By design, rates 
were not to be substantially different; in fact, those assigned to the Support Group were to receive a very 
small increase in their weekly benefit rates. 
A majority of ESA recipients were expected to fall into the WRAG. As with IB, those receiving 
ESA may engage in within certain limits. Under permitted work rules as at April 2018, ESA recipients 
can work for less than 16 hours a week, earning up to £125.50 a week, or do 'supported permitted work', 
earning up to £125.50 a week (DWP, nd). 
IB Claimants and their Movement to ESA  
Existing IB, SDA, and IS recipients continued to receive their benefits until the reassessment of 
IB recipients was piloted first with 1,700 individuals in Aberdeen, Scotland and Burnley, England in 
October 2010. This was followed by a limited introduction phase beginning in February, 2011 and a 
national roll-out in April, 2011. Individuals who reached State Pension Age during the reassessment 
period (in other words, before April 6, 2014) did not undergo reassessment in order to avoid having to 
change benefits twice in a short period. If a claimant was found to be eligible for ESA, their benefits were 
converted; if a claimant was found to be fit for work, they could claim Jobseeker’s Allowance or enter 
work (if a claimant appeals the decision, they continue to receive pre-assessment benefits until closure of 
the appeal). 
 Most current incapacity benefits claimants had a Personal Capability Assessment (PCA), the 
predecessor to the WCA, on a regular basis to assess how their health condition or disability affects their 
ability to work (DWP, 2011: 11-12). Each individual’s reassessment was based on their review date (or 
the end of their prognosis period) set by their last PCA. Those claimants who were exempt from 
undertaking a PCA had their review date set by Jobcentre Plus. The reassessment dates for other 
claimants were subject to adjustment (termed ‘smoothing’), wherein the PCA is a guide for reassessment 
date, but in some cases,  it may be before or after this date. It is not clear how prevalent ‘smoothing’ was 
in the reassessment process. 
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 Approximately 11,000 claimants a week were contacted for reassessment, with all 1.5 million 
reassessments to take place over three years (House of Commons, 2011).  By the end of 2013, IB 
reassessment had dropped considerably; for instance, before the first quarter of 2014, 90% of existing IB 
claimants had been reassessed (DWP, 2016: 5). 
Application of the WCA 
In general, the WCA is a much more stringent determination of benefit eligibility than the 
Personal Capability Assessment (PCA). Although both the WCA and PCA are points-based, some 
impairments like walking difficulties score fewer points in the WCA than under the PCA, and many 
minor disabilities no longer count. Some claimants, who could previously add up lower scores across 
different “descriptors” to meet the threshold for eligibility under the PCA, may no longer be eligible 
under the WCA (Kennedy, 2012). 
Although a greater proportion of new claims were being rejected compared to previous benefits, 
the overall number of people claiming all incapacity benefits remained largely the same since the 
introduction of ESA in October 2008 to November 2010 (Harrington, 2010: 27). Of completed new ESA 
claims from October 2008 to February 2010, 65 percent of claimants were found fit for work, 25 per cent 
were allocated to the WRAG, and 10 per cent were allocated to the Support Group (Harrington, 2010: 
27). 
A high proportion of new ESA claimants withdrew their application before completion. 
Approximately 75% of all new ESA claims were unsuccessful due to: (a) withdrawal of the claim by the 
applicant or closure of the claim by Jobcentre Plus for non-return of the questionnaire or non-attendance 
at an interview (36%); or (b) the claimant being found fit for work (39%). (Barnes et al., 2011: 6).  
The ESA has been plagued with practical issues, mostly relating to the WCA. In his independent 
review of the WCA, Professor Malcolm Harrington concluded the WCA was not working as it should, 
citing strong evidence that the process was impersonal and mechanistic and lacked transparency and 
communication between parties, resulting in poor decision making and high rates of appeals (Harrington, 
2010: 9). The mechanistic elements of the WCA were implemented by design, in order to assess the many 
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thousands of claims made each month as well as to make the assessment repeatable (Harrington, 2010: 
23). Markedly, he stated that the final decision on benefit assignment, which theoretically rests with 
Jobcentre Plus, is practically dominated by Atos Healthcare (Harrington, 2010: 10).  
Also, there was already evidence that some conditions, such as mental health conditions or 
conditions which fluctuated in severity, were inadequately measured. The Support Group was to include 
those who were terminally ill or those receiving certain types of chemotherapy, however there were media 
reports of claimants deemed fit for work dying shortly after assessment (Gentleman, 2010 and Gentleman, 
2011). 
It was in this context that the IB reassessments began nationally in early 2011. Harrington 
claimed in 2013 that he urged a delay in the reassessment process until issues with the WCA were 
addressed (Butler, 2013: np). Due to differences in the PCA and WCA, it was expected that more 
claimants would be rejected under the WCA, but early figures suggested even higher rates of 
‘disallowance’ than anticipated (Kennedy, 2012: 14). Table 2.2 presents Kennedy’s comparison of the 
Labour Government’s estimates of the relative proportions of ESA groups from December 2009 (before 
the ESA and WCA were implemented) with actual outcomes from reassessments (2012: 20). 
As of November 2012, 59% of claimants who underwent an initial assessment (a new claim to 
ESA) were declared fit for work; 40% of these claimants appealed, and 38% of appeals were successful. 
Of reassessed IB claims, 34% had been deemed fit for work (Kennedy, 2012: 1). 
Controversies and Adjustments 
Following internal DWP reviews, the assessment criteria of the WCA were further tightened in 
March 2011 despite high rates of appeals and findings that the WCA process lacked clarity and empathy. 
Additional procedural changes were made in light of Professor Harrington’s reviews from November 
2010 and November 2011 (Kennedy, 2012: 15).  
In April 2012, the Government limited receipt of ESA by WRAG members to 12 months; this 
applied to all WRAG members, including those who had been migrated from IB to ESA. The 
Government cited the budget deficit and the fact that the vast majority of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
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recipients are in employment after one year (House of Commons, 2011). Of course, the JSA population is 
younger and has more work experience than the typical ESA recipient. In its 2011 report, the House of 
Commons Work and Pensions Committee also noted that there was no apparent evidence on the 
appropriate length of time for which contributory ESA should be payable to support claimants moving 
into employment. 
The first contractor conducting assessments was Atos Healthcare, however amid mounting 
criticism that thousands of disabled individuals were inaccurately determined as ‘fit for work,’ Atos 
bought out of its contract with the Department of Work and Pensions in March 2015. The Department of 
Work and Pensions replaced Atos Healthcare with the US company, Maximus (Gentleman, 2015: np), 
which itself was mired with reports of similar issues (NAO, 2016; McVeigh, 2016).  
In 2015, the Government released mortality figures of claimants flowing off of either ESA or 
IB/SDA benefits: over 81,000 people passed away at the same time of their benefit off-flow, from 
December 2011 to February 2014 (DWP, 2015: 5). DWP asserted that no causal effect could be assumed 
from these figures, however, at the very least, the figures are indicative of inaccurate assessment. Worse, 
Barr et al. (2016a) found that the WCA increased suicide and antidepressant use. 
More recently, the National Audit Office (NAO) announced that approximately 700,000 disabled 
people were underpaid £340 million in benefits from 2011 to 2014, and that the DWP failed to correct the 
error despite discovering it in 2014 (Butler, 2018: np.). The DWP error stemmed from claimants being 
put onto contributory ESA only, when they were also eligible for income-related ESA. Approximately 
45,000 are owed £2,500, another 20,000 are owed £11,500, and a small number of claimants are due to 
receive as much as £20,000 (Butler, 2018: np.). 
 In 2018, 2.4 million people received benefits for a disability or sickness, costing the U.K. 
government  £15 billion (Butler, 2018: np.). Over a decade after the passage of the Welfare Reform Act, 
the number of people on disability rolls had decreased by 300,000, and spending had increased by £3 
billion. 
 




Clearly, the Government’s stated goal of removing one million people from the disability rolls by 
2015 was not achieved. But was the Government successful in inducing people into work? To estimate 
the effects of this policy on benefit receipt and employment, I use Understanding Society, or the UK 
Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), data. Understanding Society is a longitudinal survey of 
members of approximately 40,000 households (at Wave 1, in 2009) in the United Kingdom, following 
these individuals every year. Interviews are carried out face-to face in respondents’ homes or through a 
self-completion online survey on a range of topics including health, work, education, income, family, and 
social life. These data were pulled from the UK Data Service and required special license access. The 
sample spans 2009 to 2016, however I will limit my analysis to 2009-2014, as reassessment was largely 
completed by Quarter 1 of 2014. 
Population of Interest 
 The population of interest is individuals who received Incapacity Benefit prior to national IB 
reassessment (February 2011). I construct a time-invariant variable, IB Recipient, equaling 1 if an 
individual received IB, or SDA prior to February 2011 and equaling 0 otherwise. In order to construct this 
variable, I used the UKHLS variables: btype3 (which indicates whether the respondent receives sick, 
disability or incapacity benefit, including ESA), jbstat (which indicates one’s economic activity, one of 
which is long term sick or disabled), and health (indicating whether the respondent has a long-standing 
illness or impairment).47 If btype3, jbstat, or health indicated the respondent was off of work, receiving 
sickness, incapacity or disability benefits or had a long-standing illness or impairment prior to February 
2011, I coded IB Recipient equal to 1. Unfortunately, the way IB Recipient is constructed can result in a 
small group of people for whom IB Recipient equals 1, who actually received ESA rather than IB or 
SDA.  My sample is approximately 15,000 people with roughly 67,000 person-wave observations, 
                                               
47 Jbstat and health are added to the construction of IB Recipient, as there are approximately 8,000 people who do 
not report receiving benefits but who do report being long-term sick or disabled as their current economic activity or 
who report having a long-term illness or impairment. 
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therefore there is a substantial trade-off between more precision in the population of interest and the 
statistical power. 
Explanatory Variable 
Ideally, I would be able to observe when an individual undergoes IB reassessment with the WCA. 
However, while the UKHLS contains data on benefit receipt (type, amount), employment, and health, 
along with countless other characteristics, it does not contain this particular variable. I therefore rely on 
variation at an aggregated level to proxy for likelihood a particular individual underwent reassessment. 
UKHLS data are matched by local authority district (LAD) and quarter to the independent 
variables. My primary independent variable is the quarterly IB reassessment rate, at the LAD level (there 
are 364 LADs over 11 government office regions, or GORS, in my analysis)48 from the Department of 
Work and Pensions (DWP, n.d.-a). It should be noted that the same policy was rolled out nationwide; 
there is no known policy variation at the Local Authority District level—this is simply the method of 
reporting geographic variation in reassessment by the Department of Work and Pensions. Specifically 
regarding sources of geographic variation in implementation, the final decision was theoretically made by 
Jobcentre Plus/DWP staff, however the decision practically rested with an Atos Healthcare Professional 
(HCP). In October 2014, there were 30 Atos healthcare offices (NAO, 2016).  While there was a common 
misconception that the Department of Work and Pensions or Atos had either implicit or explicit targets 
around  those found fit for work, Harrington’s review for this to be categorically untrue (2010). There 
were, however, targets around completion of assessments. Without any evidence to suggest otherwise, I 
assume that the variation in reassessment across LADS is due to factors that can be considered plausibly 
exogenous to group assignment, such as administrative capacity. I also include a range of individual-, 
LAD-, and GOR-level covariates to further address this concern. 
                                               
48 There are 12 GORs in the United Kingdom: East Midlands, East of England, London, North East, North West, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, South East, South West, Wales, West Midlands, and Yorkshire and Humber. Northern 
Ireland is omitted from this analysis, as it has a different incapacity benefit system. 
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The reassessment rate (IBRR) is the proportion of IB reassessments that have been completed 
(i.e. a decision has been made) out of either (a) the working age population in that LAD or (b) all claims 
that have come up for reassessment (i.e. the claimant’s review date has passed) in that LAD. I also 
consider the rates of ESA receipt at the LAD level and the Fit For Work rates at the LAD level (both by 
population and by caseload). The reassessment rate was compiled from reports published by the DWP. 
Please see Table 2.3 for variation in quarterly IB reassessment rates over 2010-2014, on a national level. 
Outcome Variables 
My primary outcome variables are whether an individual receives ESA and their logged net 
benefit income (both from UKHLS data). I replaced observed incomes of £0 with £1 in order to capture 
whether a respondent had no income from either labor or benefits. I also look at whether a respondent is 
employed in a given wave (binary) and whether they are not participating in the labor force in a given 
wave (binary); however, I do not find statistically significant effects for these employment variables and 
therefore do not present them here.  
Covariates from UKHLS 
I construct several covariates from UKHLS data, including educational qualification (edqual), 
SF12 Physical Component Summary (SF12PCS), and SF12 Mental Component Summary (SF12MCS), 
which require further explanation.  
U.K. educational qualifications as well as their labor market value are significantly different from 
the United States, and devolution in the United Kingdom presents some additional complications in 
constructing a common education variable for England, Wales, and Scotland. I constructed this variable, 
edqual, based upon the following national qualifications frameworks: the Regulated Qualifications 
Framework (RQF) for England, the Credit and Qualifications Framework for Wales (CQFW) for Wales, 
and the Scottish Credit and Qualifications Framework (SCQF) for Scotland. Possible values for edqual 
are: none; school leaving exam; GCSE or equivalent; AS level; A level or equivalent; Some College or 
equivalent (e.g. a diploma in higher education or certain teaching and nursing qualifications); 1st degree 
(e.g. BA or BSc, PGCE, or professional association); and Higher Degree (e.g. MSc or PhD). 
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The SF12 Physical Component Summary (SF12PCS, for physical health) and SF12 Mental 
Component Summary (SF12MCS, for mental health). SF12PCS and SF12MCS summarize the 
respondent’s answer to origin questions into a single physical functioning score and a single mental 
functioning score (respectively). SF12PCS and SF12MCS are continuous scales with a range of 0 (low 
functioning) to 100 (high functioning). 
Covariates from Other Sources 
I include annual working age (16-64) population figures at the LAD-level, downloaded from the 
Office for National Statistics’ data site, NOMIS.  I also add GOR-level variables that may confound the 
relationship between my individual-level outcome variables and region-level IB reassessment: 
unemployment rates, gross value added (GVA), and public expenditures. Unemployment rates are from 
the Labor Force Survey, also from NOMIS. Unemployment rates are reported monthly but relate to 
interviews conducted over a three-month period, ending on the date selected. For example, selecting 
January 2011 will give data which covers the period November 2010 to January 2011. GVA figures are 
reported annually and are also downloaded from NOMIS. Gross value added (GVA) is an annual measure 
of the increase in the value of each GOR’s economy due to the production of goods and services; 
estimates are in ‘real’ pounds. I have two public expenditures variables, pulled from HM Treasury: total 
per head expenditures on all services49 and per head expenditures on social protection. The start and the 
end of the fiscal year do not correspond to the start and end of the calendar year; therefore the reported 
years overlap two calendar years (e.g. 2008-2009); I matched public expenditure figures to the second 
calendar year (in other words, 2008-2009 was matched to 2009 observations in my dataset).  
Table 2.4 shows baseline (2009-2010) unweighted summary statistics for IB recipients; Table 
2.5 presents baseline weighted summary statistics. 
                                               
49 Services can be broken up by function; for example: public safety, defence, education, economic affairs (including 
employment), and social protection (namely, benefits and credits). 
 




I use an individual-level Fixed Effects (FE) model50 in the below equation: 
!"#$%&'()*+ = -( + /(1233)*+) + 56()*+ + 78)*+ + 9:*+ + ;+ + <()*+ 
The subscripts refer to: i, individual; d, local authority district, g, government office region, and t, time. 
The primary outcomes are ESA receipt and logged benefit income.51 The primary explanatory variable is 
IBRR (or the Incapacity Benefit Reassessment Rate, measured quarterly at the Local Authority District 
level), however I also use other rates associated with IB reassessment, such as the proportion of ESA 
recipients, the Fit for Work rate, the proportion assigned to the WRAG, and the proportion assigned to the 
Support Group. I look at these rates or proportions not only as proportions of the LAD working-age (16-
65) population but also as a proportion of the ESA caseload at the LAD-level. 
X is a vector of individual-level characteristics: educational qualification, whether the respondent 
is married, whether the respondent has a child under the age of 4, and SF12PCS and SF12MCS. 
Q is a vector containing LAD-level characteristics, namely working age population. Z is a vector 
of GOR-level characteristics: unemployment rate, gross value added (GVA), and per-head GOR-level 
spending. The variables in Z are not available at a geographical unit lower than GOR. Regarding GOR-
level spending, I primarily use total expenditures social protection, although I alternatively control for per 
head expenditures on all services (of which social protection is a subset) and find similar results. 
Finally, -( is an individual fixed effect, and  ;+ is a year fixed effect.  An individual fixed effect 
controls for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity among individuals that may otherwise bias my 
                                               
50 In Stata 15.1, using reghdfe command. 
51 I also test employment, non-participation in the workforce, and monthly net labor income, however the results for 
these outcome variables are either not significant or not robust to alternative specification. The results for 
employment and non-participation in the workforce are shown in Table A-2.2 and Table A-2.3, respectively, in 
Appendix 2.1, Notably, a 10 percentage point increase in a LADs IB Reassessment Rate (by caseload) is associated 
with a 3.3 percentage point drop in non-participation in the labor force, and a 10 percentage point increase in the 
FFW Rate (by caseload) is associated with a 4.7 percentage point drop in non-participation in the labor force (Table 
A-2.3). 
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results.  Standard errors were clustered at the individual and local authority district level using STATA’s 
reghdfe command. 
Results 
Disability Insurance Receipt 
Results for regressions with ESA Receipt as the outcome can be seen in Table 2.6.52 This tests 
the impact of LAD-level rates of IB reassessment on the probability that a former IB recipient is migrated 
to the Employment and Support Allowance. Overall, LAD-level reassessment rates have modest but 
statistically significant positive impacts on ESA receipt. Models 1-3 use rates of LAD-level IB 
reassessment (the number of completed IB reassessment cases), ESA receipt (those completed cases that 
were granted ESA), and FFW assignment (those completed cases whose claimants were regarded as fit 
for work) as proportions of each local authority district’s working age population. Models 4-6 use these 
same rates as a proportion of the caseload in each local authority district. 
The effect of any primary explanatory outcome variable is small; for example, the coefficient for 
IBRR in Model 1 can be interpreted as a 10 percentage point increase in the IB reassessment rate among 
the population is associated with a 16.47 percentage point increase in the likelihood of ESA receipt, all 
else equal (significant at 95% confidence level). However, there are a few notable results. For instance, it 
is not surprising that the ‘population’ explanatory variables have coefficients that are larger in magnitude 
than the ‘caseload’ coefficients; a 100 percentage point increase in a proportion of the entire population 
constitutes a larger relative change in absolute numbers of people than the same increase in a proportion 
of the ESA caseload. Certainly, IBRR as a proportion of caseload (Model 4) is not significant, while 
IBRR as a proportion of population (Model 1) is significant. 
One would expect to see results of higher magnitude for the population measures of IB 
reassessment, however the sign for FFW is positive when measured as a proportion of population and 
negative when measured a proportion of caseload. Further, Models (5) and (6) show coefficients for ESA 
                                               
52 Coefficients for covariates are omitted from results tables, however a full table is available in Appendix 2.1 
(Table A-2.1). 
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Receipt and FFW that are expectedly inverse of one another. A claimant is either assessed as fit for work 
or as eligible for receiving ESA benefits. This inverse relationship does not hold when looking at the 
‘population’ variables. FFW, either as a proportion of population or as a proportion of caseload, is not 
significant, however. As can be observed in Model 2, a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion 
people in a Local Authority District receiving ESA is associated with a nearly 21 percentage point 
increase in in the likelihood of individual ESA receipt, all else equal (significant at 95% confidence 
level). 
The effects in Table 2.6 are broadly consistent with expectations; the WCA assessed IB 
recipients, those most likely to have a severe and longer-lasting impairment, as eligible for continued 
disability benefits, therefore IB reassessment rates would be associated with greater likelihood of ESA 
receipt.53 
Benefit Income 
Next, I look at the effects of these rates on an individual’s monthly net benefit income (Table 
2.7), which are largely consistent with my findings from Models 1-6 in Table 6. Increases to IB 
reassessment rates are associated with slight increases in net monthly benefit income. For example, a 100 
percentage point increase in the proportion of the population receiving ESA is associated with a nearly 
9% increase in net monthly benefit income, all else equal, significant at 90% (Model 8). 
I attempt to understand how the rates of different ESA groups might affect income through 
Models 9 and 10. Though the sample size is small, leading to some constraints with statistical power, one 
would expect higher proportions of people assigned to the WRAG to be associated with a slightly lower 
benefit income relative to the Support Group (refer to Table 2.1 for the benefit schedule). This is not the 
case; not only is the coefficient for WRAG (Caseload, Model 9), larger than Support Group (Caseload, 
Model 10) in magnitude but it is also significant at the 95% level, whereas Support Group is not.  
                                               
53 I stratify these regressions by educational attainment, age (16-24, 25-49, 50-64), and primary health concern. Most 
stratifications produce insignificant results, likely due to smaller sample sizes. However, I observe higher-magnitude 
results for people with a GCSE or equivalent, for those aged 50-64, and for people with impairments related to 
mobility, lifting objects, and manual dexterity. 
 




 I hypothesize that the above result is due to behavioral changes in response to being transferred 
over to the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG); whereas assignment into the Support Group—which 
offers comparable benefit levels to IB—results in no change in behavior. There was no required action 
attached to benefit receipt for Incapacity Benefits, whereas if a claimant is assigned to the WRAG, they 
must complete particular job market tasks such as work-focused interviews or training, or otherwise risk 
being sanctioned.  Assignment into the WRAG may induce previous IB recipients to seek out other 
benefits, which they qualified for previously but did not request.  
I conduct a test of this theory in Table 2.8; once the ESA was established, UKHLS asked its 
respondents who received ESA whether they were assigned to the WRAG or Support Group. This allows 
me to examine the relationship between group assignment and benefit income, as well as group 
assignment and receipt of other benefits. I continue to use an individual- and year- fixed effects model 
with individual- and GOR-level covariates included, as discussed in the Methods discussion. An 
individual’s assignment to the WRAG is associated with a 9% increase in benefit income, relative to not 
receiving ESA, significant at the 99% confidence level (Model 11). Notably, the magnitude for the 
coefficient on WRAG Assignment is slightly greater than the coefficient on SG Assignment, suggesting 
that assignment to the work-conditioned benefit is associated with slightly higher benefit income than 
higher-value benefit without work conditions. 
In Models 12-15, I regress group assignment on receipt of various benefits: Income Support, a 
range of housing-related benefits (Housing Benefit), Disability Living Allowance (DLA)/Personal 
Independence Payment (PIP).54 Model 12 regresses these group assignments on the receipt of any of the 
                                               
54 Income Support is a benefit afforded to low-income and low-wealth individuals who work fewer than 16 hours 
per week for a qualifying reason (Income Support, n.d.). Housing-related benefits include: Housing Benefit, Council 
Tax Benefit, Rent Rebate, and Rate Rebate, means-tested programs intended to help individuals and families meet 
housing costs. Disability Living Allowance (DLA) is a non-means tested, non-contributory benefit paid to disabled 
claimants who have personal care or mobility needs; the DLA was phased out for the majority of non-elderly adult 
claimants between 2013-2015 and replaced by the Personal Independence Payment (PIP), a similarly non-means 
tested, non-contributory benefit.  
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above benefits, plus Child Benefit, Job Seeker’s Allowance, and Universal Credit.55 Being assigned to the 
WRAG is not associated with a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of receiving other 
benefits (Model 12). Being assigned to either ESA group is associated with a decreased likelihood of 
receiving Income Support (Model 13). Though there is a statistically significant relationship between 
assignment to the Support Group and receipt of Housing Benefit, though the coefficient on WRAG 
assignment is not significant (Model 14).  Finally, assignment to the WRAG is associated with a higher 
probability of DLA/PIP receipt, though assignment to the Support Group is associated with a greater 
increase in that likelihood (Model 15). It is reasonable to expect that those assigned to the Support Group 
are more likely to receive DLA/PIP, as the Support Group and DLA/PIP payments are intended for 
individuals with more severe impairments. 
It may be that claimants do not immediately identify benefits for which they are eligible, such 
that any inducement of IB recipients to claim other benefits will occur some time after being migrated 
onto ESA. Additionally, the Government limited receipt of ESA by all WRAG members to 12 months in 
April 2012, including those who had been migrated from IB to ESA (my population of interest); an ESA 
recipient anticipating the end of their benefits after one year may attempt to get other benefits around the 
time that their ESA benefits end. 
I lag ESA group assignment by one year (survey wave) in Table 2.9 to examine both of these 
theories. Learning effects (differential impact of group assignment between immediate assignment and 
one year after assignment) should be captured by the coefficient on lagged SG assignment, whereas 
policy spillovers resulting from application of work conditions and a shorter time horizon for benefits 
should be captured by the coefficient on WRAG lagged assignment. 
                                               
55 Child Benefit is an allowance given to all individuals per child. Job Seeker’s Allowance is an unemployment 
benefit for people who are unemployed and actively looking for work. Universal Credit is a payment designed to 
combine and replace six benefits for working-age, low-income people: Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefit, Income 
Support, income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), income-related Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), 
and the Working Tax Credit. Gradual roll-out of the Universal Credit began in 2013, beginning initially with new 
claimants, however there have been multiple delays in implementation, with a full move not due to be completed 
until 2024 (Butler and Walker, 2018). 
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Assignment to the WRAG in the prior year is not associated with a higher benefit income (Model 
16), relative to those who did not receive the ESA following reassessment, likely as those in the WRAG 
experienced a discontinuation of their ESA payments. However, lagged WRAG assignment is associated 
with a nearly 11% increase in the likelihood of receiving other benefits, significant at the 90% level 
(Model 17). The magnitude of the WRAG coefficient is approximately twice as large as that of the 
Support Group, indicating ESA recipients in the WRAG group are uniquely induced to identify other 
benefits for which they are eligible; this is also the case for receipt of Disability Living 
Allowance/Personal Independence Payment (Model 20), in which the coefficient for lagged WRAG 
assignment is approximately six percentage points larger than that of lagged SG assignment. It appears 
that claimants assigned to the Work-Related Activity Group seek out other benefits, particularly 
Disability Living Allowance/Personal Independence Payment a year after being migrated from Incapacity 
Benefits to Employment and Support Allowance. 
Discussion 
The stated goal of the Work Capability Assessment and migration of recipients from Incapacity 
Benefits to the Employment and Support Allowance was to decrease the number of claimants to disability 
insurance, thereby increasing labor force participation. There was extensive media coverage of claimants 
losing their benefits, however the results found in this paper suggest the opposite. At least for individuals 
who likely have the most severe, long-lasting impairments (existing IB recipients), the Work Capability 
Assessment and corresponding IB reassessments had little to no impact on employment and were 
associated with increases in receipt of ESA benefits and net benefit income. These results indicate that the 
Work Capability Assessment may have been well-targeted and fit for purpose, at least insofar as those 
who are least capable of work were assessed as eligible for ESA. However, some of my results in Table 
2.8 and  Table 2.9 suggest assignment to the Work Related Activity Group is associated with program 
spillovers, in particular Disability Living Allowance/Personal Independence Payment.  
My analysis is hampered by a small sample size, an inability to observe when each individual 
undergoes reassessment, and less precise variable measurement. Although I control for GOR-level 
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unemployment, GVA, and public expenditures as well as LAD-level population, it is possible that 
geographical variation in assessment rates is driven by some characteristic that is correlated with my 
individual-level outcome variables. In order for this to threaten the validity of my results, geographical 
variation in assessment must be correlated with an unobserved time-varying individual-level variable, as 
my models include individual fixed effects. 
 Finally, it is likely that the Work Capability Assessment and the tightened eligibility requirements 
it represents had little effect on existing IB recipients and that the majority of its impacts were borne by 
new claimants to ESA. The greatest criticisms of the WCA surrounded its lack of nuance and 
consideration of barriers to work, particularly those with psychosocial issues; the Work Capability 
Assessment may represent the largest policy change for those who are not long-term or severely disabled. 
In other words, I expect to observe different effects (of larger magnitude) among new ESA claimants 
versus existing IB recipients, who had already been assessed as eligible for disability insurance using a 
different metric of assessment).  Future research should consider the new ESA claimant population, with 
the use of rates of assessment at the local authority district level as a possible source of policy variation. 
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Figure 2.1: Transition from Old Benefits to Employment and Support Allowance (ESA). 
 
Incapacity Benefit (IB)              ESA (contributory) 
Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA)     
 
 







Table 2.1: Weekly Benefit Rates, 2010/11 for single claimants aged 25 and over 
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Table 2.2: Expected versus Actual Outcomes of IB Reassessment 
 
Source: Kennedy, 2012: 20  
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Outcomes of claims where WCA has been completed 
Quarter Entitled to ESA 
FFW 
  WRAG Support Either Group 
Apr-11 to Jun-11 96.28% 39.32% 30.11% 69.43% 30.57% 
Jul-11 to Sep-11 95.88% 45.74% 27.09% 72.83% 27.17% 
Oct-11 to Dec-11 95.61% 47.86% 26.26% 74.12% 25.88% 
Jan-12 to Mar-12 95.58% 43.21% 31.54% 74.83% 25.17% 
Apr-12 to Jun-12 95.38% 42.06% 35.78% 77.91% 22.09% 
Jul-12 to Sep-12 96.18% 41.50% 40.15% 81.65% 18.35% 
Oct-12 to Dec-12 95.85% 38.72% 45.18% 83.90% 16.10% 
Jan-13 to Mar-13 95.19% 34.37% 52.71% 87.08% 12.92% 
Apr-13 to Jun-13 92.90% 22.34% 66.79% 89.13% 10.95% 
Jul-13 to Sep-13 87.86% 17.20% 71.50% 88.79% 11.21% 
Oct-13 to Dec-13 80.43% 16.22% 72.97% 89.19% 10.81% 
Jan-14 to Mar-14 76.34% 12.00% 80.00% 92.00% 9.00% 
Apr-14 to Jun-14 77.17% 9.86% 83.10% 92.96% 7.04% 
Rates are cumulative from October 2011 to the quarter specified. Volumes presented by the DWP are 
rounded to the nearest 100. Reassessment rate refers to the proportion of completed claims to all claims 
received. WRAG: Work-Related Activity Group; FFW: Fit for work. 
Source: Department of Work and Pensions (n.d.). Compiled by author. 
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Table 2.4: Unweighted Summary Statistics 
  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Age 12227.000 47.542 11.263 17 12,225 




3.240 2.376 0 7 12,227 
Married 0.537 0.499 0 1 12,227 
Child under 4 0.052 0.222 0 1 12,227 
SF12PCS 46.005 12.412 4.900 72.460 12,227 
SF12MCS 46.518 11.222 0 72.480 12,222 
Long-Term 
Impairment 0.622 0.485 0 1 12,224 
Employed 0.630 0.483 0 1 12,227 
Monthly Net 
Benefit Income £365.70 750.19 £0.10 £15,000 12,227 
Monthly Net 
Labor Income £935.27 1178.72 -£17,536.50 £15,000 12,227 
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Table 2.5: Weighted Summary Statistics 
  Mean Standard Deviation Observations 
Age 45.798 0.133 12,227 
Female 0.540 0.005 12,225 
Highest Educational 
Qualification 3.151 0.024 12,225 
Married 0.517 0.005 12,225 
Child under 4 0.051 0.002 12,225 
SF12PCS 46.457 0.120 12,225 
SF12MCS 46.392 0.114 12,225 
Long-Term Impairment 0.615 0.005 12,220 
Employed 0.639 0.005 12,217 
Monthly Net Benefit Income £344.04 6.86 12,217 
Monthly Net Labor Income £961.49 12.23 12,217 
Source: UKHLS (2009-2015) 
   
 
   
 
Table 2.6: The Effects of LAD-Level IB Reassessment Rates on Individual ESA Rate of Receipt 
         
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
IBRR (Population) 1.648**       
  (0.729)       
ESA Receipt (Population)  2.096**      
   (0.886)      
FFW (Population)   4.326     
    (3.227)     
IBRR (Caseload)    0.0857    
     (0.118)    
ESA Receipt (Caseload)     0.208*   
      (0.107)   
FFW (Caseload)      -0.194 
       (0.132) 
         
Observations 12,227 12,227 12,227 12,227 12,227 12,227 
R-squared 0.733 0.733 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 
Standard Errors Clustered at the Local Authority District Level and at the Individual Level using STATA’s reghdfe command. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 . Regressions 1-6 include individual and year fixed effects and also controlled for SF12PCS, SF12MCS, Highest Educational Qualification, 
Married, Has Child under 4, Unemployment (GOR-level), Gross Value Added (GOR-level), and Social Protection Expenditure per Head (GOR-level). 
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Table 2.7: The Effects of LAD-Level IB Reassessment Rates on Logged Net Monthly Benefit Income 
          
VARIABLES (7) (8) (9) (10) 
       
IBRR (Population) 7.839*     
  (4.327)     
ESA Receipt (Population)  8.972*    
   (5.117)    
WRAG (Caseload)   21.40**   
    (10.37)   
Support Group (ESA Caseload)    11.79 
     (9.763) 
WRAG (Caseload) = L,      
       
       
Observations 12,257 12,257 12,257 12,257 
R-squared 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.883 
Standard Errors Clustered at the Local Authority District Level and at the Individual Level using STATA's 
reghdfe command. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Regressions 7-11 include individual and year fixed 
effects and also controlled for SF12PCS, SF12MCS, Highest Educational Qualification, Married, Has Child 
under 4, Unemployment (GOR-level), Gross Value Added (GOR-level), and Social Protection Expenditure 
per Head (GOR-level). 
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Table 2.8: Effect of Work-Related Activity Group and Support Group Assignment on Benefit 
Outcomes 













VARIABLES (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
            
WRAG Assignment 0.903*** 0.0281 -0.167*** 0.0953 0.0867** 
  (0.250) (0.0469) (0.0556) (0.0586) (0.0418) 
SG Assignment 0.847*** 0.0727* -0.175*** 0.102*** 0.143*** 
  (0.207) (0.0406) (0.0376) (0.0369) (0.0409) 
       
Observations 17,424 17,424 17,422 17,424 17,424 
R-squared 0.844 0.799 0.731 0.746 0.836 
Standard Errors Clustered at the Local Authority District Level and at the Individual Level using the reghdfe 
command. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Regressions 12-16 include individual and year fixed effects and 
also controlled for SF12PCS, SF12MCS, Highest Educational Qualification, Married, Has Child under 4, 
Unemployment (GOR-level), Gross Value Added (GOR-level), and Social Protection Expenditure per Head 
(GOR-level). "Any Other Benefits" includes Income Support, Housing Benefit, Disability Living Allowance 
(DLA)/Personal Independence Payment (PIP), Child Benefit, and Universal Credit. Child Benefit, Job 
Seeker’s Allowance, and Universal Credit regressions are omitted from the table. 







Table 2.9: Effect of Lagged Work-Related Activity Group and Support Group Assignment on Benefit 
Outcomes 
        
  Logged 
Benefit 
Income 








VARIABLES (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
        
WRAG Assignment, Lagged 1 Yr. 0.0555 0.107* -0.0551 0.0891 0.153** 
  (0.418) (0.0566) (0.0861) (0.0723) (0.0771) 
SG Assignment, Lagged 1 Yr. 0.919*** 0.0554 -0.0641 0.0984** 0.0915* 
  (0.262) (0.0483) (0.0431) (0.0426) (0.0533) 
       
Observations 17,398 17,398 17,382 17,382 13,637 
R-squared 0.849 0.801 0.730 0.754 0.833 
Standard Errors Clustered at the Local Authority District Level and at the Individual Level using the reghdfe 
command. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Regressions 12-16 include individual and year fixed effects and 
also controlled for SF12PCS, SF12MCS, Highest Educational Qualification, Married, Has Child under 4, 
Unemployment (GOR-level), Gross Value Added (GOR-level), and Social Protection Expenditure per Head 
(GOR-level). "Any Other Benefits" includes Income Support, Housing Benefit, Disability Living Allowance 
(DLA)/Personal Independence Payment (PIP), Child Benefit, and Universal Credit. Child Benefit, Job 
Seeker’s Allowance, and Universal Credit regressions are omitted from the table. 








CHAPTER 3: STATE MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT: 
ANALYSIS OF HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS ACROSS OCCUPATIONS 
Previous empirical work on the minimum wage has examined its potential impacts 
on unemployment, however there may be other potential consequences for workers that cannot be 
observed in unemployment insurance rolls. There is evidence of the minimum wage inducing labor 
substitution across demographic groups and skill level, where groups are differentially affected by 
minimum wage increases (Fairris & Bujanda, 2008; Giuliano, 2013; Cengiz et al., 2019). For example, 
using personnel data from a nationwide retail firm, Giuliano (2013) found that the 1996 federal minimum 
wage resulted in a relative increase in the rate of teenage employment and a relative decrease in the rate 
of employment of workers aged 20-22. But what about substituting independent contractors for 
employees?  
Building upon the literature around job quality the determinants of self-employment, and the 
effects of the minimum wage, we use American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2000-2017 matched 
with state minimum wage data (Neumark, 2019) and a Quadruple Difference (DDDD) model 
to examine the compositional effects of state minimum wage increases, specifically on the rates of 
unincorporated and incorporated self-employment within occupations. We consider both the wage 
quartile of an occupation and scheduling flexibility of an occupation as degrees to which a worker can be 
‘treated’ or affected by a minimum wage increase.  
We theorize that individuals consider the relative earnings of self-employment and hired 
employment against the greater risks presented by self-employment, and that a minimum wage increase, 
by increasing the earnings a worker can expect to receive in hired employment, induces workers away 
from self-employment and into hired employment. We find that increases in the minimum wage are 





employed. Effects vary by incorporation status, and there appear to be heterogeneous treatment effects 
with respect to age, gender, and education.   
This paper contributes to the growing literature around the effects of the minimum wage on the 
composition of the labor force by explicitly examining the relationship between the minimum wage and 
self-employment. The effects of the minimum wage on employment, both in general and among various 
subgroups of the labor force, has been widely studied, however the notion that the minimum wage can 
shift workers’ decision making with regards to the form of their employment has not been studied. Our 
paper would suggest that the minimum wage may have a greater role in mitigating labor market risks for 
workers than previously considered.   
This paper proceeds as follows: we summarize the literature around non-standard forms of work, 
the determinants of self-employment, and the effects of the minimum wage in order to develop a 
framework through which to view the interaction between the minimum wage and self-employment 
decisions. The Methods and Data sections introduce our Difference in Difference designs, specifying how 
we identify our quasi-treated groups (workers in low-wage occupations and workers in occupations with 
higher scheduling flexibility). We estimate the effects of state minimum wage increases on an 
individual’s probability of self-employment using a Quadruple Differences (DDDD) design, with state 
fixed effects and an interaction between logged minimum wage, occupational wage quartile, and 
occupational flexibility of work hours. The results indicate that a state minimum wage increase is 
associated with a decrease in self-employment, particularly unincorporated self-employment within low-
wage occupations with highly flexible work hours. After reviewing results, we discuss limitations and 
possible directions for future work.  
Literature Review 
Literature around job quality and contingent work, self-employment, and the minimum wage are 
broad and diverse. As our research touches on these topics, we start this section with a brief review of the 





employment. Finally, we discuss the existing scholarship on the minimum wage and employment. 
Following the literature review, we provide hypotheses based on prior work.   
What does self-employment mean? 
Many have speculated that the number of permanent jobs with traditional employer-employee 
relationships has declined in the United States, driven in part by digital platforms and online gig work as 
well as domestic outsourcing and the use of independent contractors (Government Accountability Office, 
2015).  It is important to keep in mind that there are different definitions of work arrangements that are 
outside of the traditional employer-employee relationship, and there is some overlap in definitions, which 
include contingent work, alternative work, and self-employment, among others. Non-standard 
employment, sometimes called contingent work, can be defined as temporary, contract, or other forms of 
non-standard employment arrangements in which workers do not expect their work to last on a long-term 
basis (U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017) or who do not receive employer-provided retirement and 
health benefits or other employment protections. This definition captures temporary employment as well 
as agency temps, day laborers, part-time workers, and independent contractors.  Using data from the 
Contingent Worker Survey (CWS) supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1995-2017, 
the 2015 RAND-Princeton Contingent Work Survey, and administrative tax data from the Internal 
Revenue Service for 2000-2016, Katz and Krueger (2019) conclude that there has been a modest upward 
trend in non-standard employment during the 2000s, however it is important to note that not all forms of 
employment within the broad category of non-standard work may be exhibiting the same trends.  
Self-employment can be distinct from other types of alternative or non-standard employment and 
usually indicates ownership of a business whether as a sole proprietor or as a partner. One analysis using 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2012 Survey of Business Owners found that the self-employed under this 
definition numbered 14.6 million, or about 10 percent of the workforce (Pew Research Center, 2015) 
while a study by the U.S Treasury using tax filings estimated that 17 million taxpayers were self-
employed (Jackson, Looney, Ramnath, 2014). It has been noted by Katz and Kruger (2019) as well as 





puzzlingly, there is a declining trend in worker self-reports of self-employment, at least in primary jobs. 
The rise in self-employment reported in 1099 tax forms is driven by individuals with relatively small 
amounts of self-employment income, likely from secondary or supplemental work (Collins et al., WP).  
Nonstandard employment is often associated with lower wages, fewer benefits, greater job 
instability, and, in some cases, increased risk of injury (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000; Government 
Accountability Office, 2015); however, some characteristics of nonstandard employment such as self-
employment—like flexible scheduling and choice over timing and location of work— may be attractive 
(Golden, 2001; Lombard. 2001). 
It remains to be seen whether self-employment is ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ While self-employment can 
confer higher wages and greater control for some workers, it is also associated with a lack of health and 
retirement benefits (Kalleberg, 2011).  
The ambiguity in job quality of self-employment may be due to contradictory drivers of an 
individual’s entrance into self-employment. Levine and Rubinstein (2013) disaggregate self-employment 
into incorporated and unincorporated self-employment to proxy for entrepreneurial and non-
entrepreneurial forces, respectively, and find higher earnings among the incorporated.  Abraham et al. 
(2017) note that unincorporated self-employment in public-use data sources likely captures gig work, 
though gig work is not measured well in such sources. Moulton and Scott (2016) posit that self-
employment can be characterized as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending upon the type of work, skills, and 
resources required, among other factors. However, it is not always feasible to distinguish these features in 
existing datasets. 
Indeed, measuring both non-standard work and self-employment presents challenges. Katz and 
Krueger (2019) note that estimates of non-standard work can differ significantly due to different sampling 
frames and points in the business cycle, and that workers appear to have a difficult time accurately 
reporting their work status in standard surveys. They further conclude that surveys like the monthly CPS 
and CWS instrument may not capture the incidence of casual or intermittent work, because errors in 





the broader definition of non-standard work, self-employment is similarly prone to mismeasurement: on 
average, two-thirds of those with self-employment income in administrative tax data over the period of 
1996-2015 did not report self-employment to the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 
with this gap growing over time (Abraham et al., 2020).  
Drivers of self-employment 
Scholars in self-employment and entrepreneurship often separate the determinants of self-
employment, which occur at either the individual or social level, into two groups: “push” factors and 
“pull” factors (Thurik et al., 2008). Much of the literature around the determinants of self-employment 
and entrepreneurship was produced in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with some more recent scholarship 
focusing on particular subgroups, like older workers (Zissimopolous & Karoly, 2007 and 2009; Moulton 
& Scott, 2016), minorities (Blanchflower, 2008) and women (Özcan, 2011; Patrick et al., 2016).  
Push factors—like recessions, unemployment, loss of benefits, discrimination and short-run labor 
market conditions— are those that push workers away from hired employment and into self-employment 
(Fairlie & Meyer, 1996; Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; Parker, 2004). Post-Great Recession, 
underemployment may also be a push factor: higher rates of unincorporated self-employment on primary 
and secondary jobs, as well as higher rates of multiple job holders, are significantly associated with 
increases in involuntary part-time work in a state, (Valetta et al., 2020). In their analysis, Valetta et al. 
(2020) found that state unemployment rates have no meaningful impact on unincorporated self-
employment, which may indicate that involuntary part-time work is more effective in capturing slack 
labor market conditions.  
 Pull factors pull a person into self-employment when the self-employment wage is greater than 
that from hired employment (Benedict & Hakobyan, 2008; Moulton & Scott, 2016). Pull factors are often 
individual, like human, financial, and social capital (Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Anderson & Miller, 
2003; Fairlie & Krashinsky, 2012), openness to risk (Brown et al., 2011), and good health or household 
circumstances (Lombard, 2001; Wellington, 2006; Budig, 2006), though there are social factors like tax 





the interplay between social and individual factors likely vary depending on the policy context; for 
example, health insurance coverage is a significant consideration for American entrepreneurs given the 
lack of universal health care in the United States (Gumus & Regan, 2015; Moulton, Diebold, & Scott, 
2017).  
Self-Employment and the Minimum Wage 
Though there is a great deal of evidence around the employment effects of the minimum wage, 
there is very little existing research on the effect of the minimum wage on self-employment specifically. 
Much of the literature on the minimum wage concludes there is a small negative impact on employment 
(Neumark & Wascher, 2007 and 2017). Other authors suggest there is no effect on employment or that 
the minimum wage results in a small increase in employment (Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2009; Dube et 
al., 2010; Allegretto et al., 2011). 
With regards to other outcomes, it appears that the minimum wage is associated with a reduction 
in job turnover: authors have found that minimum wage increases reduce quits and/or layoffs as well as 
hiring rates (Reich et al., 2005, Bronchu & Green, 2013; Dube et al., 2016). There is less evidence 
regarding the effect of minimum wages on labor force participation, though existing literature suggests 
those with less human capital may stop searching for jobs, while workers with more human capital enter 
into the labor force (Wessels, 2005; Luna Alpizar, WP; Treacy, WP). 
The search for one definitive estimate of the relationship between the minimum wage and 
employment can obscure heterogeneous treatment effects: Doucouliagos & Stanley (2009) conclude that 
even when the minimum wage is found to result in no job loss on average, a some employers eliminate 
certain positions when the cost of labor increases as a result of a minimum wage increase. In general, the 
negative employment effects of the minimum wage have decreased over time and are largely localized to 
teenagers (Wolfson & Belman, 2019; Treacy, WP).  
Related to the concept of heterogeneous treatment effects is the effect of the minimum wage on 
the composition of the work force. There is evidence of the minimum wage inducing labor substitution 





et al., 2011; Giuliano, 2013; Cengiz et al., 2019). For example, Fairris and Bujanda (2008) observe that a 
wage increase is offset by substitution toward Latino, male, and African American workers and workers 
with more formal training.  But what about substituting independent contractors for employees? Given the 
diversity of types of work that fall under the broader umbrella of ‘non-standard employment,’ it is likely 
that the minimum wage differentially impacts these types. 
  Blau (1987) first studied the relationship between self-employment and the minimum wage, 
where the minimum wage was a proxy for wage rigidity. Observing that the long-term trend in declining 
self-employment was reversing beginning in late 1960s, he hypothesized increased wage rigidity 
increased the proportion of the labor force that resorts to self-employment as a response to being rationed 
out of wage jobs. Expecting a positive relationship between the minimum wage and self-employment 
(which would suggest the minimum wage as a push factor), Blau found the real minimum wage had 
mixed effects on self-employment: two out of the three coefficient estimates were negative.  He 
concluded that the minimum wage variable is no doubt a relatively crude proxy for wage rigidity. There 
has been little follow-up research from Blau, though there is some literature in developing counties that 
minimum wage legislation is associated with an increase in formal employment. Using Canadian data, 
Kahmi and Leung (2005) found increases in the minimum wage are associated with an increase in the 
own-account self-employment rate and argue that individuals at the low end of the labor market in terms 
of skills who are unemployed enter self-employment as an alternative to unemployment. 
Hypotheses 
Existing literature around the relationship between self-employment and the minimum wage is 
scant, however its mixed results are perhaps unsurprising. Self-employment can be viewed as a substitute 
for hired employment for both employees and employers, and because of this, an a priori prediction of the 
effect of a minimum wage increase on self-employment is ambiguous. Insofar as the minimum wage 
represents regulation in the labor market and an increase in operating costs, employers may cut back on 





workers. However, self-employed workers, observing higher wages in traditional employment, may apply 
for hired work, reducing the supply of self-employed workers. 
We theorize that individuals weigh the relative gains to self-employment and hired employment 
against the relative risk of self-employment and their own risk aversion (Blau, 1987; Parker, 1996). Self-
employment inherently carries different risks than hired employment due to volatility of earnings and lack 
of benefits, however self-employment can also confer higher earnings relative to hired employment, in 
addition to greater flexibility and control over work. A minimum wage increase represents a shift in the 
relative earnings of self-employment versus hired employment, where, upon a minimum wage increase, 
workers may be able to expect a hired wage equal to or greater than the wage they would expect from self-
employment. This shift in relative earnings is more likely for workers in occupations that pay lower wages 
than those paying higher wages. 
Thus, we expect to see that workers previously classified as self-employed under a lower minimum 
wage (where the expected wage from hired employment is lower than that of self-employment) may be 
induced into hired employment following a minimum wage increase. If this relationship exists, we should 
observe it in occupations in which workers have greater control over their work hours (scheduling 
flexibility, discussed further in Data section). Workers in occupation with greater scheduling flexibility are 
more likely to have a preference for greater control over their work schedules and therefore are more likely 
to view self-employment as a substitute for hired employment. We therefore expect to see: 
Hypothesis 1: Increases in the state minimum wage are associated with a decline in self-
employment within occupations with a high rate of scheduling flexibility. 
Hypothesis 2:  Increases in the state minimum wage are associated with a decline in self-
employment within flexible occupations particularly for workers in occupations paying lower 
wages. 
Unincorporated self-employment is easier and less expensive to enter, relative to incorporated self-
employment, and lower skilled workers are more likely to be unincorporated than incorporated (Hipple, 
2010). Approximately 60% of the 15 million self-employed workers in the United States in 2015 were 





of a corporate structure, like tax considerations, limited liability, and more opportunities to raise capital. 
Incorporated self-employed workers are more likely than unincorporated self-employed workers to have 
paid employees, and the rates of incorporated self-employment tends to rise more with educational 
attainment than unincorporated self-employment  (Hipple & Hammond, 2016). Given relative ease to move 
between hired and self-employment and the greater likelihood that an unincorporated self-employed worker 
possesses less skills (making them more susceptive to a minimum wage increase), we predict that: 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between minimum wage and self-employment predicted in 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 is stronger for unincorporated self-employment, versus incorporated self-
employment.  
We test the above hypotheses using the methodology and data specified in the following sections.  
Methods 
In order to understand the effect of state minimum wage increases on self-employment, we 
employ a series of Difference in Differences designs, starting first with a Difference in Difference (DD) 
stratified along the occupation’s degree of scheduling flexibility and the occupation’s median wage. We 
then estimate two sets of Triple Differences (DDD) stratified by flexibility and wage. We finally estimate 
a Quadruple Difference (DDDD) that incorporates all of these stratifications within one estimating 
equation, allowing us to test if the effect sizes observed for the different stratifications in the other 
methods are statistically different. This section describes each estimation and treatment variables used. 
Our outcome variable is an individual’s probability of being self-employed, where we examine 
self-employment in general as well as unincorporated and incorporated self-employment separately. All 
estimations include: !"#$% , a vector of individual-level indicators, specifically indicators for educational 
attainment, age, and gender; state fixed effects (&$); year fixed effects ('%); and state-by-year linear trends 
(($%). Subscripts are as follows: i for individual, o for occupation, s for state, and t for year. 
Difference in Difference 
We first conduct a simple Difference in Difference estimation using the following equation: 





Where lnMW is the logged state minimum wage in a given state and year.56 The coefficient for logged 
state minimum wage, ;9 estimates the effect of a percent increase in the state minimum wage on the 
probability a worker is self-employed. We then stratify this regression by both wage quartile (discussed 
further in the Data section) and by how flexible the work schedule of an occupation is (discussed further 
in the Data section). Flexible is a binary indicator equaling 1 if an occupation has a higher degree of 
flexibility in work hours (high flexibility) and zero otherwise (low flexibility).  
Triple Difference (DDD) 
We employ two Triple Difference (DDD) designs. In order to assess whether the effect of a 
minimum wage increase varies by scheduling flexibility of occupation in a statistically significant way, 
we employ our first DDD design, which includes an interaction between logged state minimum wage and 
flexibility of occupation. The state minimum wage increase is theorized to affect the self-employment 
rates of a quasi-treated group, flexible occupations, more than that of our quasi-control group, non-
flexible occupations. Our estimation equation is shown below: 
Pr(,-./012.34-5)"#$%
= 8A + B9(C.-DEF.-#$%) + ;A(ln>?$%) + G9(C.-DEF.-# ∗ ln>?$%) + !A"#$% + &A$
+ 'A% + (A$% + @A"#$%  
The coefficient on the interaction between Flexible and lnMW, G, captures the effect of a minimum wage 
increase on the probability a worker within a quasi-treated occupation is self-employed. Recognizing that 
workers across the wage distribution, whether in flexible or non-flexible occupations, are likely to be 
differentially affected by a minimum wage increase, we stratify these regressions by the occupation’s 
wage quartiles. 
We conduct our second DDD design in order to assess whether a state minimum wage increase 
differentially affects self-employment of workers in different occupational wage quartiles, and whether 
                                               
56 We run all of our models with logged minimum wage lagged one year (results in Appendix 3.2). We also run our 
models using logged real minimum wage, with 2007 as a base year (results in Appendix 3.3). Our results are 






that differential effect is statistically significant. The estimation includes an indicator for the occupation’s 
wage quartile as well as an interaction term between that indicator and the logged minimum wage: 
Pr(,-./012.34-5)"#$%
= 8I + ;I(.J>?$%) + K9(?LM-NOLPQE.-#) +	S9(?LM-NOLPQE.-# ∗ .J>?$%)
+ !I"#$% + &I$ + 'I% + (I$% + @I"#$%  
It should be noted that the fourth wage quartile is omitted, and therefore the coefficients on the first, 
second, and third wage quartile are the effect of working in an occupation in that respective wage quartile 
on self-employment, relative to occupations in the fourth wage quartile. The most common occupations in 
the fourth wage quartile are professional occupations like accountant and auditors, lawyers and judges, 
registered nurses, and police officers and detectives (see Appendix 1). The coefficient on that interaction 
between logged minimum wage and wage quartile, S9, estimates the effect of a percent increase in a state 
minimum wage on the probability a worker in an occupation in a given wage quartile (1st, 2nd, or 3rd) is 
self-employed, relative to a worker in an occupation in the fourth wage percentile. 
By stratifying the above estimation equation by scheduling flexibility of the occupation (high vs. 
low), we can observe whether the effect of the minimum wage on self-employment varies not just by the 
wage quartile of the occupation but also by how flexible that occupation is.  
Quadruple Difference (DDDD) 
Where the triple difference regressions above allow us to see the relative effect of the minimum 
wage on self-employment across wage quartile and occupational scheduling flexibility, we can observe 
whether these differences are statistically significant in a Quadruple Difference (DDDD) design. The 
estimation, as specified below, includes logged minimum wage, occupational flexibility indicator for 
wage quartile, and interactions of these terms: 
Pr(,-./012.34-5)"#$%
= 8T + BA(C.-DEF.-#$%) + ;T(ln>?$%) + KA(?LM-NOLPQE.-#) + GA(C.-DEF.-#
∗ ln>?$%) +	SA(?LM-NOLPQE.-# ∗ ln>?$%) + '(?LM-NOLPQE.-# ∗ C.-DEF.-#)





The DDDD estimator, U, is the predicted effect of a percent increase in the state minimum wage on the 
probability a worker in a highly flexible occupation in a given wage quartile (1st, 2nd, or 3rd) is self-
employed, relative to a worker in a non-flexible occupation in the fourth wage percentile. 
Data 
We use American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2000-2017,57 conditioned on employment 
and working age (aged 16-65). The self-employment indicator variable is derived from the values for the 
ACS variable CLASSWKR, which specifies whether a worker is a wage or salary earner, self-employed 
(incorporated or not incorporated), or an unpaid family worker.58  
We supplement our data with two additional data sources: (1) David Neumark’s (2019) state 
minimum wage data for 2000-2017, matched by state-year;  and (2) data from the CPS Work Schedules 
Supplement, collapsed to the occupation-state-year and matched to our data. The Work Schedules 
Supplement59 collects additional information on working hours for all respondents in a household that 
were working at the time of the supplement (May of 1991, 1997, 2001, and 2004). We use the values for 
WSFLEXHRS, which reports whether respondents have the ability to vary when they begin and end the 
workday, a measure of schedule flexibility, as an additional treatment variable. Workers in highly flexible 
occupations likely have preferences towards schedule flexibility, a characteristic of self-employment. 
These workers may be more likely, therefore, to view self-employment as a substitute for hired 
employment.  Collapsing the data by occupation across supplement years (1991, 1997, 2001, and 2004) 
for occupations with at least 10 observations per year, we examine the proportion of workers with flexible 
hours within each occupation. Those occupations with higher rates of scheduling flexibility than the 
median rate (roughly 30%) are considered ‘Flexible’ occupations. Our results (the coefficients for 
                                               
57 From IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2020). 
58 For workers with multiple sources of employment, CLASSWKR relates to the work relationship in which they 
spent the most time during the reference day or week. This necessarily limits our inferences, as workers who are 
self-employed outside of their main job are uncaptured by our analysis. 





‘Flexible’) suggest a positive correlation between self-employment and scheduling flexibility across type 
of self-employment and wage quartile, giving us some confidence about scheduling flexibility as a 
treatment variable.  
The wage quartiles mentioned in the Methods section were created using ACS data from 2001 to 
2007.60 Wages were constructed using business and wage income, divided by the product of usual hours 
worked, UHRSWORK, and weeks worked, WKSWORK1. Wages were converted to real wages, with 
2007 as the base year, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The median wage was then calculated for 
each occupation and merged with our dataset. Finally, we determined the wage quartiles within our 
dataset, with the wage quartiles as follows:  $6.37 to $10.98 for Quartile 1;  greater than $10.98 to $15.82 
for Quartile 2; greater than $15.82 to $22.45 for Quartile 3; and greater than $22.45 to the maximum of 
$71.01 for Quartile 4.61 
 Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.1. The underlying sample contains approximately 19.5 
million observations. Approximately 10% of the sample is self-employed, with 6% unincorporated and 
4% incorporated. The average state minimum wage for the time period is $7.15 an hour, with the 
minimum $5.15 and maximum $12.50 an hour. Approximately 40% of the sample possessed a high 
school degree or less, while about 20% has four years of college. 
Results 
We run a Difference in Difference (DD) model, regressing self-employment on logged minimum 
wage across the entire sample, then stratified by wage quartile and by flexibility of occupation (high 
versus low) in Table 3.2. Though there are very few significant results in this table, a one percent 
increase in state minimum wage is associated with a 0.006 percentage point decline in the probability a 
                                               
60 We use the years 2001-2007 only, because the ACS variable for weeks worked, WKSWORK1, is reported in 
intervals from 2008 onwards. 
61 See Table A-3.1 in Appendix 3.1 for a full list of occupations by scheduling flexibility and wage quartile. 
Common flexible occupations in the first wage quartile are retail salespersons, grounds maintenance workers, 
personal care aids, and agricultural workers, compared to non-flexible occupations in the first wage quartile like 





worker in the second wage quartile will be self-employed, significant at the 95% confidence level 
(Regression 2). 
 Table 3.3 displays our first Triple Difference (DDD) estimation for the whole sample, then 
stratified by wage quartile. Unsurprisingly, there is an association between the flexibility of an occupation 
(how flexible that occupation is in its work hours) and the likelihood that a worker within that occupation 
is self-employed, as evidenced by positive, statistically significant coefficients across all regressions. The 
minimum wage is associated with higher probability of self-employment both at the lowest and highest 
wage quartiles among non-flexible occupations.  However, the coefficient on the interaction between 
minimum wage and flexibility is negative and statistically significant across all wage quartiles 
(Regressions 1 and 4-7), providing further evidence to support Hypothesis 1. As predicted in Hypothesis 
2, the coefficient for the first wage quartile is substantially larger in magnitude than the other quartiles 
and suggests that a one percent increase in a state’s minimum wage is associated with a .095 percentage 
point decrease in the likelihood a worker in a flexible occupation is self-employed, significant at the 99% 
confidence level. We can interpret this reduction in individual probability that a worker is self-employed 
as the reduction in the occupation’s overall share of self-employment: within flexible, lower-wage 
occupations, a minimum wage increase is associated with a decrease in the share of self-employed 
workers. 
The coefficients for the interaction term appear to largely be driven by unincorporated self-
employed (Regressions 2 and 8-11) versus the incorporated self-employed (Regressions 3 and 12-15), for 
which statistically significant results are only present at higher wage quartiles (and at much smaller 
magnitudes). As discussed in Hypothesis 3, the more consistent effects for unincorporated self-
employment may be driven by the fact that it is likely easier to move between hired employment and 
unincorporated self-employment than it is to move between hired employment and incorporated self-
employment. Also, insofar as unincorporated self-employment is more likely to capture casual, non-





disproportionately allow for workers who bear greater labor market risk to move into less risky, hired 
employment. 
 We perform another Triple Difference (DDD) estimation in Table 3.4, wherein the interaction 
term is now between wage quartile and logged minimum wage, and regressions are presented for all 
occupations as well as stratified by scheduling flexibility of occupation. The coefficient on the interaction 
between the first wage quartile and logged minimum wage among workers in highly flexible occupations 
is negative for unincorporated self-employment (Regression 4) and positive for incorporated self-
employment (Regression 8), suggesting different forces driving workers into these two subtypes. It is 
worth noting that the omitted category for these indicators is the fourth wage quartile, thus an 
interpretation of these coefficients is relative to that omitted category; for example, a one percent increase 
in the minimum wage is associated with a .0711 percentage point decrease in the probability that a worker 
in a flexible occupation in the first wage quartile is unincorporated self-employed, significant at the 99% 
confidence level (Regression 5). The fourth wage quartile being the omitted category may be why the 
interaction between wage quartile and logged minimum wage is otherwise positive (for example, in 
Regression 8 for the second and third quartile).  
Table 3.5 shows results from a Quadruple Difference (DDDD) estimation, where the interaction 
between wage quartile, logged minimum wage, and scheduling flexibility of occupation is the coefficient 
of interest. While the interaction62 is negative and statistically significant for self-employment in general, 
this estimate is driven by unincorporated self-employment:  a one percent increase in the minimum wage 
is associated with a .071 percentage point decrease in the probability that a worker, earning a wage within 
the first wage quartile and working in a highly flexible occupation, is unincorporated self-employed, 
significant at the 99% confidence level (Regression 2).  As a comparison, the same interaction is slightly 
positive but statistically insignificant for incorporated self-employed. Conversely, the coefficient 
interaction between the third wage quartile, high flexibility, and logged minimum wage is positive 
                                               





(though substantially smaller in magnitude) and statistically significant for both types of self-
employment. Again, we can interpret these individual probabilities as compositional changes within 
occupation: a state minimum wage increase is associated with declines in unincorporated self-
employment in highly flexible, lower wage occupations, compared to that of higher wage occupations. 
Minimum wage increases are conversely associated with an increase in the share of workers who are self-
employed in highly flexible occupations that are in the third wage quartile, though this compositional 
change is smaller in size. 
Finally, we explore heterogeneous treatment effects by stratifying the regression used in Table 
3.5 by gender, age, and education, and focusing on the probability someone is self-employed. Table 3.6 
displays stratifications by gender. While both men and women working in flexible occupations in the first 
wage quartile are less likely to be self-employed as a result of a state minimum wage increase, relative to 
workers in occupations in the fourth wage quartile, the magnitude of the coefficient for women is just 
over half the magnitude for men. However, women are less likely to be self-employed in general, with 
7.5% of women in our sample being unincorporated self-employed, versus 12.4% of men. Results for 
workers in occupations in other wage quartiles (quartiles two and three) are less consistently significant, 
with only the interaction for wage quartile 2 for women and the interaction for wage quartile 3 for men 
being positive and statistically significant.  
Table 3.7 displays stratifications by age. The relationship between minimum wage and self-
employment among flexible, first wage quartile occupations (relative to the fourth wage quartile)  remains 
statistically significantly negative across all but one age group (16-25 years), and the magnitude the 
magnitude of the coefficient on this interaction (between minimum wage, flexibility, and first wage 
quartile) generally increases with older ages, peaking for workers aged 46-55. The relationship between 
minimum wage and self-employment among flexible, third wage quartile occupations (relative to the 
fourth wage quartile) is statistically significant and positive across age groups until the age of 45, though 





 Table 3.8 shows stratifications by education. The relationship between minimum wage and self-
employment among flexible, first wage quartile occupations (relative to the fourth wage quartile) is 
statistically significant for workers with a high school diploma or more education, and the magnitude of 
the coefficient on this interaction (between minimum wage, flexibility, and first wage quartile) generally 
increases with educational attainment, peaking for those with a college degree. The sign of the 
relationship between minimum wage and self-employment among flexible, third wage quartile 
occupations (relative to the fourth wage quartile) varies with educational attainment: the relationship is 
statistically significantly negative for workers with some college education or with a college degree but 
positive for those without a high school diploma and those with some post-graduate education.  
Discussion 
In this paper, we show that a state minimum wage increase is associated with a decrease in self-
employment, particularly unincorporated self-employment within occupations that are likely to be more 
affected by a minimum wage increase: occupations in the first wage quartile ($6.37 to $10.98). This 
negative association between minimum wage and self-employment for lower wage work is present for 
occupations with greater scheduling flexibility. The effect of the minimum wage on within-occupation 
self-employment varies by wage quartile of the occupation, where a minimum wage increase is associated 
with increases in the share of self-employed for higher-paying occupations. Are higher wage workers 
involuntarily pushed into self-employment due to increased labor costs resulting from a minimum wage 
increase? Is there a substitution of lower-wage workers for higher-wage workers as a result of a minimum 
wage increase?  Questions around this result merit further study. Effects also vary depending on whether 
our outcome variable is unincorporated or incorporated self-employment, corroborating existing literature 
that would suggest these two subtypes of self-employment are likely fundamentally different from one 
another. 
 We have argued that a negative relationship between the minimum wage and self-employment in 
flexible, low-wage occupations is observed because individuals weigh the relative gains of self-





lack of benefits, and other considerations.  A minimum wage represents a shift in relative earnings of self-
employment versus hired employment, particularly for those working in lower-wage occupations.  
Workers in highly flexible occupations have a greater ability to move between hired and self-
employment, therefore these workers may move into less risky hired employment when the hired wage is 
equal to or exceeds what they can expect from a self-employed wage. The negative relationship between 
minimum wage and self-employment among low-wage occupations is greater in magnitude for 
unincorporated versus incorporated self-employment. 
 We observed in Tables 3.6-3.8 that there are differential effects of the minimum wage on self-
employment (within occupations with low wages and high flexibility) across gender and education.  
Further research is needed to understand why these differential effects persist. Similarly, it is reasonable 
to expect that, given the diversity of work arrangements within the broader group of non-standard 
employment, the effect of the minimum wage should vary across these groups. While we focus 
specifically on self-employment, further research should explore the extent to which the minimum wage 
affects other subtypes of non-standard employment. 
 There are some notable limitations to our analysis. First, surveys are known to have substantial 
measurement error when it comes to self-employment and other forms of non-standard employment, such 
that instances of self-employment are likely not captured in our ACS data. Second, we theorize that 
workers in occupations with greater scheduling flexibility have a greater propensity to enter self-
employment, because these workers have preferences for greater control over their work schedules. 
Though we can observe occupational scheduling flexibility is associated with higher rates of self-
employment, it may be possible that another occupational dimension would be better suited for this 
analysis. Finally, we have presented a theory around risk of self-employment and the extent to which the 
minimum wage can alter workers’ trade-offs between earnings and risk, and we have shown some 
analysis using public survey data to support it. However, further research into how individuals make these 
choices should be conducted, and should include other constraints like health insurance access, household 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
  Average SD Min Max 
Self-Employed 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Unincorporated Self-Employed 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Incorporated Self-Employed 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Year 2010 4.5 2000 2017 
Minimum Wage 7.14 1.19 5.15 12.5 
Female 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Age 41.54 12.94 16 65 
Education (NA omitted)     
Nursery to 4 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Grade 5 to 8 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Grade 9 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Grade 10 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Grade 11 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Grade 12 0.34 0.47 0 1 
1 Years of College 0.16 0.37 0 1 
2 Years of College 0.09 0.29 0 1 
4 Years of College 0.21 0.41 0 1 
5+ Years of College 0.12 0.33 0 1 
N 19,516,316       






Table 3.2: P(Self-Employed) Difference in Difference (DD) Stratified by Wage Quartile and Flexible Occupations 
 Full Wage Quartile Flexible 
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th High Low 
  (1) (4) (5) (6) (7) (16) (17) 
Self-Employed        
log(min wage) -0.0027 -0.0016 -0.0060** -0.0016 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0022 
 (0.0025) (0.0057) (0.0027) (0.0054) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0019) 
        
  (2) (8) (9) (10) (11) (18) (19) 
Unincorporated Self-Employed        
log(min wage) -0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0051 -0.0022 -0.003 -0.004 -0.0026 
 (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0025) (0.0044) (0.0016) 
        
  (3) (12) (13) (14) (15) (20) (21) 
Incorporated Self-Employed        
log(min wage) 0.0004 0.0021 -0.001 0.0005 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0004 
 (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0010) 
         
N 19,516,316 4,880,963 4,879,313 4,869,222 4,886,818 9,800,881 9,715,435 
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state by year linear time trends. Models are 
stratified separately by the median wage for each occupation (by quartile) and occupation's flexibility of work hours. Standard errors clustered by state 
are in parentheses.  







Table 3.3: P(Self-Employed) Triple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Wage 
  Wage Quartile: 
 Full 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
  (1) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Self-Employed      
Flexible×Log(min wage) -0.0454*** -0.0950*** -0.0227*** -0.0274** -0.0382*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0197) (0.0078) (0.0127) (0.0106) 
Log(min wage) 0.0204*** 0.0272*** 0.0012 0.0146 0.0282*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0095) (0.0032) (0.0102) (0.0093) 
Flexible 0.1855*** 0.3280*** 0.1474*** 0.1657*** 0.1622*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0398) (0.0150) (0.0219) (0.0188) 
      
  (2) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Unincorporated Self-Employed      
Flexible×Log(min wage) -0.0341*** -0.0898*** -0.0222*** (0.0164) -0.0212** 
 (0.0054) (0.0139) (0.0058) (0.0118) (0.0095) 
Log(min wage) 0.0142*** 0.0236*** 0.0021 0.0075 0.0147* 
 (0.0034) (0.0071) (0.0039) (0.0093) (0.0076) 
Flexible 0.1241*** 0.2848*** 0.1188*** 0.0969*** 0.0805*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0298) (0.0105) (0.0201) (0.0165) 
      
  (3) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Incorporated Self-Employed      
Flexible×Log(min wage) -0.0113*** (0.0052) (0.0005) -0.0111*** -0.0170*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0081) (0.0049) (0.0032) (0.0036) 
Log(min wage) 0.0062*** 0.0036 -0.0009 0.0071** 0.0135*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0040) 
Flexible 0.0614*** 0.0432*** 0.0286*** 0.0687*** 0.0817*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0148) (0.0091) (0.0069) (0.0079) 
       
N 19,516,316 4,880,963 4,879,313 4,869,222 4,886,818 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. Models are stratified by the median wage for each occupation (by quartile). 
Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 







Table 3.4: P(Self-Employed) Triple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Flexible Occupations 
 
Self-Employed Unincorporated  Self-Employed 
Incorporated  
Self-Employed 
Flexible: Full High Low Full High Low Full High Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Wage Q1×Log(min 
wage) 0.0036 -0.0549** 0.0032 -0.0113* -0.0711*** (0.0010) 0.0148*** 0.0162* 0.0042*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0219) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0158) (0.0067) (0.0038) (0.0084) (0.0008) 
Wage Q2×Log(min 
wage) 0.0280*** 0.0196** 0.0071 0.0101*** (0.0010) 0.0005 0.0179*** 0.0206*** 0.0066*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0093) (0.0053) (0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0038) (0.0058) (0.0019) 
Wage Q3×Log(min 
wage) 0.0260*** 0.0181** 0.0037 0.0144*** 0.0095 0.0016 0.0116*** 0.0086*** 0.0021 
 (0.0047) (0.0069) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0068) (0.0044) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0013) 
Log(min wage) -0.0170*** -0.0043 -0.0062 -0.0064** 0.0038 -0.0025 -0.0106*** -0.0081** -0.0036*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0011) 
Wage Q1 0.0365* 0.2360*** 0.0458*** 0.0829*** 0.2705*** 0.0463*** -0.0464*** -0.0345** (0.0005) 
 (0.0192) (0.0450) (0.0126) (0.0155) (0.0344) (0.0122) (0.0073) (0.0154) (0.0019) 
Wage Q2 -0.0387*** 0.0273 0.0366*** 0.0116** 0.0732*** 0.0329*** -0.0503*** -0.0459*** 0.0037 
 (0.0096) (0.0170) (0.0096) (0.0048) (0.0094) (0.0112) (0.0069) (0.0102) (0.0034) 
Wage Q3 -0.0465*** 0.0045 0.0128* (0.0116) 0.0213* 0.0096 -0.0350*** -0.0168*** 0.0032 
 (0.0087) (0.0124) (0.0067) (0.0079) (0.0117) (0.0077) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0026) 
           
N 19,516,316 9,800,881 9,715,435 19,516,316 9,800,881 9,715,435 19,516,316 9,800,881 9,715,435 
          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state by year linear time trends. Models are 
stratified by the occupation's flexibility of work hours. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  







Table 3.5: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDDD) 
 
Self-Employed Unincorporated  Self-Employed 
Incorporated  
Self-Employed 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×Log(min wage) -0.0595** -0.0713*** 0.0118 
 (0.0274) (0.0197) (0.0091) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×Log(min wage) 0.0135 (0.0024) 0.0159** 
 (0.0155) (0.0099) (0.0062) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×Log(min wage) 0.0126*** 0.0062** 0.0064*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0021) 
Wage Q1×Log(min wage) 0.0019 (0.0017) 0.0036*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0073) (0.0011) 
Wage Q2×Log(min wage) 0.0055 0.0000 0.0055*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0016) 
Wage Q3×Log(min wage) 0.0035 0.0017 0.0018 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0011) 
Flexible×Log(min wage) -0.0373*** -0.0209** -0.0164*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0097) (0.0038) 
Wage Q1×Flexible 0.1665*** 0.2108*** -0.0443** 
 (0.0514) (0.0380) (0.0167) 
Wage Q2×Flexible (0.0161) 0.0390** -0.0552*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0177) (0.0110) 
Wage Q3×Flexible (0.0009) 0.0171*** -0.0180*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0057) (0.0043) 
Log(min wage) 0.0154* 0.0125 0.003 
 (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0024) 
Wage Q1 0.0601*** 0.0548*** 0.0053** 
 (0.0144) (0.0129) (0.0022) 
Wage Q2 0.0359*** 0.0320** 0.0039 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0030) 
Wage Q3 0.0048 0.0050 (0.0002) 
 (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0023) 
Flexible 0.1633*** 0.0784*** 0.0849*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0166) (0.0084) 
     
N 19,516,316 19,516,316 19,516,316 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. Models are stratified by the occupation's flexibility of work hours. 
Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 








Table 3.6: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Gender 
Gender: Male Female 
  (1) (2) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×Log(min wage) -0.0933** -0.0477** 
 (0.0358) (0.0204) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×Log(min wage) (0.0090) 0.0202*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0050) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×Log(min wage) 0.0122** (0.0038) 
 (0.0061) (0.0026) 
   
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.1236 0.0749 
   
N 10,104,847 9,411,469 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. The above models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, 
logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, flexibility and 
minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  







Table 3.7: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Age 
Age: 16 to 25 26 to 35 36 to 45 46 to 55 56 to 65 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×Log(min wage) (0.0094) -0.0318* -0.0818** -0.1167** -0.1050** 
 (0.0075) (0.0171) (0.0360) (0.0444) (0.0522) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×Log(min wage) (0.0033) (0.0042) 0.0016 0.0217 0.0650*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0114) (0.0160) (0.0165) (0.0223) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×Log(min wage) 0.0129*** 0.0198*** 0.0224*** 0.0019 (0.0026) 
 (0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0076) (0.0086) 
      
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.0267 0.0662 0.1071 0.1267 0.1539 
       
N 2,814,466 3,955,927 4,495,814 4,958,321 3,291,788 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state by year linear time trends. The above 
models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, 
flexibility and minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  














Table 3.8: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Education 




College College College + 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×Log(min wage) 0.0059 -0.0532** -0.0742*** -0.0792*** -0.0688** 
 (0.0349) (0.0233) (0.0243) (0.0272) (0.0274) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×Log(min wage) 0.0016 0.0180 (0.0032) 0.0097 0.1334*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0091) (0.0146) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×Log(min wage) 0.0449* 0.0059 -0.0151** -0.0188** 0.0374*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0092) (0.0076)       
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.1026 0.1000 0.0912 0.1004 0.1164 
       
N 1,536,084 6,646,864 4,885,600 4,065,266 2,382,502 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. The above models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, 
logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, flexibility and 
minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 











APPENDIX 1.1: SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES FOR FIXED EFFECTS MODELS 
Table A-1.1: Estimated Impact of RTW Laws on Logged Wages, All Covariates 
  Workers Covered by a Union Contract All Workers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector 
Right-to-Work State -0.065 0.024 -0.003 0.046** 
  (0.063) (0.044) (0.028) (0.019) 
Union Member 0.058** 0.103*** 0.057* 0.099*** 
  (0.025) (0.014) (0.029) (0.013) 
Covered by Union Contract   0.082*** 0.134*** 
    (0.019) (0.017) 
RTW*Member 0.038 -0.015 0.033 -0.017 
  (0.036) (0.022) (0.041) (0.023) 
RTW*Covered   -0.018 -0.029 
    (0.040) (0.027) 
Age 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.290*** -0.221*** -0.281*** -0.228*** 
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Nonwhite -0.138*** -0.061*** -0.121*** -0.075*** 
  (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) 
Years of Education 0.088*** 0.109*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Job Experience 0.276*** 0.324*** 0.178*** 0.200*** 
  (0.017) (0.025) (0.007) (0.017) 
Part Time -0.471*** -0.610*** -0.787*** -0.900*** 
  (0.022) (0.038) (0.011) (0.013) 
Logged State 
Unemployment Rate -0.131*** -0.047 -0.063*** -0.054* 
  (0.049) (0.039) (0.019) (0.027) 
Constant 8.274*** 7.929*** 7.401*** 7.658*** 
  (0.103) (0.124) (0.057) (0.104) 
       
Observations 28,936 26,698 299,829 63,243 
R-squared 0.388 0.426 0.481 0.515 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The above regressions include industry, state, and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 






Table A-1.2: Estimated Impact of Lagged RTW Laws on Logged Aggregate Outcomes 
         
  Logged Free Riding Logged Union Membership Logged Union Coverage 
  (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) 










0.306 0.407 -0.249*** -0.080 -0.208** -0.053 
 (0.233) (0.354) (0.081) (0.131) (0.081) (0.083) 
        
Baseline Rate 0.044 0.122 0.082 0.288 0.086 0.317 
Observations 1,336 1,339 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Logged Free Riding is calculated among union-covered workers; union 
membership and coverage are calculated among all workers. Zero values for free riding, membership, and 
coverage rates have been changed to 0.01 in order to preserve the observation in a logged model; because 
there are state-years with no union covered workers, the sample sizes for the free riding models is different 
from the membership and coverage models. The above regressions include state and year fixed effects. The 
following covariates are included: average age, proportion female, proportion nonwhite, average years of 
education, proportion with job experience, proportion employed part-time, and the natural log of the state 
unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 






Table A-1.3: Estimated Impact of RTW Laws on Individuals' Probability to Free Ride, Be a Union 
Member, and be Covered by a Union Contract 
  Free Rider Union Member Covered by a Union Contract 
  (A7) (A8) (A9) (A10) (A11) (A12) 












State 0.006 0.055** -0.031*** -0.062 -0.032*** -0.037 
  (0.022) (0.027) (0.008) (0.040) (0.009) (0.034) 
        
Observations 29,223 26,824 306,923 64,056 306,923 64,056 
R-squared 0.069 0.083 0.133 0.251 0.131 0.242 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The above regressions (linear probability models) include state, industry, 
and year fixed effects. The following covariates are included: age, female, nonwhite, years of education, job 
experience, part-time employment, and the natural log of the state unemployment rate. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. 
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS) ASEC 1990-2018. 
 
 
The table above reports individual-level regressions (linear probability models) with the outcomes: the 
probability a union-covered individual free rides, Pr($%&&%'(&%), the probability an individual is a union 
member, Pr(*&+,&%), and the probability an individual is covered by a union, Pr(./0&%&(). These are 
used in individual-level regressions in order to check the robustness of the state-level findings, using 
industry fixed effects (1234- 1534) in addition to state fixed effects (67) and year fixed effects (89).  
(4) Pr($%&&%'(&%) = <=>?@79 + B=C79 + D=E79 + 6=7 + 1=34 + 8=9 + F79  
(5) Pr(Covered) = <5>?@79 + B5C79 + D5E79 + 657 + 1534 + 859 + F79 







APPENDIX 1.2: SUPPELEMENTAL FIGURES FOR SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD 
Figure A-1.1: Treatment Effect of Wisconsin RTW: Public Sector Unionization 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows the gap 







Figure A-1.2: Treatment Effect of Wisconsin RTW: Public Sector Union Coverage 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows the gap 





Figure A-1.3: Comparison of Trends in Public Sector Unionization: Wisconsin vs. Ohio 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents trends in 







Figure A-1.4: Comparison of Trends in Public Sector Union Coverage: Wisconsin vs. Ohio 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents trends in 






Figure A-1.5: Treatment Effect of Wisconsin RTW: Private Sector Unionization 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows the gap 







Figure A-1.6: Treatment Effect of Wisconsin RTW: Private Sector Union Coverage 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure shows the gap 






Figure A-1.7: Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Public Sector Unionization Rate): RMSPE 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for 







Figure A-1.8: Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Public Sector Union Coverage Rate): RMSPE 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for 






Figure A-1.9: Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Private Sector Unionization Rate): RMSPE 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for 







Figure A-1.10: Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Private Sector Union Coverage Rate) 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for 






Figure A-1.11: In-Time Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Public Sector Unionization Rate) 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for  







Figure A-1.12: In-Time Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Public Sector Union Coverage Rate) 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for  






Figure A-1.13: In-Time Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Private Sector Unionization Rate) 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for  







Figure A-14: In-Time Placebo Testing (Wisconsin’s Private Sector Union Coverage Rate) 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for  






Figure A-1.15: Leave-One-Out Method for Public Sector Unionization Synthetic Control 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018.The figure presents results for 







Figure A-1.16: Leave-One-Out Method for Public Sector Union Coverage Synthetic Control 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for 






Figure A-1.17: Leave-One-Out Method for Private Sector Unionization Synthetic Control 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for 







Figure A-1.18: Leave-One-Out Method for Private Sector Union Coverage Synthetic Control 
 
Note: Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018. The figure presents results for 






APPENDIX 1.3: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Table A-1.4: Difference-in-Difference for Wisconsin's Public Sector 
Union Membership 
VARIABLES (A13) (A14) (A15) (A16) 
Treat 0.036** -0.048 0.065* -0.019 
  (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Post -0.003 0.039 0.037 0.024 
  (0.007) (0.031) (0.067) (0.064) 
Post*Treat -0.215*** -0.159** -0.198** -0.197** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.014) 
       
Observations 667 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.921 0.852 0.780 0.811 
Control All Donor States Minnesota Ohio Oregon 
Union Coverage 
VARIABLES (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) 
Treat 0.034*** -0.038** 0.045 -0.020 
  (0.012) (0.001) (0.010) (0.017) 
Post -0.079*** 0.051 0.048 0.017 
  (0.026) (0.034) (0.061) (0.070) 
Post*Treat -0.208*** -0.161** -0.194*** -0.180* 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.017) 
       
Observations 667 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.916 0.857 0.805 0.814 
Control All Donor States Minnesota Ohio Oregon 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors clustered at the state level. Covariates included: Percent 
female, African American, aged 45-65, working part-time, working in manufacturing, living in a 
metropolitan area; average years of education; average per capita income. Regressions with all donor states 
(A13 and A17) include a state fixed effect; all regressions include a year trend. 
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018.   
 
The above table shows Difference-in-Difference regressions, where Wisconsin is the treated state and the 
control is all states (A13 and A17) or the three states that consistently received a higher weight in 
Synthetic Control (Minnesota, A14 and A18; Ohio, A15 and A19; and Oregon, A16 and A20). The 
coefficient for Post*Treat is the estimated treatment effect of Wisconsin’s Act 10, which was associated 
with a 21.5 percentage point decline in public sector union membership and a 20.8 percentage point 
decline in public sector union coverage (using estimates from A13 and A17, both significant at the 99% 
level).  Baseline rates for union membership and coverage in Wisconsin were 46.5% and 49.9%, 






Table A-1.5: Difference-in-Difference for Wisconsin's Private Sector 
Union Membership 
VARIABLES (A21) (A22) (A23) (A24) 
Treat -0.018 -0.012 -0.010*** -0.012 
  (0.014) (0.011) (0.000) (0.009) 
Post 0.014*** 0.016 0.010 0.017* 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
Post*Treat -0.030*** -0.022* -0.014*** -0.034*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Observations 667 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.893 0.911 0.955 0.931 
Control All Donor States Minnesota Ohio Oregon 
Union Coverage 
VARIABLES (A25) (A26) (A27) (A28) 
Treat -0.024 -0.015 -0.011 -0.014 
  (0.016) (0.011) (0.004) (0.009) 
Post 0.016*** 0.017 0.011* 0.021 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) 
Post*Treat -0.032*** -0.023** -0.018* -0.039*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
       
Observations 667 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.885 0.914 0.954 0.917 
Control All Donor States Minnesota Ohio Oregon 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors clustered at the state level. Covariates included: Percent 
female, African American, aged 45-65, working part-time, working in manufacturing, living in a 
metropolitan area; average years of education; average per capita income. Regressions with all donor states 
(A21 and A25) include a state fixed effect; all regressions include a year trend. 
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS) ORGS 1990-2018.   
 
The above table shows Difference-in-Difference regressions, where Wisconsin is the treated state and the 
control is all states (A21 and A25) or the three states that consistently received a higher weight in 
Synthetic Control (Minnesota, A22 and A26; Ohio, A23 and A27; and Oregon, A24 and A28). The 
coefficient for Post*Treat is the estimated treatment effect of Wisconsin’s private sector RTW law, which 
was associated with a 3 percentage point decline in public sector union membership and a 3.2 percentage 
point decline in public sector union coverage (using estimates from A21 and A25, both significant at the 
99% level).  Baseline rates for union membership and coverage in Wisconsin were 42.3% and 40.8%, 
respectively;  as such, the legislation was associated with a reduction in membership of 42.3% and in 






APPENDIX 2.1: SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES 
Table A-2.1: The Effects of LAD-Level IB Reassessment Rates on Individual ESA Rate of Receipt 
(Table 7 with Covariates) 
VARIABLES (A-1) (A-2) (A-3) (A-4) (A-5) (A-6) 
              
IBRR (Population) 1.648**       
  (0.729)       
ESA Receipt (Population)  2.096**      
   (0.886)      
FFW (Population)   4.326     
    (3.227)     
IBRR (Caseload)    0.0857    
     (0.118)    
ESA Receipt (Caseload)     0.208*   
      (0.107)   
FFW (Caseload)      -0.194 
       (0.132) 
Highest Educational 
Qualification -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SF12PCS -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SF12MCS -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Has Child Under 4 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Unemployment Rate (GOR) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Logged Population (LAD) 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.014 0.013 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Logged Gross Value Added, 
LAD 0.101 0.100 0.018 -0.110 -0.067 -0.035 
  (0.328) (0.327) (0.328) (0.318) (0.320) (0.314) 
Social Exp. per Head (GOR) 0.066 0.054 0.086 0.048 0.044 0.081 
  (0.243) (0.244) (0.238) (0.241) (0.245) (0.245) 
Constant -0.828 -0.737 -0.621 0.115 -0.145 -0.382 
  (2.539) (2.546) (2.503) (2.538) (2.607) (2.590) 
         
Observations 12,227 12,227 12,227 12,227 12,227 12,227 
R-squared 0.733 0.733 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 
Standard Errors Clustered at the Local Authority District Level and at the Individual Level using STATA's 
reghdfe command. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Regressions include individual and year fixed effects. 






Table A-2.2:The Effects of LAD-Level IB Reassessment Rates on the Individual Likelihood of Employment 
         
VARIABLES (A-7) (A-8) (A-9) (A-10) (A-11) (A-12) 
        
IBRR (Population) -0.188      
  (0.756)      
ESA Receipt (Population)  -0.323     
   (0.883)     
FFW (Population)   0.971    
    (4.070)    
IBRR (Caseload)    0.130   
     (0.136)   
ESA Receipt (Caseload)     -0.0921  
      (0.129)  
FFW (Caseload)      0.229 
       (0.166) 
        
Observations 12,253 12,253 12,253 12,253 12,253 12,253 
R-squared 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889 
Standard Errors Clustered at the Local Authority District Level and at the Individual Level using STATA's reghdfe command. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 . Regressions 1-6 include individual and year fixed effects and also controlled for SF12PCS, SF12MCS, Highest Educational Qualification, 
Married, Has Child under 4, Unemployment (GOR-level), Gross Value Added (GOR-level), and Social Protection Expenditure per Head (GOR-level). 







Table A-2.3: The Effects of LAD-Level IB Reassessment Rates on Individual Likelihood of Non-
Participation in the Labor Force 
         
VARIABLES (A-13) (A-14) (A-15) (A-16) (A-17) (A-18) 
        
IBRR (Population) -0.474      
  (1.100)      
ESA Receipt (Population)  -0.463     
   (1.284)     
FFW (Population)   -3.689    
    (5.786)    
IBRR (Caseload)    -0.333**   
     (0.149)   
ESA Receipt (Caseload)     0.0358  
      (0.131)  
FFW (Caseload)      -0.466*** 
       (0.164) 
        
Observations 12,253 12,253 12,253 12,253 12,253 12,253 
R-squared 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.862 
Standard Errors Clustered at the Local Authority District Level and at the Individual Level using STATA's 
reghdfe command. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Regressions 1-6 include individual and year fixed 
effects and also controlled for SF12PCS, SF12MCS, Highest Educational Qualification, Married, Has Child 
under 4, Unemployment (GOR-level), Gross Value Added (GOR-level), and Social Protection Expenditure 
per Head (GOR-level). 







APPENDIX 3.1: OCCUPATIONS, SCHEDULING FLEXIBILITY, AND WAGE QUARTILE 
Table A-3.1: Occupations by Scheduling Flexibility and Wage Quartile (Counts in Parentheses) 
Wage Quartile 1 
High Flexible Low Flexible 
Retail Salespersons (431,337) 
Grounds Maintenance Workers (145,377) 
Personal Care Aides (123,028) 
Farmers, Ranchers, and Other Agricultural 
Managers (115,030) 
Agricultural workers, nec (108,445) 
Hairdressers, Hairstylists, and Cosmetologists 
(102,458) 
First-Line Supervisors of Food Preparation and 
Serving Workers (71,633) 
Recreation and Fitness Workers (51,551) 
Combined Food Preparation and Serving Workers, 
Including Fast Food (42,183) 
Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs (38,173) 
Host and Hostesses, Restaurant, Lounge, and Coffee 
Shop (34,907) 
Personal Appearance Workers, nec (31,578) 
Law enforcement workers, nec (27,654) 
Nonfarm Animal Caretakers (25,885) 
Bakers (24,288) 
Door-to-Door Sales Workers, News and Street 
Vendors, and Related Workers (22,322) 
Library Assistants, Clerical (16,917) 
Telemarketers (14,718) 
Personal Care and Service Workers, All Other 
(12,280) 
Residential Advisors (11,974) 
Food Batchmakers (10,925) 
Barbers (10,475) 
Tailors, Dressmakers, and Sewers (10,157) 
Library Technicians (7,873) 
Tour and Travel Guides (6,975) 
Photographic Process Workers and Processing 
Machine Operators (6,773) 
Models, Demonstrators, and Product Promoters 
(6,419) 
Animal Trainers (5,560) 
Shoe and Leather Workers and Repairers (1,496) 
Cashiers (406,598) 
Janitors and Building Cleaners (305,904) 
Chefs and Cooks (301,012) 
Laborers and Freight, Stock, and Material Movers, 
Hand (271,556) 
Nursing, Psychiatric, and Home Health Aides 
(262,476) 
Waiters and Waitresses (252,693) 
Stock Clerks and Order Fillers (195,618) 
Childcare Workers (173,108) 
Maids and Housekeeping Cleaners (170,985) 
Receptionists and Information Clerks (148,789) 
Teacher Assistants (143,999) 
Food Preparation Workers (100,582) 
Preschool and Kindergarten Teachers (75,789) 
Bank Tellers (56,200) 
Packers and Packagers, Hand (52,151) 
Bartenders (47,303) 
Food preparation and serving related workers, nec 
(41,456) 
Cleaners of Vehicles and Equipment (41,253) 
Dishwashers (34,769) 
Packaging and Filling Machine Operators and 
Tenders (32,746) 
Sewing Machine Operators (29,072) 
Counter Attendant, Cafeteria, Food Concession, and 
Coffee Shop (27,999) 
Laundry and Dry-Cleaning Workers (23,556) 
Entertainment Attendants and Related Workers, nec 
(23,240) 
Food Servers, Nonrestaurant (22,915) 
Hotel, Motel, and Resort Desk Clerks (17,124) 
Automotive and Watercraft Service Attendants 
(14,158) 
Counter and Rental Clerks (13,918) 
Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Mechanics, 
Installers, and Repairers, nec (10,436) 
Parking Lot Attendants (8,520) 
Helpers, Construction Trades (7,835) 
Pressers, Textile, Garment, and Related Materials 
(6,314) 
Graders and Sorters, Agricultural Products (6,170) 
Helpers--Production Workers (5,919) 
Crossing Guards (5,727) 
Ushers, Lobby Attendants, and Ticket Takers 
(5,113) 
Motor Vehicle Operators, All Other (4,615) 





Woodworking Machine Setters, Operators, and 
Tenders, Except Sawing (3,651) 
Helpers--Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
Workers (2,794) 
Textile Winding, Twisting, and Drawing Out 
Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders (2,109) 
Food Cooking Machine Operators and Tenders 
(1,443) 
Shoe Machine Operators and Tenders (456) 
 
Wage Quartile 2 
High Flexible Low Flexible 
Customer Service Representatives (306,123) 
Bookkeeping, Accounting, and Auditing Clerks 
(200,271) 
Carpenters (167,227) 
Food Service and Lodging Managers (129,563) 
Other Teachers and Instructors (112,971) 
Painters, Construction and Maintenance (66,246) 
Billing and Posting Clerks (64,940) 
Clergy (62,320) 
Data Entry Keyers (57,939) 
Word Processors and Typists (50,132) 
File Clerks (46,202) 
Athletes, Coaches, Umpires, and Related Workers 
(34,541) 
Other Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
Workers Including Wind Turbine Service 
Technicians, and Commercial Divers, and Signal 
and Track Switch Repairers (32,598) 
Payroll and Timekeeping Clerks (24,654) 
First-Line Supervisors of Landscaping, Lawn 
Service, and Groundskeeping Workers (23,055) 
Carpet, Floor, and Tile Installers and Finishers 
(21,464) 
Automotive Body and Related Repairers (20,568) 
Photographers (20,291) 
Massage Therapists (20,129) 
First-Line Supervisors of Personal Service Workers 
(18,544) 
Drywall Installers, Ceiling Tile Installers, and 
Tapers (18,441) 
Interviewers, Except Eligibility and Loan (17,926) 
Information and Record Clerks, All Other (13,876) 
Logging Workers (11,675) 
Medical, Dental, and Ophthalmic Laboratory 
Technicians (11,362) 
Religious Workers, nec (11,019) 
Travel Agents (10,507) 
Physical Therapist Assistants and Aides (10,483) 
Pest Control Workers (9,146) 
First-Line Supervisors of Farming, Fishing, and 
Forestry Workers (8,948) 
Secretaries and Administrative Assistants (533,218) 
Driver/Sales Workers and Truck Drivers (432,603) 
Construction Laborers (192,521) 
Office Clerks, General (166,077) 
Other production workers including semiconductor 
processors and cooling and freezing equipment 
operators (164,034) 
Assemblers and Fabricators, nec (134,689) 
Automotive Service Technicians and Mechanics 
(113,248) 
Security Guards and Gaming Surveillance Officers 
(111,524) 
Inspectors, Testers, Sorters, Samplers, and Weighers 
(106,254) 
Medical Assistants and Other Healthcare Support 
Occupations, nec (105,557) 
Welding, Soldering, and Brazing Workers (82,827) 
Shipping, Receiving, and Traffic Clerks (76,655) 
Bus and Ambulance Drivers and Attendants 
(73,930) 
Health Diagnosing and Treating Practitioner Support 
Technicians (70,419) 
Industrial Truck and Tractor Operators (67,930) 
Metal workers and plastic workers, nec (58,578) 
Insurance Claims and Policy Processing Clerks 
(45,219) 
Dispatchers (38,031) 
Dental Assistants (36,913) 
Bookbinders, Printing Machine Operators, and Job 
Printers (32,518) 
Couriers and Messengers (32,445) 
First-Line Supervisors of Housekeeping and 
Janitorial Workers (31,610) 
Butchers and Other Meat, Poultry, and Fish 
Processing Workers (31,592) 
Emergency Medical Technicians and Paramedics 
(25,761) 
Bill and Account Collectors (25,110) 
Roofers (23,265) 






Directors, Religious Activities and Education 
(8,467) 
Credit Authorizers, Checkers, and Clerks (6,780) 
Electronic Home Entertainment Equipment 
Installers and Repairers (6,251) 
Office Machine Operators, Except Computer (6,208) 
Coin, Vending, and Amusement Machine Servicers 
and Repairers (5,796) 
Fishing and hunting workers (5,748) 
Home Appliance Repairers (5,393) 
Upholsterers (5,255) 
Entertainers and Performers, Sports and Related 
Workers, All Other (5,099) 
Molders, Shapers, and Casters, Except Metal and 
Plastic (4,530) 
Fence Erectors (3,692) 
Locksmiths and Safe Repairers (3,574) 
Dancers and Choreographers (2,298) 
Forest and Conservation Workers (2,180) 
Paperhangers (747) 
Brickmasons, Blockmasons, and Stonemasons 
(20,424) 
Painting Workers and Dyers (20,242) 
Correspondent clerks and order clerks (20,094) 
Reservation and Transportation Ticket Agents and 
Travel Clerks (18,357) 
Medical Records and Health Information 
Technicians (17,511) 
Cutting, Punching, and Press Machine Setters, 
Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic (17,233) 
Highway Maintenance Workers (15,972) 
Parts Salespersons (15,663) 
Mail Clerks and Mail Machine Operators, Except 
Postal Service (13,494) 
Crushing, Grinding, Polishing, Mixing, and 
Blending Workers (12,595) 
Court, Municipal, and License Clerks (11,996) 
Refuse and Recyclable Material Collectors (11,605) 
Weighers, Measurers, Checkers, and Samplers, 
Recordkeeping (10,855) 
Cutting Workers (10,243) 
Extraction workers, nec (8,947) 
Baggage Porters, Bellhops, and Concierges (8,914) 
Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters (8,754) 
Cement Masons, Concrete Finishers, and Terrazzo 
Workers (8,622) 
Human Resources Assistants, Except Payroll and 
Timekeeping (8,150) 
Material moving workers, nec (7,636) 
Opticians, Dispensing (7,400) 
Molders and Molding Machine Setters, Operators, 
and Tenders, Metal and Plastic (7,094) 
Small Engine Mechanics (6,758) 
Construction workers, nec (6,747) 
Telephone Operators (6,141) 
Sawing Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, 
Wood (5,842) 
Prepress Technicians and Workers (5,669) 
Insulation Workers (5,305) 
Jewelers and Precious Stone and Metal Workers 
(5,224) 
Switchboard Operators, Including Answering 
Service (5,115) 
Meter Readers, Utilities (4,907) 
Extruding, Forming, Pressing, and Compacting 
Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders (4,650) 
Grinding, Lapping, Polishing, and Buffing Machine 
Tool Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and 
Plastic (4,495) 
Woodworkers including model makers and 
patternmakers, nec (4,419) 





Textile, Apparel, and Furnishings workers, nec 
(3,189) 
Furniture Finishers (2,286) 
Paving, Surfacing, and Tamping Equipment 
Operators (2,079) 
Proofreaders and Copy Markers (1,927) 
Recreational Therapists (1,885) 
Adhesive Bonding Machine Operators and Tenders 
(1,684) 
Textile Knitting and Weaving Machine Setters, 
Operators, and Tenders (1,679) 
Etchers, Engravers, and Lithographers (1,472) 
Plating and Coating Machine Setters, Operators, and 
Tenders, Metal and Plastic (1,423) 
Lathe and Turning Machine Tool Setters, Operators, 
and Tenders, Metal and Plastic (1,188) 
Drilling and Boring Machine Tool Setters, 
Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic (527) 
 
Wage Quartile 3 
High Flexible Low Flexible 
First-Line Supervisors of Sales Workers (577,917) 
First-Line Supervisors of Office and Administrative 
Support Workers (216,830) 
First-Line Supervisors of Construction Trades and 
Extraction Workers (130,493) 
Social Workers (128,771) 
Human Resources, Training, and Labor Relations 
Specialists (122,856) 
Designers (108,822) 
Real Estate Brokers and Sales Agents (103,681) 
Counselors (96,173) 
Insurance Sales Agents (73,604) 
Computer Support Specialists (71,979) 
Property, Real Estate, and Community Association 
Managers (68,967) 
Engineering Technicians, Except Drafters (59,545) 
Other Business Operations and Management 
Specialists (56,619) 
Paralegals and Legal Assistants (50,319) 
Social and Community Service Managers (48,176) 
Credit Counselors and Loan Officers (47,981) 
Production, Planning, and Expediting Clerks 
(43,217) 
Claims Adjusters, Appraisers, Examiners, and 
Investigators (40,519) 
Purchasing Agents, Except Wholesale, Retail, and 
Farm Products (38,243) 
Editors, News Analysts, Reporters, and 
Correspondents (36,316) 
Computer, Automated Teller, and Office Machine 
Repairers (33,556) 
Legal Support Workers, nec (29,738) 
Elementary and Middle School Teachers (534,214) 
First-Line Supervisors of Production and Operating 
Workers (141,200) 
Electricians (104,063) 
Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses 
(99,008) 
Office and administrative support workers, nec 
(79,881) 
Pipelayers, Plumbers, Pipefitters, and Steamfitters 
(71,670) 
Maintenance and Repair Workers, General (70,196) 
Sheriffs, Bailiffs, Correctional Officers, and Jailers 
(59,732) 
Industrial and Refractory Machinery Mechanics 
(59,013) 
Machinists (53,963) 
Construction equipment operators except paving, 
surfacing, and tamping equipment operators 
(53,684) 
Postal Service Mail Carriers (50,664) 
Heating, Air Conditioning, and Refrigeration 
Mechanics and Installers (47,690) 
Clinical Laboratory Technologists and Technicians 
(45,827) 
First-Line Supervisors of Mechanics, Installers, and 
Repairers (45,764) 
Bus and Truck Mechanics and Diesel Engine 
Specialists (43,500) 
Firefighters (39,771) 
Sales and Related Workers, All Other (35,801) 





Wholesale and Retail Buyers, Except Farm Products 
(29,659) 
Writers and Authors (27,716) 
Artists and Related Workers (27,552) 
Advertising Sales Agents (27,511) 
Community and Social Service Specialists, nec 
(26,723) 
Drafters (26,373) 
Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians, nec 
(26,111) 
Musicians, Singers, and Related Workers (22,635) 
Public Relations Specialists (19,178) 
Therapists, nec (19,143) 
Meeting and Convention Planners (18,904) 
Flight Attendants and Transportation Workers and 
Attendants (17,065) 
Appraisers and Assessors of Real Estate (14,440) 
Broadcast and Sound Engineering Technicians and 
Radio Operators, and media and communication 
equipment workers, all other (13,555) 
Logisticians (13,452) 
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations, 
nec (12,957) 
Dieticians and Nutritionists (12,779) 
Tax Preparers (11,857) 
Private Detectives and Investigators (11,027) 
Precision Instrument and Equipment Repairers 
(8,786) 
Tax Examiners and Collectors, and Revenue Agents 
(8,467) 
First-Line Supervisors of Gaming Workers (8,374) 
Financial Specialists, nec (8,285) 
Security and Fire Alarm Systems Installers (6,809) 
Archivists, Curators, and Museum Technicians 
(6,635) 
Television, Video, and Motion Picture Camera 
Operators and Editors (6,515) 
Social Scientists, nec (6,386) 
Surveyors, Cartographers, and Photogrammetrists 
(5,573) 
Agents and Business Managers of Artists, 
Performers, and Athletes (5,169) 
Agricultural and Food Scientists (4,469) 
Biological Technicians (3,233) 
Funeral Directors (2,916) 
Supervisors of Transportation and Material Moving 
Workers (32,623) 
Heavy Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Service 
Technicians and Mechanics (31,869) 
Transportation, Storage, and Distribution Managers 
(30,598) 
Librarians (27,974) 
Aircraft Mechanics and Service Technicians 
(25,312) 
Telecommunications Line Installers and Repairers 
(20,522) 
Postal Service Clerks (19,433) 
Computer Operators (19,119) 
Loan Interviewers and Clerks (18,261) 
Sheet Metal Workers, metal-working (17,219) 
Health Technologists and Technicians, nec (16,134) 
Construction and Building Inspectors (13,324) 
Gaming Services Workers (13,152) 
Stationary Engineers and Boiler Operators (13,110) 
Water Wastewater Treatment Plant and System 
Operators (12,968) 
Postal Service Mail Sorters, Processors, and 
Processing Machine Operators (12,127) 
Supervisors, Protective Service Workers, All Other 
(11,845) 
Media and Communication Workers, nec (11,825) 
Computer Control Programmers and Operators 
(11,136) 
Tool and Die Makers (10,547) 
Surveying and Mapping Technicians (10,541) 
Chemical Technicians (10,489) 
Eligibility Interviewers, Government Programs 
(10,202) 
Mining Machine Operators (9,391) 
First-Line Supervisors of Correctional Officers 
(8,927) 
Crane and Tower Operators (8,780) 
Structural Iron and Steel Workers (8,276) 
Chemical Processing Machine Setters, Operators, 
and Tenders (8,031) 
Dredge, Excavating, and Loading Machine 
Operators (6,466) 
Transportation Inspectors (6,454) 
Announcers (6,389) 
Ship and Boat Captains and Operators (5,830) 
Glaziers (5,479) 
Derrick, rotary drill, and service unit operators, and 
roustabouts, oil, gas, and mining (5,236) 
Maintenance Workers, Machinery (4,954) 
Agricultural and Food Science Technicians (4,829) 
Paper Goods Machine Setters, Operators, and 
Tenders (4,357) 





Electric Motor, Power Tool, and Related Repairers 
(4,145) 
Credit Analysts (4,038) 
Pumping Station Operators (4,018) 
Earth Drillers, Except Oil and Gas (3,928) 
Structural Metal Fabricators and Fitters (3,808) 
Hazardous Materials Removal Workers (3,733) 
Statistical Assistants (3,690) 
Metal Furnace Operators, Tenders, Pourers, and 
Casters (3,555) 
Control and Valve Installers and Repairers (2,886) 
Fire Inspectors (2,778) 
Gaming Managers (2,747) 
Engine and Other Machine Assemblers (2,407) 
Explosives Workers, Ordnance Handling Experts, 
and Blasters (2,404) 
Boilermakers (2,329) 
Electronic Equipment Installers and Repairers, 
Motor Vehicles (2,227) 
Furnace, Kiln, Oven, Drier, and Kettle Operators 
and Tenders (1,932) 
Conveyor operators and tenders, and hoist and 
winch operators (1,872) 
Rail-Track Laying and Maintenance Equipment 
Operators (1,617) 
Buyers and Purchasing Agents, Farm Products 
(1,521) 
Heat Treating Equipment Setters, Operators, and 
Tenders, Metal and Plastic (717) 
Railroad Brake, Signal, and Switch Operators (698) 
 
Wage Quartile 4 
High Flexible Low Flexible 
Managers, nec (including Postmasters) (482,322) 
Accountants and Auditors (284,334) 
Sales Representatives, Wholesale and 
Manufacturing (200,847) 
Postsecondary Teachers (194,161) 
Computer Scientists and Systems Analysts/Network 
systems Analysts/Web Developers (172,387) 
Chief executives and legislators/public 
administration (159,164) 
Financial Managers (155,048) 
Lawyers, and judges, magistrates, and other judicial 
workers (152,202) 
Managers in Marketing, Advertising, and Public 
Relations (137,566) 
Software Developers, Applications and Systems 
Software (134,466) 
General and Operations Managers (133,192) 
Education Administrators (127,354) 
Physicians and Surgeons (120,601) 
Constructions Managers (102,762) 
Registered Nurses (423,110) 
Secondary School Teachers (115,282) 
Police Officers and Detectives (112,936) 
Diagnostic Related Technologists and Technicians 
(45,565) 
Pharmacists (38,342) 
Radio and Telecommunications Equipment 
Installers and Repairers (25,281) 
Dental Hygienists (23,497) 
Speech Language Pathologists (19,712) 
First-Line Supervisors of Police and Detectives 
(17,491) 
Electrical Power-Line Installers and Repairers 
(17,048) 
Respiratory Therapists (15,029) 
Physician Assistants (14,264) 
First-Line Supervisors of Fire Fighting and 






Management Analysts (97,897) 
Sales Representatives, Services, All Other (83,864) 
Medical and Health Services Managers (82,918) 
Computer and Information Systems Managers 
(73,207) 
Engineers, nec (71,882) 
Computer Programmers (70,445) 
Human Resources Managers (64,108) 
Personal Financial Advisors (46,680) 
Civil Engineers (44,749) 
Securities, Commodities, and Financial Services 
Sales Agents (41,630) 
Industrial Production Managers (35,205) 
Mechanical Engineers (34,012) 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (32,613) 
Network and Computer Systems Administrators 
(32,355) 
Physical Therapists (30,008) 
Physical Scientists, nec (28,188) 
Purchasing Managers (27,839) 
Compliance Officers, Except Agriculture (27,820) 
Industrial Engineers, including Health and Safety 
(26,726) 
Architects, Except Naval (26,527) 
Psychologists (26,242) 
Aircraft Pilots and Flight Engineers (23,796) 
Actors, Producers, and Directors (23,744) 
Dentists (23,287) 
Architectural and Engineering Managers (22,408) 
Aerospace Engineers (19,302) 
Operations Research Analysts (18,473) 
Cost Estimators (17,810) 
Medical Scientists, and Life Scientists, All Other 
(17,741) 
Administrative Services Managers (17,372) 
Financial Analysts (15,788) 
Database Administrators (15,628) 
Education, Training, and Library Workers, nec 
(14,966) 
Insurance Underwriters (14,446) 
Occupational Therapists (13,942) 
Economists and market researchers (13,244) 
Chemists and Materials Scientists (12,626) 
Biological Scientists (12,297) 
Veterinarians (11,643) 
Environmental Scientists and Geoscientists (11,478) 
Technical Writers (8,889) 
Computer Hardware Engineers (8,612) 
Chemical Engineers (8,543) 
Chiropractors (7,978) 
Budget Analysts (7,242) 
Optometrists (5,402) 
Materials Engineers (5,016) 
Power Plant Operators, Distributors, and 
Dispatchers (7,630) 
Locomotive Engineers and Operators (7,223) 
Railroad Conductors and Yardmasters (7,143) 
Plant and System Operators, nec (6,432) 
Air Traffic Controllers and Airfield Operations 
Specialists (5,645) 
Elevator Installers and Repairers (3,552) 
Electrical and electronics repairers, transportation 
equipment, and industrial and utility (3,145) 





Environmental Engineers (4,706) 
Sales Engineers (4,641) 
Petroleum, mining and geological engineers, 
including mining safety engineers (4,553) 
Conservation Scientists and Foresters (4,345) 
Actuaries (3,608) 
Urban and Regional Planners (3,446) 
Audiologists (2,257) 







APPENDIX 3.2: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE MODELS WITH LOGGED MINIMUM WAGE LAGGED ONE YEAR 
Table A-3.2: P(Self-Employed) Difference in Difference (DD) Stratified by Wage Quartile and Flexible Occupations Using Logged Minimum 
Wage Lagged One Year 
 Full Wage Quartile Flexible 
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th High Low 
  (1) (4) (5) (6) (7) (16) (17) 
Self-Employed        
LagLog(min wage) -0.0014 0 -0.0042* -0.0045 0.001 0.0005 -0.0037** 
 (0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0025) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0018) 
        
  (2) (8) (9) (10) (11) (18) (19) 
Unincorporated Self-Employed        
LagLog(min wage) 0 0.0015 -0.0039 -0.0026 0.0035 0.0027 -0.0029* 
 (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0017) 
        
  (3) (12) (13) (14) (15) (20) (21) 
Incorporated Self-Employed        
LagLog(min wage) -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0008 
 (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0010) 
         
N 19,344,532 4,840,849 4,833,640 4,824,674 4,845,369 9,714,936 9,629,596 
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state by year linear time trends. Models are 
stratified separately by the median wage for each occupation (by quartile) and occupation's flexibility of work hours. Standard errors clustered by state 
are in parentheses.  







Table A-3.3: P(Self-Employed) Triple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Wage Using Logged Minimum 
Wage Lagged One Year 
  Wage Quartile: 
 Full 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
  (1) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Self-Employed      
Flexible×LagLog(min wage) -0.0474*** -0.0939*** -0.0247*** -0.0315** -0.0414*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0206) (0.0077) (0.0126) (0.0106) 
LagLog(min wage) 0.0228*** 0.0282*** 0.0039 0.0143 0.0355*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0092) (0.0037) (0.0095) (0.0075) 
Flexible 0.1880*** 0.3233*** 0.1506*** 0.1727*** 0.1673*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0407) (0.0145) (0.0214) (0.0183) 
      
  (2) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Unincorporated Self-Employed      
Flexible×LagLog(min wage) -0.0342*** -0.0888*** -0.0227*** (0.0181) -0.0216** 
 (0.0051) (0.0145) (0.0056) (0.0119) (0.0094) 
LagLog(min wage) 0.0174*** 0.0282*** 0.0037 0.0082 0.0214*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0061) (0.0043) (0.0088) (0.0069) 
Flexible 0.1233*** 0.2804*** 0.1191*** 0.0998*** 0.0806*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0305) (0.0102) (0.0199) (0.0159) 
      
  (3) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Incorporated Self-Employed      
Flexible×LagLog(min wage) -0.0132*** (0.0052) (0.0020) -0.0134*** -0.0198*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0079) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0036) 
LagLog(min wage) 0.0055** 0 0.0003 0.0061** 0.0140*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0037) 
Flexible 0.0648*** 0.0429*** 0.0315*** 0.0729*** 0.0867*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0142) (0.0086) (0.0067) (0.0079) 
       
N 19,344,532 4,840,849 4,833,640 4,824,674 4,845,369 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. Models are stratified by the median wage for each occupation (by quartile). 
Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 







Table A-3.4: P(Self-Employed) Triple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Flexible Occupations Using Logged Minimum Wage Lagged One Year 
 
Self-Employed Unincorporated  Self-Employed 
Incorporated  
Self-Employed 
Flexible: Full High Low Full High Low Full High Low 




0.0051 -0.0520** 0.0020 -0.0117* -0.0708*** (0.0020) 0.0168*** 0.0188** 0.0040*** 




0.0282*** 0.0193** 0.0060 0.0092*** (0.0021) (0.0001) 0.0191*** 0.0214*** 0.0061*** 




0.0247*** 0.0159** 0.0027 0.0129*** 0.0074 0.0011 0.0118*** 0.0084*** 0.0016 
 (0.0050) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0070) (0.0043) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0012) 
LagLog(min wage) -0.0160*** 0.0002 -0.0069 -0.0028 0.0111** -0.0023 -0.0132*** -0.0109** -0.0045*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0012) 
Wage Q1 0.0336* 0.2289*** 0.0483*** 0.0834*** 0.2681*** 0.0481*** -0.0498*** -0.0392** 0.0002 
 (0.0193) (0.0462) (0.0123) (0.0156) (0.0357) (0.0119) (0.0072) (0.0148) (0.0018) 
Wage Q2 -0.0383*** 0.0285* 0.0389*** 0.0138*** 0.0753*** 0.0341*** -0.0521*** -0.0468*** 0.0048 
 (0.0093) (0.0162) (0.0095) (0.0050) (0.0094) (0.0109) (0.0066) (0.0094) (0.0032) 
Wage Q3 -0.0431*** 0.0094 0.0149** (0.0081) 0.0255** 0.0106 -0.0350*** -0.0161*** 0.0043* 
 (0.0091) (0.0127) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0118) (0.0074) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0024) 
           
N 19,344,532 9,714,936 9,629,596 19,344,532 9,714,936 9,629,596 19,344,532 9,714,936 9,629,596 
          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state by year linear time trends. Models are 
stratified by the occupation's flexibility of work hours. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  







Table A-3.5: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDDD) Using Logged Minimum Wage 
Lagged One Year 
 
Self-Employed Unincorporated  Self-Employed 
Incorporated  
Self-Employed 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) -0.0551* -0.0699*** 0.0148 
 (0.0285) (0.0208) (0.0090) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) 0.0146 (0.0026) 0.0172*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0097) (0.0059) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) 0.0117*** 0.0049 0.0068*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0021) 
Wage Q1×LagLog(min wage) 0.0003 (0.0029) 0.0032*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0011) 
Wage Q2×LagLog(min wage) 0.0042 (0.0008) 0.0050*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0014) 
Wage Q3×LagLog(min wage) 0.0021 0.0010 0.0011 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0010) 
Flexible×LagLog(min wage) -0.0406*** -0.0213** -0.0193*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0095) (0.0038) 
Wage Q1×Flexible 0.1565*** 0.2062*** -0.0497*** 
 (0.0528) (0.0395) (0.0163) 
Wage Q2×Flexible (0.0178) 0.0394** -0.0572*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0170) (0.0102) 
Wage Q3×Flexible 0.0012 0.0199*** -0.0186*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0059) (0.0043) 
LagLog(min wage) 0.0190** 0.0163** 0.0027 
 (0.0072) (0.0079) (0.0026) 
Wage Q1 0.0631*** 0.0569*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0125) (0.0022) 
Wage Q2 0.0386*** 0.0334*** 0.0052* 
 (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0029) 
Wage Q3 0.0075 0.0064 0.0011 
 (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0022) 
Flexible 0.1684*** 0.0785*** 0.0899*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0160) (0.0084) 
    
N 19,344,532 19,344,532 19,344,532 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. Models are stratified by the occupation's flexibility of work hours. 
Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 








Table A-3.6: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Gender Using Logged 
Minimum Wage Lagged One Year 
Gender: Male Female 
  (1) (2) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) -0.0896** -0.0446** 
 (0.0369) (0.0212) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) (0.0080) 0.0203*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0049) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) 0.0105* -0.0050* 
 (0.0061) (0.0028) 
   
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.1236 0.0749 
   
N 10,014,779 9,329,753 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. The above models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, 
logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, flexibility and 
minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  







Table A-3.7: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Age Using Logged Minimum Wage Lagged One Year 
Age: 16 to 25 26 to 35 36 to 45 46 to 55 56 to 65 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) (0.0083) (0.0277) -0.0789** -0.1118** -0.0966* 
 (0.0081) (0.0189) (0.0376) (0.0459) (0.0522) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) (0.0038) (0.0049) 0.0011 0.0216 0.0689*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0112) (0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0209) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×LagLog(min wage) 0.0126*** 0.0188*** 0.0202*** 0.0007 (0.0033) 
 (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0056) (0.0074) (0.0086) 
      
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.0267 0.0662 0.1070 0.1267 0.1538 
       
N 2,787,839 3,916,816 4,448,078 4,918,543 3,273,256 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state by year linear time trends. The above 
models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, 
flexibility and minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  







Table A-3.8: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Education Using Logged 
Minimum Wage Lagged One Year 




College College College + 




0.0279 -0.0447* -0.0704*** -0.0776*** -0.0738*** 




0.0220 0.0213 (0.0002) 0.0116 0.1313*** 




0.0556* 0.0086 -0.0141** -0.0194** 0.0351*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0092) (0.0074)       
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.1026 0.1000 0.0912 0.1004 0.1163 
       
N 1,519,710 6,583,263 4,844,928 4,032,228 2,364,403 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. The above models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, 
logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, flexibility and 
minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 







APPENDIX 3.3: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE MODELS WITH LOGGED REAL 
MINIMUM WAGE (2007 BASE YEAR) 
Table A-3.9: P(Self-Employed) Triple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Wage, Using Logged Real Minimum 
Wage 
  Wage Quartile: 
 Full 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
  (1) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Self-Employed      
Flexible×log(real min wage) -0.0427*** -0.1708*** (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0088) 
 (0.0114) (0.0343) (0.0180) (0.0267) (0.0214) 
log(real min wage) 0.0191*** 0.0510*** -0.0059 0.0011 0.0043 
 (0.0061) (0.0137) (0.0058) (0.0175) (0.0179) 
Flexible 0.1782*** 0.4672*** 0.1069*** 0.1174** 0.1046*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0674) (0.0335) (0.0482) (0.0390) 
      
  (2) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Unincorporated Self-Employed      
Flexible×log(real min wage) -0.0295** -0.1519*** (0.0054) 0.0107 0.0031 
 (0.0120) (0.0236) (0.0119) (0.0264) (0.0205) 
log(min wage) 0.0120* 0.0431*** -0.0036 -0.0072 -0.0051 
 (0.0063) (0.0094) (0.0053) (0.0171) (0.0164) 
Flexible 0.1138*** 0.3984*** 0.0861*** 0.0450 0.0333 
 (0.0227) (0.0478) (0.0219) (0.0476) (0.0371) 
      
  (3) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Incorporated Self-Employed      
Flexible×log(real min wage) -0.0131* (0.0189) 0.0036 -0.0133** (0.0119) 
 (0.0075) (0.0157) (0.0123) (0.0063) (0.0080) 
log(real min wage) 0.0071* 0.0078 -0.0023 0.0083** 0.0094 
 (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0040) (0.0064) 
Flexible 0.0644*** 0.0689** 0.0208 0.0724*** 0.0713*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0292) (0.0226) (0.0127) (0.0157) 
       
N 19,516,316 4,880,963 4,879,313 4,869,222 4,886,818 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state 
by year linear time trends. Models are stratified by the median wage for each occupation (by quartile). Standard 
errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 






Table A-3.10: P(Self-Employed) Triple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Flexible Occupations Using Logged Real Minimum Wage 
 
Self-Employed Unincorporated  Self-Employed 
Incorporated  
Self-Employed 
Flexible: Full High Low Full High Low Full High Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Wage Q1×log(real 
min wage) (0.0224) -0.1360*** 0.0226* -0.0337*** -0.1410*** 0.0146 0.0112 0.0050 0.0080*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0365) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0265) (0.0130) (0.0069) (0.0144) (0.0015) 
Wage Q2×log(real 
min wage) 0.0184 0.0200 0.0062 0.0002 (0.0039) (0.0007) 0.0182** 0.0239* 0.0069* 
 (0.0125) (0.0221) (0.0107) (0.0058) (0.0114) (0.0132) (0.0079) (0.0128) (0.0041) 
Wage Q3×log(real 
min wage) 0.0347*** 0.0291** 0.0136* 0.0205** 0.0205 0.0075 0.0142*** 0.0086** 0.0061* 
 (0.0090) (0.0144) (0.0068) (0.0086) (0.0145) (0.0087) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0031) 
log(real min wage) -0.0105* 0.0047 -0.0148 0 0.0117* -0.0088 -0.0105** -0.007 -0.0059*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0082) (0.0099) (0.0039) (0.0059) (0.0113) (0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0022) 
Wage Q1 0.0860*** 0.3873*** 0.0092 0.1248*** 0.3998*** 0.0166 -0.0389*** (0.0125) -0.0073** 
 (0.0304) (0.0719) (0.0236) (0.0241) (0.0540) (0.0238) (0.0131) (0.0265) (0.0030) 
Wage Q2 (0.0192) 0.0275 0.0386* 0.0309*** 0.0786*** 0.0352 -0.0502*** -0.0511** 0.0034 
 (0.0230) (0.0405) (0.0197) (0.0109) (0.0212) (0.0242) (0.0145) (0.0232) (0.0074) 
Wage Q3 -0.0618*** (0.0156) (0.0057) (0.0224) 0.0007 (0.0015) -0.0394*** -0.0163** (0.0042) 
 (0.0168) (0.0264) (0.0123) (0.0155) (0.0261) (0.0156) (0.0075) (0.0080) (0.0060) 
           
N 19,516,316 9,800,881 9,715,435 19,516,316 9,800,881 9,715,435 19,516,316 9,800,881 9,715,435 
          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state by year linear time trends. Models are 
stratified by the occupation's flexibility of work hours. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  







Table A-3.11: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Gender Using Logged Real 
Minimum Wage 
 
Self-Employed Unincorporated  Self-Employed 
Incorporated  
Self-Employed 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×log(real min wage) -0.1655*** -0.1604*** (0.0051) 
 (0.0482) (0.0352) (0.0157) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×log(real min wage) 0.0061 (0.0098) 0.0159 
 (0.0354) (0.0228) (0.0134) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×log(real min wage) 0.0094 0.0085 0.0009 
 (0.0080) (0.0064) (0.0044) 
Wage Q1×log(real min wage) 0.0247 0.0155 0.0092*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0144) (0.0019) 
Wage Q2×log(real min wage) 0.0120 0.0029 0.0091*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0151) (0.0031) 
Wage Q3×log(real min wage) 0.0166* 0.0094 0.0072*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0100) (0.0022) 
Flexible×log(real min wage) (0.0082) 0.0047 (0.0128) 
 (0.0224) (0.0211) (0.0083) 
Wage Q1×Flexible 0.3649*** 0.3764*** (0.0115) 
 (0.0904) (0.0670) (0.0289) 
Wage Q2×Flexible (0.0011) 0.0532 -0.0543** 
 (0.0642) (0.0416) (0.0243) 
Wage Q3×Flexible 0.0060 0.0132 (0.0072) 
 (0.0157) (0.0122) (0.0084) 
log(real min wage) -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.0152) (0.0170) (0.0045) 
Wage Q1 0.0169 0.0220 (0.0051) 
 (0.0284) (0.0260) (0.0036) 
Wage Q2 0.0237 0.0263 (0.0026) 
 (0.0259) (0.0272) (0.0058) 
Wage Q3 (0.0201) (0.0097) -0.0104** 
 (0.0164) (0.0179) (0.0043) 
Flexible 0.1061** 0.0288 0.0773*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0381) (0.0165) 
    
N 19,516,316 19,516,316 19,516,316 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and state 
by year linear time trends. Models are stratified by the occupation's flexibility of work hours. Standard errors 
clustered by state are in parentheses. 








Table A-3.12: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Gender Using Logged 
Real Minimum Wage 
Gender: Male Female 
  (1) (2) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×log(real min wage) -0.2232*** -0.1261*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0331) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×log(real min wage) (0.0278) 0.0242** 
 (0.0624) (0.0108) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×log(real min wage) 0.0123 (0.0094) 
 (0.0132) (0.0060) 
   
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.1236 0.0749 
   
N 10,104,847 9,411,469 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. The above models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, 
logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, flexibility and 
minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  








Table A-3.13: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Age Using Logged Real 
Minimum Wage 
Age: 16 to 25 26 to 35 36 to 45 46 to 55 56 to 65 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (2) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×log(real 
min wage) -0.0385*** -0.1125*** -0.1974*** -0.2639*** -0.2611*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0279) (0.0621) (0.0788) (0.0897) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×log(real 
min wage) (0.0048) 0.0018 0.0087 0.0201 0.0533 
 (0.0145) (0.0279) (0.0364) (0.0350) (0.0441) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×log(real 
min wage) 0.0119* 0.0229*** 0.0260** 0.0042 (0.0030) 
 (0.0070) (0.0078) (0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0156) 
      
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.0267 0.0662 0.1071 0.1267 0.1539 
       
N 2,814,466 3,955,927 4,495,814 4,958,321 3,291,788 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. The above models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, 
logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, flexibility and 
minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.  









Table A-3.14: P(Self-Employed) Quadruple Difference (DDD) Stratified by Education Using Logged 
Real Minimum Wage 
Education: < High School High  School 
Some 
College College College + 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (2) 
Wage Q1×Flexible×log(real 
min wage) (0.0472) -0.1577*** -0.1624*** -0.1715*** -0.1682*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0391) (0.0422) (0.0485) (0.0448) 
Wage Q2×Flexible×log(real 
min wage) (0.0029) (0.0067) (0.0010) 0.0314 0.1831*** 
 (0.0558) (0.0402) (0.0405) (0.0197) (0.0276) 
Wage Q3×Flexible×log(real 
min wage) 0.0839* (0.0141) -0.0257** (0.0185) 0.0410** 
 (0.0439) (0.0093) (0.0114) (0.0220) (0.0187) 
      
Prob(Self-Employed) 0.1026 0.1000 0.0912 0.1004 0.1164 
       
N 1,536,084 6,646,864 4,885,600 4,065,266 2,382,502 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Models include indicators for gender, education, age, state, and year and 
state by year linear time trends. The above models also include occupational flexibility, wage quartile, 
logged minimum wage, and interaction terms between wage quartile and minimum wage, flexibility and 
minimum wage, and wage quartile and flexibility. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. 
Source: U.S. Census American Community Survey 2001 - 2017, Neumark (2019). 
 
